135. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq0

960. Joint State–Defense. Embtels 966 1 and 1010.2 You authorized approach Prime Minister along following lines:

1.
Indicate that in absence any F–86 training activity or any apparent Iraqi interest to date in resumption thereof US is withdrawing training personnel. (If this should provoke request for resumption F–86 training or question re US willingness consider resumption, you may reply that US remains ready meet its obligations under outstanding agreements with Iraq and if GOI prepared reaffirm and implement its responsibilities under said agreements training mission can be reconstituted. Remind Prime Minister however that training stopped by Iraqis and indicate US unable hold idle any longer in Iraq personnel which needed elsewhere. You should also make it clear that US considers remaining F–86 aircraft as being included among “major items military equipment”; referred to in Para 2 below which spells out considerations bearing on any decision re resumption shipments.)
2.
You should refer to message from DMO (Embtel 1010) and point out that US has demonstrated its good intentions with regard programmed military aid by completing delivery items which were on high seas at time of revolution and by indicating shortly following recognition (Deptel 5933 and Embtel 6404) our willingness discuss matter of military aid on frank basis with GOI. In order reach common understanding [Page 340]regarding existing military aid agreement including question of further deliveries of major items military equipment, USG would appreciate clarification of Iraqi Government’s attitude with regard to relationships spelled out in existing bi-lateral agreements and indication its general views regarding future US–Iraq military relations. You should add that present atmosphere created by such acts as interrogation Embassy officers, opening of diplomatic pouches, restrictions on movement US military personnel, extraordinary boarding and searching of US and US owned vessels in Shatt al-Arab, gratuitous attempts implicate US in current trials and lack of action re three missing Americans is such as to raise question re degree of cooperation with US desired by GOI. For this reason US, in determining its attitude re military shipments, would appreciate clarification of Iraqi positions re above matters and US–Iraq military relations in general.
3.
You should not raise subject future aid (FY 59 and subsequent). (If Prime Minister raises subject you should point out this question obviously related matters outlined above and could not fruitfully be dealt with until current problems and relationships satisfactorily worked out. You may indicate that this does not rule out possibility future US military aid and that GOI should feel free raise matter again at such time it considers appropriate.)
4.
MAAG should address brief reply to DMO indicating Ambassador discussing matter with Prime Minister.
5.
Would appreciate elaboration your views re point (b), Para 1, Deptel 798.5
6.
For your information only. Current status of Army and Air Force MAAG personnel in Baghdad cannot be accepted indefinitely. While the continued presence of these personnel in Baghdad relates to the decision to resume or not to resume MAP, the Department and Defense would appreciate the country team’s assessment as to whether or not some reduction in MAAG personnel is possible now.6

Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/9–458. Secret. Drafted by Rockwell and Lakeland; cleared by McClelland, Dillon, Sprague, and Barnes; and approved by Rountree. The text of this telegram was discussed at a September 5 State–JCS meeting during which General Lemnitzer expressed concern that continuation of U.S. military aid to Iraq would adversely affect relations with U.S. friends and allies. (Ibid., State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417)
  2. In telegram 966, August 30, Gallman observed that it was “highly unlikely” that the Iraqis would request resumption of F–86 training in the near future. He recommended that he be authorized to discuss with Prime Minister Qassim three related topics: 1) immediate resumption of F–86 training or a withdrawal of U.S. training personnel, 2) immediate resumption of shipments of programmed aid, and 3) determination by Iraq regarding future U.S. military aid. (Ibid., Central Files, 787.5–MSP/8–3058)
  3. In telegram 1010, September 4, Gallman reported that a “secret and urgent letter” from the Iraqi Director of Military Operations to MAAG requested information about MAP and asked if items programmed prior to July 1958 would be delivered. (Ibid., 787.5–MSP/9–458)
  4. Document 132.
  5. In telegram 640, August 6, Gallman reported that he conveyed orally the substance of telegram 593 to Foreign Minister Jomard on August 4, and that the Foreign Minister reiterated Iraq’s “wish and determination to have really close, friendly relations with US.” (Department of State, Central Files, 611.87/8–658)
  6. In this paragraph of telegram 798, August 22, the Department requested the Country Team’s assessment of the desirability of the United States acceding to a request from Iraq to resume MAP deliveries and F–86 training programs. (Ibid., 787.5–MSP/8–1358)
  7. Staff Notes No. 423, prepared for the President, September 15, summarized telegram 960 to Baghdad. There is no indication that Eisenhower saw the note. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries)