209. Memorandum of Discussion at the 428th Meeting of the National Security Council0
[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1. Vice President Nixon presided at the meeting.]
2. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security (NSC Action No. 2068)1
Reporting on Iraq, Mr. Bissell said that Kassem left the hospital last week after his recovery. His recuperation was celebrated publicly by a parade which had been organized and dominated by the Communists. Iraqi troops had been extensively deployed during this parade and the Nationalist quarters had been blocked off. In addition to these arrangements, Kassem had held a six-hour press conference which turned into a denunciation of the Nationalists. In this conference he had reversed himself sufficiently to say that the Kirkuk massacre had been stirred up by the Nationalists and had denounced a current attempt to contest Communist control over an Iraqi student union. In other words, all the auspices surrounding Kassem’s departure from the hospital indicated that he now blames the assassination attempt against him on the Nationalists and that his mind is inflamed against them. The indications now are that if Kassem had to make a choice, he would rely heavily on the Communists instead of maintaining the precarious balance which he has been seeking to maintain in the past. However, Mr. Bissell continued, the picture in Iraq is not entirely black. Kassem’s popularity has considerably diminished, and there are officers in the army who take the Nationalist point of view and who are ready to move against him. Recognizing that predictions are hazardous, Mr. Bissell predicted that if no further assassination attempts were made against Kassem, there was a strong possibility of a growth in Communist power. However, there was a better than even chance that another attempt would be made to assassinate Kassem. An abortive assassination attempt known to Kassem would drive him into the arms of the Communists. The actual assassination of Kassem would quite likely result in civil war and possibly in an intervention by Iraq’s neighbors. In summary, Mr. Bissell felt that there would be further assassination attempts and that each of these attempts could present serious policy problems in Washington.
Secretary Herter said the difficulty with the Nationalists was that they were divided into two groups, the genuine Nationalists and the [Page 495] Nasser stooges. Mr. Bissell said there was even a third group of Nationalists consisting of the survivors of the Nuri Said regime. He added there were indications now that Nasser believed it would not be feasible for the UAR to attempt to annex Iraq. Secretary Herter said Nasser was still active in stirring up trouble in Iraq. The Vice President asked whether he was correct in assuming that this Government had no particular affinity for any of the three groups of Nationalists. Secretary Herter said we hoped that Kassem would be able to steer a middle course. This Government did not want Iraq to be taken over by either Nasser or the Communists. He remarked, incidentally, that our Ambassador to Iraq was not very optimistic about the situation. The Vice President inquired whether Secretary Herter felt there was no possible third force in Iraq. Secretary Herter said there was none. [1–½ lines of source text not declassified]
Mr. Gray reminded the Council of the existence of the Interdepartmental Group on Iraq established by NSC Action 2068, and said he felt sure the Secretary of State had in mind having the Group keep the Council informed as to the situation. The Vice President was sure that the Interdepartmental Group would be considering the events mentioned by Mr. Bissell. The Vice President recalled that Mr. Bissell had mentioned possible intervention by Iraq’s neighbors and asked which neighbors would be likely to intervene in the event of civil war. Mr. Bissell said that Jordan or the UAR might intervene. [1–½ lines of source text not declassified] Nasser was in close communication with the Baath party. Both Jordan and the UAR felt it would be risky to initiate action against Iraq, but in the course of a self-generated crisis, such as a civil war in Iraq, they might feel free to intervene. Secretary Anderson asked whether the Communists and the Nationalists were about equal in armament in Iraq. Mr. Bissell answered in the affirmative, while pointing out that the Communists were numerically fewer. However, the Communists were organized and disciplined while the Nationalists were divided and discouraged, although the Nationalists probably had the army on their side. Secretary Herter said there was one optimistic note, namely the normal antipathy of Moslems to Communism. Mr. Bissell said he would give the non-Communists a slight edge in the event of civil strife in Iraq because Abdi, the Military Governor, was a symbol of authority and was anti-Communist. Hence in the event of the assassination of Kassem, continuity of authority was possible through the person of Abdi.
[Here follow the remainder of agenda item 2 and agenda items 3 and 4.]
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Boggs on December 10.↩
- See footnote 12, Document 176.↩