Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XII

222. National Intelligence Estimate⁰

NIE 36.2–60

Washington, November 1, 1960.

THE OUTLOOK FOR IRAQ

The Problem

To estimate the outlook for Iraq over the next year or so.

Conclusions

1. On balance, we believe that the Qassim regime’s lack of political dynamism, Qassim’s intermittent reliance on the Communists, and his failure to make a convincing show of social and economic progress will sooner or later lead to his removal, most likely by nationalist-minded army officers. A coup attempt could occur at any time. However, given the ineffectiveness of the opposition so far, we consider that the chances are about even that Qassim will succeed in retaining power over about the next year. The ability of the Iraqi Communist Party to seize power has diminished over the past year and will probably remain low for the next year. (Paras. 10, 13, 25)

2. Iraqi economic conditions have deteriorated seriously in the past two years, and the one promising development program has virtually come to a halt. We do not believe, however, that economic stresses will of themselves precipitate political upheaval. Oil revenues will probably be sufficient to operate the government, pay for needed grain imports, and provide for some development projects. (Paras. 14–17)

3. Iraq continues to rely heavily on the Bloc for military and economic assistance. The Soviets will probably strive to maneuver Qassim into increasing dependence on them—without seeking an early Communist takeover. The UAR will give support to anti-Qassim groups, but is not likely to commit itself to an all-out effort to overthrow the regime. The Qassim government’s attitude towards the Western powers, once hostile, has gradually improved. This trend is subject to sudden reversals, and while it may continue, it is not likely to be carried very far. (Paras. 18–19, 21)

Discussion

4. Since coming to power in 1958, the Qassim regime has survived three major coup attempts (one involving rebellion by portions of the army), a near-successful assassination of the Prime Minister, and a number of serious breakdowns of public order involving street rule and local massacre in major cities. Nasser has actively supported some of the conspiracies, while Jordan’s Hussein, backed at times by Iran, has had occasional hopes of a Hashemite restoration. The capitals of the UAR, Jordan, and Lebanon are littered with committees of Iraqi exiles, supported by one or another foreign government, plotting ways and means of returning to power. The formerly promising economic development program has virtually come to a halt, sizable wheat shortages have arisen, the once-thriving Iraqi economy is stagnant, and the government is relying increasingly on oil revenues to meet current expenses.

5. Qassim remains Prime Minister and “sole leader” of Iraq chiefly by default. Despite considerable discontent, no person or group has been able to marshal the forces of dissatisfaction into a cohesive opposition. Movements aimed at seizing power by direct action have been demonstrably unsuccessful and their failures have given pause to the regime’s opponents. The pillars of the old regime are either in jail or abroad seeking help from their erstwhile friends; the military have been chastened by the execution of the Mosul rebels; the Communists overreached themselves in the Kirkuk massacres; the Baathists lost substantially by their bungled attempt on Qassim’s life; and the civilian nationalists¹ do not appear to have sufficient cohesiveness to be effective. This is not to suggest that Qassim is in full control of the field, but rather that his opposition is disorganized, mutually suspicious, or intimidated. Plotting against him has been more or less continuous and still goes on.

6. Qassim has displayed little constructive political talent. He has, however, been skillful in keeping the political forces of the country balanced off. For example, in the licensing of political parties, he has permitted some to operate openly, but not the best organized ones or those most hostile to his regime.² He checked the Communists by refusing to license the orthodox Communist Party of Iraq and encouraging the splinter faction of Da’ud Sayigh. He similarly encouraged separation of the National Democratic Party into two legal parties. Licenses were denied the militant right-wing groups and the Baath. Out of this superficially haphazard approach has developed a situation in which (a) some moderate elements have official standing; (b) considerable latitude is given to both licensed and unlicensed groups to express their views in the press, though excesses are curbed from time to time; and (c) no serious action is taken to break up the organization of nonlicensed parties. The latter may not function publicly but are not prevented from carrying on their activities discretely.

7. The Qassim regime has taken no steps in recent months to turn back the government to civilian control. Little has been heard lately about drafting a new constitution or electing a national assembly, though Qassim promised both by the summer of 1960. There has been no lessening of military control, which includes martial law in the entire country. Military officers occupy half the cabinet posts, numerous provincial governorships, and many important administrative jobs, e.g., Directors General of Ports, Railways, Police, and Security.

8. Qassim’s continuance in office rests on several factors. The principal one is the army. While the armed forces are not enthusiastic for Qassim, no military elements have attempted a move against him since the Mosul revolt of February 1959. Many dissident officers have been removed from the forces. The armed forces have received some $170 million worth of Bloc weapons and equipment, though dissatisfaction concerning their quality is being expressed at high levels. Pay raises and improved housing have helped morale, especially of enlisted grades, which tend to be more favorable toward Qassim than are the officers. The armed forces in general will probably continue to support Qassim as long as they reap benefits from association with him. The removal of ranking officers at the time of the July 1958 coup and in subsequent purges has raised many of the survivors to positions of importance which they might not have attained for another 10 to 15 years under the old regime. Senior officers feel that in most important respects they are running the country, a belief which helps account for their acceptance of Qassim. The bulk of upper-level officer sentiment is Iraqi nationalist and anti-Communist; the latter sentiment is reflected in steady repression of the Communists by military commanders in the provinces.

9. Qassim is also helped by the support which he enjoys among younger politically conscious elements which feel they are now actively participating in the affairs of Iraq, and among minorities that he has cultivated. While this support has markedly waned with the regime’s failure to make appreciable progress in solving Iraq’s problems, conditions are not bad enough to stimulate a drastic reaction. Unrest in the farming areas and in the tribal countryside will persist, but it is unlikely to be widespread enough to pose a serious threat to the regime.

10. In a curious way, the Communists also shore up the Qassim regime. In the first year after the revolution, the Communists were able, thanks to efficient organization, to make heavy inroads in many sectors of the country, and at one time appeared to be on the verge of assuming control. Following the Kirkuk massacres of July 1959, public opinion turned against them, they were severely checked by Qassim, and the nationalists began to assume greater importance. The Communists now probably believe that they would be worse off under any foreseeable successor to Qassim, and ride along with him as their best bet in the circumstances. On the other hand, the various rival nationalist groups are restrained from action against Qassim by their fear that his overthrow could be exploited by the more disciplined and better organized Communists.³

11. Qassim does not appear committed to any particular political system or philosophy and has failed to provide vigorous leadership or to dramatize a program in the way that Nasser has done in Egypt. One of Qassim’s chief characteristics is an ability to keep his own counsel (an ability which was a principal factor in the success of the July 1958 revolution), and to operate on his own without benefit of consultation with his ministers or the government bureaucracy. His propensity for ignoring advisers has alienated much of the civilian talent he so badly needs. His view of Iraq’s affairs tends to come almost completely through a small coterie of military associates, no better versed in government than himself. He shows a poor grasp of the complexities of government and scant appreciation of economic factors.

12. Thus the chance of the regime’s developing a forward momentum that would allay discontent seems slight. Qassim is primarily concerned with trying to ensure that no political grouping, whether of right or left, develops sufficient strength on its own to oust him from the position of “sole leader.” He will persist in his balancing efforts, probably with considerable skill. However, the growing resentment of the various nationalist factions at Qassim’s intermittent use of the Communists is reducing his room for maneuver.

13. While Qassim has so far managed to keep both nationalists and Communists within bounds, he runs the continual risk of miscalculation. There is a possibility that one or another group may build its strength to the point where he cannot cope with it, though at the moment no group seems to have leaders resolute enough to risk a coup. To overthrow Qassim and consolidate a new regime, any civilian movement would need to have military backing, particularly among units around Baghdad. The Communists are not likely to gain such support. The civilian nationalists, although divided into a number of factions, have a substantially better chance of getting it. On the whole, however, we believe that the initiative for any successful coup is most likely to come from the military. In these circumstances, Qassim will probably continue both to cultivate the army and to keep it under close scrutiny.

Economy

14. The economy of Iraq has undergone severe strains in the past two years. The coup leaders were inexperienced in the ways of government and deprived (by their own action) of the cadre of experienced senior civil servants. The development program lost momentum and focus as the neutralist regime terminated many Western-backed development projects of the Nuri government and accepted Bloc offers of assistance. The USSR has extended a $137 million line of credit for 27 development projects, very little of which has been used as yet. Most recently, the USSR has advanced an additional $45 million to rehabilitate and convert the Baghdad–Basra railroad to standard gauge. The Iraqis have also signed an agreement with Czechoslovakia for some $33 million in economic and technical aid. Qassim has announced a $1.12 billion four year development program, but neither plans nor sufficient funds for it are available. Publicizing of this program was largely a political gesture, and it impressed few.

15. Iraq derived $242 million from oil revenues in 1959. Even though oil production facilities have grown, annual oil revenues will probably stand near this level for the next year or two. This prospect results from a combination of lowered posted prices and of reduced production in the southern fields, the latter owing to Iraq’s imposition of exorbitant port dues. Revenues could decline still further unless present disagreements with the Iraq Petroleum Company are resolved. More than half of Iraq’s oil income goes for government operating expenses. While the remainder could not pay for Qassim’s grandiose schemes, it is adequate for a modest development program. In any case, the principal problem hampering development is not lack of funds, but lack of planning and administrators. Consequently, the development program is not likely to get back on track in the next year or two.

16. The slowdown of the development program has increased unemployment, lessened the purchasing power of the populace and, coupled with the civil disorders of 1959, caused a virtual stagnation of the economy. Land reforms and drought have caused serious declines in wheat production for two consecutive years. Iraq, normally a net exporter of wheat, has had to import 400,000 tons a year for domestic consumption and is likely to have to continue imports on this scale for the coming year or two. The communications network, never good, is deteriorating even further due to poor management and upkeep. Serious transportation difficulties will continue to plague the country for at least the next two to three years. Depressed conditions in the countryside have accelerated population drift to urban centers, compounding problems of unemployment and housing.

17. Nevertheless, economic conditions in Iraq are not likely of themselves to precipitate political upheaval. So long as oil revenues remain at approximately their present levels, the government will be able to supplement food deficiencies by foreign purchase and to pay the armed forces and civil service. Accordingly, economic hardships are not likely to approach the point where they could cause widespread disorder. The development program will probably manage somehow to keep enough projects going to make some show of progress, particularly in such fields as urban housing.

Foreign Affairs

18. The revolutionary reaction against British and American influence in Iraqi affairs appears to have largely spent itself. The US and UK are no longer repeatedly accused by the government of fomenting plots against Iraq, and harassment of US personnel and facilities has about ended. Relationships with other Western countries are generally correct, though diplomatic relations with France have not been resumed since the Suez crisis. Western goods are reappearing on the Iraqi market in substantial quantities. However, Qassim has made virtually no effort to regain Western military and technical aid, and his regime continues to rely heavily on the Bloc for military and economic assistance. Iraq has diplomatic relations with all Bloc countries. It has signed trade agreements with most of them, though these agreements have not thus far resulted in a significant volume of trade, nor are they likely to do so so long as oil accounts for the great bulk of Iraqi exports.

19. Despite some setbacks, the USSR has established a fairly strong position of influence in Iraq. The Soviets will probably push for further penetration of Iraq through economic and military aid and strive to maneuver Qassim into increasing dependence on them; they will probably not seek to establish an openly Communist regime. The Iraqi Communist Party appears to follow the strategy of Moscow more closely than that of Peiping. In the case of an Arab-sponsored attempt to overthrow Qassim, the Soviets would probably not undertake armed intervention, since such a move would involve serious adverse reactions in the Arab World and the Afro-Asian areas as a whole. Soviet policy will face difficulty in supporting Qassim without alienating Nasser, since conflict between the two Arab leaders is almost certain to persist.

20. Iraqi’s relations with its non-Arab neighbors are now quiet. The new government of Turkey will probably continue to show minimal interest in Iraq, unless Iraq should veer strongly toward the Communist camp. Relations between Iraq and Iran will be troubled by the continuing dispute over the Shatt-al-Arab boundaries, but the hostility of Qassim and the Shah toward Nasser will contribute to keeping the two countries on speaking terms. Moreover, the Shah has become less fearful of Communist influence in Iraq.

21. Tensions between the UAR and Iraq will continue, albeit with variations in intensity. Traditional Egyptian-Iraqi rivalry will cause Nasser to desire the downfall of any independent Iraqi regime even when he is not actively pressing for it. However, Nasser has been burned in sponsoring earlier coup attempts against Qassim, and probably will not directly commit the UAR to an all-out effort to unseat him. The UAR will continue to support Iraqi exile groups and to channel aid to anti-Qassim elements, notably the Baath and pro-Nasser nationalists within Iraq.

22. The ill-feeling between Iraq and the UAR is likely to project itself—as it often has in the past—upon Syria. Anxious to break out of a Nasser-imposed isolation, to assert area leadership, and to provide a diversion at home, Qassim will seek to exploit discontent in the Syrian region. Conversely, Nasser’s pressures on Iraq will vary in intensity with his concern over his northern province.

23. Although King Hussein and Qassim share a common hostility toward Nasser, which has recently led them to agree to resume diplomatic relations, Jordan will continue to provide a haven for Iraqi exiles and will be tempted to aid groups that promise a more congenial regime in Iraq. Hussein and Nasser are at cross purposes in this regard, since each wishes to eliminate the other’s influence in that country. However, Hussein is likely to remain under greater pressure from Nasser than from Qassim, and at least as long as this is so, Hussein is not likely to take active measures to overthrow Qassim.

24. We believe that the various Iraqi exile groups in the Arab capitals are rapidly losing vitality. The chances of their playing a significant role in the future are small and will continue to decline.

25. On balance, we believe that the Qassim regime’s lack of political dynamism, Qassim’s intermittent reliance on the Communists, and his failure to make a convincing show of social and economic progress will sooner or later lead to his removal, most likely by nationalist-minded army officers. Moreover, assassination is an ever-present possibility. It is impossible to predict when a coup attempt might be made, and it could come at any time. However, given the ineffectiveness of the opposition so far, we consider that the chances are about even that Qassim will succeed in retaining power over about the next year.

26. In the event of Qassim’s removal, the successor regime would probably be nationalist and would probably continue a broad policy of neutralism as between East and West. It might seek better relations with the UAR than has Qassim, but would remain loyal to Iraqi nationalism rather than turn to a Pan-Arabism dominated by Nasser.

0. Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet indicates that this estimate, submitted by the CIA, was prepared by CIA, INR, the intelligence organizations of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff. All members of the USIB concurred in this estimate except the representatives of the AEC and FBI who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.
1. In this memorandum, we use the term “nationalist” to describe a varied array of Iraqi elements whose chief common quality is that they are not Communist or pro-Communist. They range from the left-of-center National Democratic Party and the socialist Baath to more conservative groups and from proponents of Pan-Arabism to advocates of a more narrow Iraqi nationalism. [Footnote in the source text.]

2. The following parties have been licensed: United Democratic Party of Kurdistan—leftist-led Kurdish nationalist group dating at least from the mid-forties; National Democratic Party (NDP)—long-time socialist party headed by Kamil Chadirji; National Progressive Party—an offshoot of the NDP headed by Muhammad Hadid; Communist Party of Iraq—Da’ud Sayigh’s splinter group, founded in 1960; Islamic Party—recently founded group standing for traditional Moslem society.

   Unlicensed parties are: Ittihad al-Sha’b—the orthodox Communist Party, in existence since the mid-thirties; Istiqlal Party—relatively conservative, nationalist group long in opposition to Nuri; Tahrir Party—right-wing Islamic Party; Baath Party of Iraq—Pan-Arab socialist party associated with the parent organization in Syria; Qawmiyyin al-Arab—Arab nationalist group; Arab Socialist Party; Republican Party—Communist front. [Footnote in the source text.]

3. On November 14, John S.D. Eisenhower included in his list of intelligence items reported to the President the following on Iraq: “The Qasim regime has dealt the Iraqi Communist party another blow by arresting the prominent Communists, including at least one central committee member. This move, following the harsh suppression of Communist-inspired riots from 5 to 7 November, is likely to induce other key members to go underground. If Qasim endorses this action, this may placate dissatisfied anti-Communist elements who have felt that his recent policies have been too favorable to the Communists.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries)