Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XII

220. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

SecDel/MC/88

New York, October 3, 1960.

SECRETARY’S DELEGATION TO THE FIFTEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

New York, September 19–October 8, 1960

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • G. Lewis Jones
• Iraq
  • Hashim Jawad, Foreign Minister of Iraq

SUBJECT

• Iraqi Foreign Minister’s Views regarding Relations with the United States

I entertained Foreign Minister Jawad alone at lunch today. He seemed to appreciate this attention, making himself available at very short notice, and to be more self-assured than when I had seen him a year ago. The following emerged:

King Hussein

Jawad said that King Hussein had “very few friends” among the Arab delegations since he had made his “unfortunate” speech.¹ When I asked why the speech was “unfortunate” he replied that the King was most ill-advised to have publicized his dispute with Nasser in the United Nations. Jawad said the United Nations was not the forum for disputes of this kind. Had Iraq wished to do so, it could have done the same thing last year and the year before. What the King had done and what upset the Arabs was the fact that he had broken ranks with the other Arabs and had “washed his dirty linen in public.”

Note: The King’s crime—i.e. a lapse from solidarity is widely commented upon among the Arab delegations. Jawad said that even the Jordanian delegation was divided on this subject. Surprisingly, the Afghan Ambassador told me that his delegation had found the speech a “bad one” since the King had elected to expose his unfortunate dispute.

Iraq–Jordan Relations

Jawad confirmed the statement of the King of Jordan regarding a rapprochement between the two countries.² He said the umbrage was all on the Jordan side: relations could have been resumed at any time. However, the King and he have been able to reach an agreement and he thought diplomatic relations between the countries might be resumed in the fairly near future.

U.S.-Iraqi Relations

In response to my question Jawad said he thought U.S.-Iraqi relations were moving in the right direction but because of the bombardment by the Communist radio he could only move so far, so fast in improving these relations. For example, one of the latest charges used to prove that the United States is a reactionary imperialist power is the U.S. stand on Algeria. Iraqi public opinion is persuaded in Algeria if the United States would only take a strong line with France. He said it was incredible to the Iraqis that so many countries south of the Sahara should be ready for independence and Algeria not ready. He hoped that the United States could take a more forthcoming attitude regarding Algeria this year: the stand in the past really hurt the United States in the Arab world. As best I could I explained the difficulties confronting us in connection with the Algerian problem and got him to admit that General De Gaulle, and only General De Gaulle, is capable of solving it. I also mentioned the necessity for European solidarity at a time when the Berlin problem seems likely to be resurgent. Jawad opined that France was probably closer to a revolution or a coup d’état than most people thought: he cited the demonstrations in Paris yesterday as evidence of this.

Iraqi Jews

I asked Jawad how many Jews remained in Baghdad. He replied that he thought there were about 6,000—mostly members of the wealthier families. He said that they were subjected to no persecution or other difficulties and that the new government had repealed the anti-Jewish laws initiated by Nuri Said. Jawad spoke regretfully of the persecution of the Iraqi Jews, saying that this had been instituted artificially by Nuri as a political measure and that some unscrupulous Iraqis had attempted to benefit from the exodus of the Jews—taking away their money, etc.

A–B–C Case³

I thanked Jawad for having settled this matter.

Iraqi Development

I got Jawad to talk about the economic development programs in Iraq which according to him were moving ahead much as they had under the old regime. “We are still paying our bills”, he said.

Five Power Resolution⁴

Jawad brought up this subject and readily agreed when I pointed out the futility of a two man meeting which could not settle anything. I referred to Mr. Khrushchev’s position with regard to the President published in the papers today and suggested that in the circumstances the best plan would be for the five sponsors to let the resolution drop, i.e. say no more about it. Jawad agreed with this analysis and I got the impression that he would counsel along these lines. He did not mention the Australian resolution.⁵

Seeing the Secretary

Jawad said that he would like to pay a “courtesy call” on the Secretary if the Secretary could find time to receive him. I said that I thought this could be arranged.⁶

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1767. Confidential. Drafted by Jones. The meeting was held in the U.N. delegates dining room.
1. King Hussein gave the speech before the General Assembly on October 3 that attacked communism and to a lesser extent Nasser.
2. On October 2 after a meeting between King Hussein and Iraqi Foreign Minister Jawad in New York, Jordan recognized the “form of government” in Iraq while Jawad denounced the assassination of the late King Faisal. (Telegrams 553 and 561 from Amman, October 2 and 3; Department of State, Central Files, 787.02/10–260 and 787.02/10–360)
3. Apparent reference to Iraq’s payment of compensation to the families of Americans Robert Alcock, Eugene Burns, and George Colley, Jr., who were killed during the Iraqi coup of July 1958; see footnote 1, Document 201.
4. The Five-Power Resolution was enclosed in letters to Eisenhower and Khrushchev from Nkrumah of Ghana, Nehru of India, Sukarno of Indonesia, Nasser of the UAR, and Tito of Yugoslavia. It requested a resumption of face-to-face meetings between Eisenhower and Khrushchev to promote world peace.
5. U.N. Document A/L.316.
6. See Document 221.