25. Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting0

[Here follows a list of participants.]

Mid East Situation—Sec. Dulles first recounted a statement by Stalin in 1924 to the effect that the Communist road to victory over the West lies in nationalism among the peoples of Asia and Africa.1 He then noted three things inherently advantageous to the Communists, or disadvantages to the Free World, as regards the Mid East: (1) the fact that the existence of Israel has served as a stimulant to Arab nationalism, especially since the Russians in 1955 [1952] switched from supporting Israel to direct aid to the Arabs; (2) the existence of anti-Western feeling which Russians can exploit but we cannot in view of the interests we and our allies have there; and (3) the effective demagoguery of Nasser is something the Russians encourage and exploit, whereas we in good conscience cannot do so.

Although the United States tried for a time to work with Nasser, said the Secretary, it became impossible to do so once Egypt accepted Russian arms in large quantity.

The Secretary called attention to the publication by us recently of approximately 125 specific acts by Syria to aid the rebels in Lebanon during the two months of what was originally a non-serious internal difference. This activity was considerably reduced following Hammarskjold’s discussion with Nasser and the establishment of the UN observation team. Consequently, and since the team is very limited in size, it has not reported any evidence of further Syrian activity.

Sec. Dulles told how President Chamoun had some weeks ago sounded out what would be the US response to a request for assistance, and he was informed by us that aid would be forthcoming in any desperate situation. Prior to the Iraq coup it appeared that Chamoun would not have to request aid. The coup, however, frightened President Chamoun and Hussein as to their own positions and they called on the United States and the United Kingdom for assistance in sustaining their governments.

The President’s decision to send aid, Mr. Dulles said, was not made under any illusion it would solve the problem; rather, it resulted from the awareness that failure to act would cause many other small nations to mistrust US policy and they would not be able to count on US [Page 80] assistance in time of crisis, hence they would be less willing to make a firm stand for freedom.

Mr. Dulles said that, although the United States went immediately to the Security Council to ask for a stronger UN force in Lebanon so that we might withdraw, the UN outcome is uncertain particularly because many nations have not accepted the fact of Syrian intrigue and look upon the Lebanon struggle as an internal one in which outside nations should not intervene. Mr. Dulles cited specific instances of intrigue originating in Cairo.

In estimating the seriousness of the situation, Sec. Dulles said that one must estimate the relative power of the United States and Russia as a basis for estimating whether Russia would take steps likely to lead to war. He stated that our present estimate is that the United States is now in a very strong position, perhaps stronger than in years to come when Russia has operational missiles.

Regarding the Baghdad Pact, Sec. Dulles recalled that the United States had not favored Iraqi membership in the Pact, hence the United States had not joined in it. He believed that the strain placed upon the Iraqi Government by membership in the Pact may have considerably contributed to that government’s downfall. He did not see much chance of retrieving the Iraqi situation since there appeared to be very few troops or people loyal to the old government.

Mr. Dulles then directed attention to oil resources, concerning which he believed there would be no problem so long as alternative resources are held in Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Iraq would need oil revenues. He indicated also that none of the threats against pipelines crossing unfriendly area have been carried out. He stated that the Subcommittee on oil is keeping abreast of the situation.

In response to Secretaries Benson, Weeks and Anderson, Mr. Dulles noted that India stands opposed to our action whereas Pakistan supports it, that Secretary General Hammarskjold had been unable to persuade the Swedish Government to alter its policy to one of support for us, that the Baghdad Pact was not constituted in such a way that it could properly intervene to retrieve the Iraq situation. Mr. Anderson was most concerned with the rapidity of the coup and the absence of indications in advance of its happening. He also felt that other nations would be concerned with this and would be very worried as to their own future after US troops leave the area.

The President felt that our major effort must be one of getting our whole propaganda effort into a stronger position, which would require [Page 81] much money2 and a larger mutual security program. In the meantime, he believed Turkey and Iran must be strengthened, as also Lebanon and Jordan and perhaps also Libya, Tunis, and the Sudan. He repeated his emphasis on the need for money for the Mutual Security Program so as to get on with the job of rehabilitating our position in the area.

Mr. Allen Dulles recalled that the CIA had pinpointed more than a year ago the movement against the Iraq Government and had warned last March about the precarious situation in Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, that the President had directed an intensive review be made but that it was almost impossible to predict the exact timing of any coup. He mentioned several happenings which had probably served to trigger the coup earlier than planned.

[Here follows a briefing on the state of the economy.]

LAM
  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Cabinet Series. Confidential. Drafted by L. Arthur Minnich, Jr. Attached, but not printed, was a text of Dulles’ remarks, classified Top Secret.
  2. Stalin’s lecture on the “Foundations of Leninism.”
  3. In a July 22 personal and confidential letter to George Humphrey, Eisenhower reiterated his belief that Nasser and the Soviet Union were winning the propaganda war in the Middle East:

    “The basic reason for our Mid East troubles is Nasser’s capture of Arab loyalty and enthusiasm throughout the region. Foster and I have long struggled with the Congress to get the kind of propaganda campaign established in that area that could counteract anti-Western sentiment as it now pours out of the Cairo—and Soviet—radios. We have never been able to get the money to do a good job, though today we are probably spending more by the month to solve this crisis than it would have cost us by the year to have been more effective in preventing it.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries)