Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XII

223. Paper Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board⁰

Washington, December 14, 1960.

OPERATIONS PLAN FOR IRAQ

I. Objectives

1. Following are the objectives of U.S. policy in the Near Eastern area:

a. As of paramount importance, continued denial of the area to Soviet domination.

b. Continued availability of sufficient Near Eastern oil to meet vital Western European requirements on reasonable terms.

c. Peaceful resolution as early as possible, in whole or in part, of the Arab-Israeli dispute.

d. Continued availability to the United States and its allies of rights of peaceful passage through and intercourse with the area in accordance with international law and custom and existing international agreements.

e. Political evolution and economic and social development in the area to promote stable governments, popularly supported and resistant to Communist influence and subversion.

f. Continued availability to the United States and its allies of important strategic positions, including military overflight, staging and base rights in the area.

g. The expansion of U.S. and, where appropriate, Free World influence in the area, and the countering and reduction of Communist influence.

2. The need for achieving all the foregoing objectives has been taken into consideration in determination of U.S. courses of action for Iraq although paragraphs (d) and (f) are of relatively less significance than the other objectives.

II. Operational Guidance

US-Iraq Relations

3. Notwithstanding the extended period of outward political calm, we continue to be confronted in Iraq with a basically unstable political situation in which violent changes are an ever present possibility. The principal recent developments and current factors which have significant bearing on U.S. policy objectives in the area are: the pronounced polarization of the country into a well-organized and highly vocal Communist minority and a strongly anti-Communist but faction-ridden majority; the widespread loss of respect and popular support for Qassim; public and official disenchantment with Soviet Bloc economic and technical assistance activities, which has been at least partially offset by new Soviet initiatives and corrective efforts; some improvement in Iraq-UAR relations, partial resumption of relations between Iraq and Jordan, and the return of Iraq to Arab League councils; continued harmonious relations with Turkey and more tranquil relations with Iran, despite the lack of basic progress on the Shatt-al-Arab dispute; continued sluggishness in Iraq’s economy and the absence of any real progress in economic development. Iraq continues to depend on the predominantly British Iraq Petroleum Company for development and exploitation of petroleum resources but has taken greater initiative in petroleum matters in the face of recent price cuts and is currently pressing for revisions in the existing concession agreement.

4. While the scope of U.S. initiatives to improve U.S.-Iraq relations or strengthen the Western position with Iraq remains limited, there has been a quiet but nonetheless significant improvement in U.S.-Iraq relations during the current year. While we continue to labor under the disabilities resulting from our position on the Arab-Israeli and Algerian issues, Qasim himself has stated we are “no longer hated” in Iraq. Despite continuing efforts by the pro-Communist minority to keep alive Iraq mistrust of U.S. “imperialism”, suspicion regarding our motives in Iraq has abated in the absence of any action on our part to which our enemies could convincingly point as evidence of hostile U.S. intentions. Despite continued security surveillance of the Embassy compound (and, on occasion, of Embassy officers) there is no unusual interference in normal operations of the Mission, and the USIS is now permitted to conduct a modest cultural and informational program. The ICA participant training program, under which substantial numbers of Iraqi government officials and employees are being sent to the United States and third countries for specialized training, is functioning with growing effectiveness and public acceptance.

Guidance

5. The U.S. should continue efforts to develop firm but friendly relations with the Iraq Government. We should conduct our relations with Iraq in a normal and friendly way, ceremoniously as well as substantively.

6. As Iraqi suspicions continue to diminish, we should make every effort to develop contacts, both official and unofficial, with personalities of the regime and other individuals of potential political importance.

7. If Iraq requests U.S. cooperation in constructive programs, U.S. agencies should be prepared to give prompt and friendly consideration in the light of the then existing situation and outlook in Iraq.

8. Our information program should emphasize those activities most conducive to restoring the confidence of the Iraqi Government and people in the U.S. USIS should concentrate on personal contacts and cultural activities, particularly English-teaching and exchange of persons programs. The USIS effort should be discreet and unostentatious. Upon signature of the recently negotiated Cultural Agreement (or sooner, if signature is long delayed¹) USIS should activate its Baghdad library, and expand appropriate informational activities.

9. Should shifts in the internal power structure in Iraq take place bringing into existence a regime seeking closer relations with the Free World, the U.S. should be prepared promptly to support it and to take advantage of this opportunity to strengthen its position in the area.

Iraq-Soviet Relations

10. Soviet Bloc efforts in the propaganda field are assisted by the existence of a number of Communist and pro-Communist newspapers and by Communist infiltration in the Ministry of Guidance and Broadcasting and the Ministry of Education. On the other hand, there has been a growing chorus of criticism of Soviet Bloc policies and of international Communism in the nationalist press. Despite growing Iraqi doubts about the disinterestedness of Soviet Bloc military and economic assistance, Qasim recently decided to accept supplemental Soviet assistance for the rehabilitation of the Basra-Baghdad railway, and there are reports that Iraq will also receive additional Soviet military equipment, including MIG 19 aircraft. Iraq has also concluded an aid agreement with Czechoslovakia. The well-organized (but still unlicensed) hardcore Communist Party has made effective use of the relative freedom of action which has been permitted to it, and in terms of leadership, organization and capacity for street action in Baghdad is unrivaled by any nationalist group with the possible exception of the (also unlicensed) Baath Party. Despite some changes in personnel of the Ministry of Guidance and Broadcasting, Baghdad Radio and TV still tend to favor the Communist point of view. The Communists still control most of the “popular” organizations and many of the professional associations. Although the Iraqi Federation of Labor belongs to the Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions, the Communists have lost control of a large number of Iraqi trade unions in recent elections conducted under the watchful (and distinctly anti-Communist) eye of the Iraqi administrative and security establishments.

Guidance

11. We should use every appropriate opportunity to bring home to Iraqi leaders and people the threat posed by international Communism to the goals of independence, neutrality, and national dignity which the Iraqi regime has set for itself.

12. As much information as possible should be obtained on the details of the Soviet economic thrust in Iraq. Whenever possible, such information should be turned to the advantage of the U.S. and other free world states, and to Soviet Bloc disadvantage.

13. To counterbalance the effects of Iraqi labor’s affiliation with the WFTU, the U.S. should develop friendly relations with the Iraqi Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor. The UN’s International Labor Organization should be encouraged to revive its labor mission in Baghdad.

Iraq’s Relations with States in the Area

14. While Qasim remains highly suspicious and jealous of Nasser and extremely sensitive to UAR propaganda attacks and support of Iraqi political émigrés tensions between Iraq and the UAR have diminished. This appears to have been furthered by the Arab League Foreign Ministers conference held in Lebanon in August 1960. The subsequent discontinuing of the “Voice of Free Iraq” clandestine broadcasts from the Syrian region removed an important source of irritation to Qasim. Qasim for his part has desisted from his earlier public invitations to the Syrians to dissolve their union with Egypt and associate themselves with Iraq. Qasim nevertheless remains apprehensive of Nasser’s longer range pan-Arab ambitions and envious of Nasser’s popularity and prestige.

15. Common dislike of Nasser by Qasim and Bourguiba continues to be the basis of cordial relations between Iraq and Tunisia. Iraq is also wooing Morocco in various ways and taking every opportunity to cement its relations with Lebanon in the interest of offsetting UAR influence there.

16. King Hussein’s and Qasim’s common suspicion and fear of Nasser have contributed to an improvement of relations between Iraq and Jordan. Recent negotiations between representatives of the two governments led in September to a Jordanian Government announcement of recognition of the current regime in Iraq. Resumption of diplomatic relations is expected in the near future. Iraq’s relations with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have improved somewhat with diminution of the prospect of a Communist-controlled regime in Iraq.

17. Iraq’s harmonious relations with Turkey have continued undisturbed by the change of regime in the latter. Qasim was prompt in expressing his good wishes to the new Turkish Government and reiterating his policy of non-interference in Turkish affairs. Cultural exchanges under a pre-revolution agreement have been continued and a trade agreement is under consideration.

18. Iraq-Iran relations, though recently more harmonious, are subject to periodic disturbances by possible developments in several issues of significance to both countries: control of navigation on the Shatt-al-Arab, division of water from rivers flowing into Iraq from Iran, curtailment by Iran of pilgrim travel to Shi’a shrines in Iraq, sporadic border incidents, and mutual suspicion of intrigues among the Kurds.

Guidance

19. We should counsel Iraq’s neighbors, particularly the Iranians, against interference in Iraq’s affairs and other provocative measures which tend to push Iraq into closer relations with the Soviets.

20. We should, without involving ourselves in the substance of disputes, encourage Iraq and Iran (or any other friendly state with which Iraq may develop a dispute) to seek a mutually acceptable solution through direct negotiations, or other peaceful means.

21. We should continue, as circumstances warrant, efforts to use other area states, including friendly Arab states, as channels for the exercise of constructive influence of Qasim. We should, as appropriate opportunities arise in official contacts with Iraqis, make clear our satisfaction at improvements in Iraq’s relations with its neighbors.

Iraq’s Relations with the UK

22. Although the British economic position in Iraq, which was paramount before the revolution, is being steadily whittled away it remains substantial. The UK has the largest financial interest in the IPC and retains its traditional control of management. Iraq’s political and cultural relations with the UK remain satisfactory though not particularly close. A UK-Iraq Cultural Relations Agreement has been signed.

Guidance

23. We should seek the continuing exchange of information and views on Iraq with the UK.

24. Although we should leave the initiative on petroleum matters to the UK, we should follow developments closely and consult with the UK regularly.

Economic

25. Iraq’s efforts to restart and reshape its development program following the revolution have largely failed because of the centralization of authority in the hands of the Prime Minister and the latter’s failure to define objectives in terms of realizable economic programs. Iraq’s economic development difficulties are compounded by general stagnation in the public and private investment sector, drastic reductions in grain production due to drought and the disruptive effects of the Agrarian Reform Law, and a near-breakdown of planning and managerial functions of the government. The economy of Iraq can, however, be maintained, albeit at a reduced level of activity, as long as oil revenues continue to accrue at approximately the present rate. Moreover, the country had substantial foreign exchange reserves upon which it can draw.

Guidance

26. The possibilities of failure in the Iraqi development effort or of Iraqi disillusionment with Soviet Bloc aid should be continuously appraised as a guide to U.S. action.

27. Although requests from the Iraqi Government for direct U.S. economic or technical assistance seem unlikely under present circumstances, the U.S. should be prepared to respond promptly to requests for technical assistance which may be made. The U.S. attitude towards any requests for economic aid should be one of prompt and openminded consideration in the light of then existing situation and over-all U.S. interests. However, official Iraqi sensitivity to foreign investment and to U.S. assistance requires that initiative in these fields be left entirely to the Iraq Government. The increasing Iraqi tendency to seek educational assistance and technical data from U.S. agencies, both public and private, should be encouraged, as should be the interest of Iraqi officials in travel to the U.S. UN agencies should also be encouraged to offer technical advice and assistance to Iraq as an alternative to increased dependence on the Soviet Bloc.

28. Every effort should be made to have U.S. products and firms given impartial and competitive consideration in Iraqi trade and developmental undertakings, official or private. American firms now on the scene should be encouraged to remain, and both old and prospective new firms should be given every possible assistance in extending their operations and avoiding or minimizing disputes or causes for dispute with the Government of Iraq. Embassy efforts to facilitate U.S. private economic activity, however, should be discreet, and should take into account the suspicion with which Americans and those with whom they freely associate are widely regarded.

Military

29. The termination of the Mutual Security Agreement of 1954,² which was taken at the initiative of Iraq in May 1959, removed the existing basis for U.S. grant aid military assistance. Subsequently, approval was given for sale of U.S. military equipment (chiefly, spare parts) on a case-by-case basis. Since the revolution, negotiations for the purchase by Iraq of British military aircraft, armored vehicles, and artillery bogged down over the issue of price and appear to be dormant. Iraq has recently expressed interest in the purchase of British jet trainer aircraft, however. Provision has been made in the FY 1961 military assistance training program to train a small number of Iraqi military personnel in the U.S.

Guidance

30. Requests by Iraq for commercial or military sales of U.S. military equipment, including spare parts and replacement items, should in each instance be considered on their merits in the light of U.S. interests. In the event that Iraq requests or exhibits serious interest in expanded training of Iraqi military personnel in the U.S., we should respond affirmatively if possible.

U.S. Personnel Overseas

31. The acceptance of the presence of official U.S. personnel on foreign soil directly affects our capability to achieve our national security objectives. To this end, programs should be developed and improved to encourage and strengthen the natural inclination of the individual American to be a good representative of his country and to promote conduct and attitudes conducive to good will and mutual understanding.

32. The OCB has prepared a comprehensive document which serves as a guidance for senior U.S. representatives overseas:

“Report on U.S. Personnel Overseas” (July 1959), including a Statement of National Policy and a Presidential Letter as well as a reprint of the Conclusions and Recommendations of a 1958 report.

Guidance

33. Hold the number of U.S. official personnel in Iraq to a strict minimum consistent with sound implementation of our programs.

Note: See: NIE 36.2–60, Outlook for Iraq, November 1, 1960. NIE 30–59, Main Currents in the Arab World, August 25, 1959.³

[Here follow Annexes A “Arrangements or Agreements with the U.S.” B “Statements of Agency Programs in Iraq,” and C “Sino-Soviet Bloc Activity in Iraq,” and a Financial Annex and Pipeline Analysis–MSP.]

0. Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Iraq. Secret. According to a covering memorandum by Bromley Smith, the OCB revised and concurred in this paper at its meeting on December 7. In addition, the Board noted that the Departments of State and Defense “would take the steps necessary to assure that their respective principal representatives in the field would receive guidance in connection with contingent policies applicable to Iraq which are not set forth in the Operations Plan.” Also attached was a statement of the “Purpose and Use of the Operations Plan,” which was applicable to all operations plans.
1. Signed at Baghdad on January 23, 1961, and entered into force August 13, 1963; 14 UST 1168.
2. 5 UST 2496.
3. Documents 222 and 71.