Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XII

210. Special National Intelligence Estimate⁰

SNIE 36.2–5–59

Washington, December 15, 1959.

SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS FOR IRAQ

The Problem

To estimate the short-term outlook in Iraq.

The Estimate

1. Since Qassim went into the hospital following the unsuccessful attempt on his life on 7 October, Iraqi politics have shown a superficial calm. There has, however, been mounting tension between the Communists and the various nationalist factions.¹ During the same period, the economy has continued its steady decline, with rising unemployment and prices, stagnating business activity and investment, and a bogging down of the development program. In these circumstances, we believe that Iraq is facing a growing crisis of leadership.

2. The enigmatic figure of Qassim is still central to the short-run outlook in Iraq. Ever since the 1958 revolution, he has maneuvered between the Communists and their antagonists. He probably still considers himself uncommitted to any faction, and capable of playing a role above the struggle. His messianic tendencies have apparently been reinforced by his recent near-martyrdom.

3. However, conflicting political pressures and growing internal problems are likely to make it increasingly difficult for Qassim to remain in effective control and still avoid committing himself to one or another of the Iraqi factions.² Baathist elements and other Pan-Arab nationalists sympathetic to Nasser have of course long opposed Qassim. Their opposition is probably now shared to a growing extent by Iraqi nationalists who once saw in Qassim a leader able and determined to keep Iraq out of the hands of both Nasser and the Communists. Nationalist elements have been alienated by various actions of Qassim, e.g., his continued support for the outspokenly pro-Communist Colonel Mahdawi, his execution of Brigadier Tabaqchali in September, and the antinationalist tone of his speech of 2 December. Qassim’s failure to cope with deteriorating economic conditions has almost certainly added further to growing disillusionment.

4. Even so, we believe that Qassim will continue his attempts to maintain himself in power by relying on the support of the armed forces while maneuvering between the various political factions. If he continues his recent line of conduct, he will become increasingly isolated from nationalist elements. It is possible that he might regain a measure of nationalist support, but to do so would require a more drastic reversal of his recent policies, as well as more effective leadership, than we consider likely. Hence, we believe that he will be increasingly isolated from anti-Communist elements, to the longer range advantage of the Communists.

5. We continue to believe that short-run Communist strategy calls for consolidating power and expanding influence without assuming the risks of an overt takeover. It is also likely that, in Communist eyes, Qassim retains his usefulness as a figure who, combining popular appeal and willingness to countenance the Communists, is preferable to any other immediately available leader in terms of short-range Communist interests. In these circumstances, the Communists will probably continue efforts to impress upon Qassim their usefulness and reliability as supporters of his regime against the machinations of the “imperialist” powers and Nasser’s agents. In pursuing these tactics, the Communists have, despite certain internal differences, the advantage of better organization than their more numerous but factionalized opponents and a greater ability to make sudden shifts in tactics.

6. Present evidence concerning Qassim’s state of mind, particularly his fear of the UAR and the nationalists, indicates that the Communists have good prospects of success in alternately exploiting Qassim’s misgivings and courting his favor. And at least in the short run, Qassim would have Communist support against a nationalist opposition short of an uprising. Thus, the reliance of Qassim and the Communists on one another for support appears to be increasing.

7. While alarm and discontent are generally growing, disparate nationalist groups have not coalesced and are likely to do so only on a temporary basis. Present evidence does appear, however, to warrant the estimate that a nationalist move to undercut the Communists would probably involve an attempt to destroy Qassim’s power as well. For a time at least, nationalist opposition groups may be driven closer together out of common fear that they cannot afford to wait too long, lest Qassim’s concessions to the Communists cost more nationalist lives or his countermeasures reduce nationalist capabilities.

8. The Iraqi Army, as a whole, has supported Qassim against internal challenges to his regime. This support reflected the army’s approval of Qassim’s “neutralist” policies, its improved status resulting from better pay, more modern equipment, and its closer identification with the government. Nevertheless, a degree of alarm and disillusionment has beset many elements of the army as the Iraqi situation becomes more unsettled, and plotting among military and civilian groups appears on the increase. On the whole, so long as Qassim survives and continues to cultivate the army, he can probably retain considerable military support, which will reduce the chances of overthrowing him. Internal instability and tension is likely to increase, however.

9. In these circumstances, the most likely way to remove Qassim would be by assassination, and we consider it probable that another attempt will be made before long. We are much less confident concerning which nationalist leaders or groups will actually undertake it.

10. If Qassim were eliminated, the outcome of the coup would depend on how quickly and effectively its organizers could move to consolidate control. Substantial army support would clearly be essential to its success. Given the present state of discontent with the regime, we believe that a well-organized nationalist coup would have at least an even chance of establishing power over the country. Even if the effort were inspired by civilian nationalists (e.g., Baathists), the resulting regime would probably work with and through military officers—possibly such figures as General Rubai and General Abdi.³ Chances of success would be best if the coup appeared to be wholly internal and without prior commitment to any foreign power, including the UAR.

11. If effective control were not quickly established, Qassim’s removal could result in widespread disorders and even civil war, with Iraqi Communists taking active measures to protect their position, such as reactivating the People’s Resistance Forces (PRF) and arming their supporters. In such a situation, moreover, there would be at least an even chance of overt intervention by one or more of Iraq’s neighbors.

12. Turkey’s attitude toward the Qassim regime, heretofore rather tolerant and hopeful, would almost certainly change rapidly if Turkish leaders came to believe that Communist ascendancy were imminent. Relations with Iran will remain distant, conditioned by the Shatt al-Arab controversy and by Qassim’s suspicions of the Shah’s intentions toward him. Israel has consistently encouraged Turkey and Iran to tolerate Qassim lest his overthrow strengthen Nasser.

13. Nasser still desires to see Qassim overthrown, but he has been more restrained in his plotting, and we do not believe that he seriously entertains hopes of establishing UAR control over Iraq. Most dissident Iraqi groups turn to Nasser for support in their conspiracies, and the UAR will continue to extend both material and moral backing to various Iraqi elements opposing Qassim, without being overly particular as to which faction initiates a move. Nasser would be reluctant to use overt military force in support of the nationalist cause, but he might feel compelled to respond to a call for help. Before doing so, however, he would probably require US assurances against counter-moves by Israel and Turkey.

14. Hussein still desires to re-establish Hashemite rule in Iraq and to block the extension of Nasser’s influence there. Iraqi exiles are in contact with Hussein, and will continue to play upon these desires. However, Hussein is unlikely to intervene overtly in Iraq unless he receives Western acquiescence and support. Although Hussein has been maintaining contact with the UK, Turkey, and Iran concerning Iraq, none of them has indicated much confidence in intervention by Hussein as a solution. However, should the situation become more critical, his aspirations might be taken more seriously. Even Israel might under certain circumstances countenance intervention by Jordan, though it would react strongly against any such move by Nasser.

15. The UK is losing confidence in Qassim’s ability to maintain his power. The UK will continue to favor a solution which would result in diminishing the influence of the Communists without unduly augmenting that of Nasser.

16. The Soviets will probably continue to avoid direct involvement in the Iraqi situation, even in the event of Qassim’s downfall. They will in any event provide whatever covert support is feasible to the local Communists. If their preferred course of action—the gradual extension of Communist influence in the country—were disrupted, they would probably seek the formation of another pro-Communist, but not openly Communist, regime. In the event of disorder they would seek by threats to discourage any outside power from intervening. If, nevertheless, other powers in the area were to intervene with military force, we believe the Soviets would boost their support of the Communists and other resisting elements, perhaps with covert military assistance, but short of the overt introduction of Soviet military forces.

0. Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Iraq. Secret. A note on the cover sheet indicates that this special estimate, submitted by the CIA, was prepared by CIA, INR, the intelligence organizations of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff. All members of the USIB concurred in this estimate on December 15 except the representatives of the AEC and FBI who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.
1. In this estimate, we use the term “nationalist” to describe a varied array of Iraqi elements whose chief common quality is that they are not Communist or pro-Communist. When necessary, we distinguish among the nationalist groups—which range from the left-of-center National Democratic Party and the Pan-Arab socialist Baath to more conservative groups with varying allegiances toward Iraqi as against Pan-Arab nationalism. [Footnote in the source text.]
2. In a December 11 memorandum to Katherine W. Bracken, Chief of the Mid-East Aegean Division of INR, Deputy Director of NENicholas Thacher commented on a draft version of this SNIE. Thacher stated that NE did not concur with the thrust of this sentence, which “strongly pointed to a conclusion” that Qassim’s continuance in power would lead necessarily to his total dependence on the Communists through force of circumstances and choice. (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 61 D 43, Baghdad)
3. Rubai and Abdi have the advantage of legal claims to power if Qassim should disappear, since Rubai is formal Chief of State and Abdi is military Governor-General of Iraq. [Footnote in the source text.]