298. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Marcy) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Jones)0
SUBJECT
- Freedom of Elections in Iran1
REF
- Our Conversation of August 19, 19602
Although the electorate was subject to severe property and educational qualifications, the first two Parliaments following the Constitutional Revolution were freely and honestly elected. Following 1912, the system broke down and in the confusion during and following World War I, elections became subject to local official whims or the desires of invading armies. Reza Shah, while rigidly respecting the etiquette of popular government, controlled the elections with an iron hand, though he did usually select people with some standing in their communities. The Fifteenth Majlis was elected in comparative freedom over most of Iran with adult male suffrage, but at this time one could see a deadly pattern emerging: reactionary landlords being elected by hordes of their own peasants in the country, and demagogues swaying the city masses. In addition, these elections were marked by strong-arm tactics, beatings, and stealing of ballot boxes by various official and non-official groups.
The Sixteenth Majlis elections were rigged by Prime Minister Qavam to insure that all successful candidates would be friendly to him. He made each aspirant swear a personal oath of loyalty to him. (These loyal retainers, upon the inspiration of the Shah, voted no confidence in Qavam two months after their election.
[Page 697]The elections for the Seventeenth Majlis were held by Mosadeq, with Saleh as Interior Minister. They were relatively free, though there was some rough stuff in Tehran. Mosadeq’s supporters swept the cities, where the first balloting occurred, but Mosadeq’s landlord enemies were winning the country seats when the old man cancelled the elections, leaving only a rump Majlis of city and town representatives.
The Eighteenth Majlis was selected, not elected, about half by Zahedi and half by the Shah. It was understood that the elections would not be free.
The Nineteenth Majlis was handpicked, every one, by the Shah. The Nineteenth Majlis, even more than those of Reza Shah, abased itself continually before the Shah.
The Shah had hinted for a long time that he would let the two tame “Parties” fight the Twentieth Majlis elections between themselves. After the events in Turkey, he voluntarily and without prompting spoke to the Parliament, to the press, and to the nation over the radio repeatedly to the effect that the Twentieth Majlis elections would be genuinely free, and urging the public to vote. The Prime Minister repeatedly confirmed these assurances.
Many politically-conscious Iranians did not believe a word of it, but some apparently believed that the elections would be free between the two parties, while others hoped that independents, both rightist and leftist, would be allowed to run. No one expected that communists would be allowed to participate. Therefore, a large number of relatively influential people decided to contest the elections, either as independents or under a party label, who would otherwise never have bothered to run because the elections would be considered rigged.
When the elections turned out to be rigged as thoroughly as before, two results followed which will be detrimental to the stability of the regime:
- (a)
- The Shah has been publicly exposed as a prevaricator or as being incredibly badly informed regarding the activities of his own government—to believe that the Shah would repeatedly and seriously deceive his people will be a great shock to many persons who would normally be strong supporters of the regime.
- (b)
- Several hundred influential persons attempted to contest Majlis seats who would not have done so had they not, from official assurances, believed or hoped that the elections would be free to some extent—these persons have now lost “face” and feel personally deceived and put upon by the regime.
We had hoped that the Shah might, by allowing limited freedom in the elections, have made progress toward some system of party responsibility which would give him a measure of freedom from direct responsibility for the administration, and that further he might be able to entice [Page 698] moderate independents into a “loyal opposition” role rather than driving them toward extremism. Both these hopes have been dashed by the conduct of the elections.
In summary, although we do not feel that free elections would be any kind of answer to Iran’s problems, we did hope that use of the elections to increase confidence and a sense of participation by moderate elements now critical of the regime would reduce existing internal pressures.
The elections were not less free than those of the past two Majlises, but because of wide expectations that more freedom would be allowed and hence greater interest, there were widespread cases of conflict between central government offices and between central and provincial officials as to just how and for whom the rigging would be accomplished, leading to more excitement than in the past two elections.3
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.00/8–2560. Confidential. Drafted by Bowling. Jones wrote “Most interesting” on the memorandum and apparently sent it to Herter and Henderson.↩
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At the 457th Meeting of the NSC, August 25, a brief report on Iran was included in the usual intelligence briefing:
“Mr. Dulles expressed concern over the ‘rigging’ of the parliamentary elections in Iran. He said events in Korea and Turkey had indicated that fixed elections can produce dangerous repercussions. The aftermath of the Iranian elections has produced an undercurrent of opposition to the Shah. The opponents of the Shah may take advantage of his forthcoming absence from the country for a trip to Europe to stage a coup d’état.” (Memorandum of discussion by Boggs, August 25; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)
↩ - No record of this conversation has been found.↩
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On September 24, the Embassy in Tehran sent despatch 150 to the Department. The summary of this 14-page analysis of the 1960 Majlis elections reads:
“The 1960 Iranian Majlis elections were a fiasco. They were characterized by blatant rigging on the one hand and repeated assurances by the Shah of ‘Freedom’ on the other. In order to retrieve some of his lost prestige the Shah was forced to take steps voiding them even before they were completed. In retrospect the biggest mistake of the regime appears as the Shah’s promise of ‘Free Elections’ at a time and under circumstances when the regime cannot afford to have an uncontrolled Majlis. This unfulfilled promise had three main effects: 1) It stimulated more and hotter political activity than probably otherwise there would have been; 2) it necessitated more blatant and cruder rigging than would otherwise have been required; 3) it remains to haunt the regime through the next elections which, by the regime’s requirements, must at one and the same time be more ‘free’ than the last and yet produce a moderately-controlled Majlis.
“The Shah by his action in voiding the elections has regained some prestige and gained some time; considering the problems facing him, he needs both.” (Department of State, Central Files, 788.00/9–2460)
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