Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XII

297. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State⁰

Tehran, August 18, 1960, 5 p.m.

417. For Hugh Cumming and Lewis Jones. [2 lines of source text not declassified] reporting Baktiar’s comments that present policies of Shah and Government are leading Iran toward revolution, and that Baktiar expects Shah will flee to Europe in near future as he becomes increasingly aware situation getting out of his control. Following are my comments.

1. I believe there no doubt Baktiar at present fed up with his job, especially requirements placed upon him by Shah in connection with elections. For some time Baktiar has made clear [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] his extreme distaste for rigging procedures which Savak has been obliged to carry out at Shah’s orders in order to insure victory of Melliyun majority. Baktiar probably now being affected by numerous bitter comments his agents picking up re rigged elections and by blame likely being placed by public upon Savak and Baktiar personals for measures taken to achieve rigged results. Seems no doubt that Shah has not paid any attention to Baktiar’s conviction that these irregular procedures politically unwise. Thus, it is likely Baktiar currently in depressed mood.

2. Re remark that Iran is heading for revolution, not clear whether Baktiar bases this on political factors such as elections or on deteriorating economic situation. We have no evidence of any civilian or military revolutionary planning arising from political discontent, although it of course possible that such activity could be taking place without our knowledge. It is too early to judge whether discontent with conduct of elections, when added to existing unhappiness arising from political and economic causes, will provide sufficient stimulus to convert current verbal complaints and opposition to regime into direct action against regime. Remains to be seen whether, when elections are over and turmoil they are now stirring up has died down, things will not return to usual pattern of complaint and criticism without direct action. Additionally on political side, it should not be forgotten that last fall there were indications that General Baktiar himself was sympathetic to idea of action which would place him at head of Iranian Government. This should be borne in mind in context Baktiar’s reported feeling contingency planning must be further perfected, and his desire become chief of ground forces.

3. If Baktiar’s remarks based on economic considerations, we believe such pessimism not wholly justified over the short run. He, as layman, probably does not realize that countries, particularly undeveloped countries, can survive long time even with very bad economic situation. In any case, at time of reported conversation, prospects for economic stabilization looked dim but in last days have bettered considerably (see Embtel 412).¹

4. With regard to possibility Shah’s fleeing to Europe, on recent occasions when I have seen him I have detected no lack of confidence on his part nor feeling situation getting out of his control. On contrary, he has seemed almost over-confident he has matters in hand and that no serious trouble will arise from elections. This in itself does not indicate Shah not planning to flee, as I believe he is consummate actor, but I find it difficult believe that Shah thinks situation here now so much worse than it has been for some time that he losing control. If serious rioting broke out as result of elections or if country came on verge economic collapse, Shah might indeed flee, but if no trouble arises as result of elections and if stabilization plan put into effect and funds from IMF and DLF received, it seems likely political and economic situations here will rock along for some time to come. I believe, there is no doubt that Shah finds burden of running Iran sometimes almost too much for him and would at times welcome becoming private citizen. I do not believe, however, that this feeling in itself would cause him to flee.

With regard alleged conversion royal property into hard currency, this not first time report has been heard [2 lines of source text not declassified]. Reported lack interest by Shah in domestic investment not necessarily indication of intent leave country.

In short, while one can never be certain that will happen in country like this and it impossible to know what is going on in Shah’s mind, I believe it more likely Baktiar’s assertions re Shah’s plans may arise more from his own current state of depression and possibly from plans of his own, rather than from solid indications of likelihood Shah will soon depart country. Latter possibility cannot be discounted, however, and developing political and economic situations will have important bearing on this question. Certainly present messy election situation has left bad taste and damaged Shah’s prestige in country.

[1 line of source text not declassified]

Wailes

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.00/8–1860. Top Secret; Priority; [distribution indicator not declassified].
1. In telegram 412, August 18, the Embassy reported that the Shah and Iranian Finance Minister Zarqam had evidently become convinced that cuts in the year’s central government budget were necessary if the Plan Organization was to continue and drastic cuts in private credit were to be avoided. In addition, the Embassy learned that Iran would soon agree to IMF proposals although the Embassy was unaware of what they were. (Ibid., 888.13/8–1860)