Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus

241. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Jones) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree)⁰

Washington, June 20, 1958.

SUBJECT

• Next Steps on Cyprus Problem

1. Situation Report

The NAC meeting on June 19 was inconclusive in that neither Greece nor Turkey agreed to, nor flatly rejected, Mr. Spaak’s suggestions concerning further discussions in the NAC.¹ Prime Minister Macmillan announced the new British proposals to Parliament on June 19, following the NAC meeting.² The British may now proceed with the implementation of their plan, or a part of their plan, depending on the cooperation they get from the Greek and Turkish Cypriots or the Greek and Turkish Governments. Alternatively, Mr. Spaak may seek again to get started in the NAC a discussion bearing on the British proposals. The most important determining factor will be the attitude of the Greeks and Turks in the wake of Mr. Macmillan’s announcement.

The Greek Government has thus far made no public statement concerning the plan but Greek reactions through diplomatic channels have been negative.³ In a public statement issued on June 19 commenting on the British plan, the Turkish Government asserts the Cyprus problem is one to be solved among the three governments concerned, reaffirms its belief that partition is the proper solution, and expresses a willingness to participate in a tripartite conference at which the UK plan would be one of several conference documents. It is too early to assess popular reaction in Greece and Turkey.

2. Substantive Changes Needed to Warrant our Support of UK Plan

In his public statement in presenting the plan, the Prime Minister said that “we are not asking for immediate acceptance of our policy in every particular.” We continue to believe that it is unlikely that the present Greek Government could accept the present plan and survive. We also believe that the shared sovereignty concept will encounter serious administrative difficulties and is slanted in favor of eventual partition.

We believe, therefore, that the plan should be modified to minimize the need for formal acceptance or participation by the Greek and Turkish Governments and also to make it a more truly interim arrangement that does not exclude or even favor strongly any particular eventual solution. Specifically, we suggest:

(a) Elimination of the representation of the Governments of Greece and Turkey on the Ministerial Council and the provisions for consultation by right on specific issues between these representatives and the Governor. This is the point on which the Greeks are choking and it does in fact give the Turks a legal status on the Island and thus influence the nature of a final settlement.

(b) Elimination of the right of Greek and Turkish Cypriots to obtain Greek or Turkish citizenship, in addition to British. This provision has a great potential for mischief and could easily be employed by the Greeks and Turks as an excuse for intervention on behalf of their citizens on Cyprus.

3. Procedures to be Followed

The NAC meeting of June 19 was unable to get past two procedural hurdles: (a) the Greeks wanted bilateral talks with the United Kingdom only, while the Turks plumped hard for a tripartite conference, and (b) neither was willing to accept the British proposals as the basis for discussions, although the Turks indicated some flexibility in this matter.

We believe the procedure suggested by Mr. Spaak at the NAC meeting on June 19 could be made to surmount these difficulties. Mr. Spaak suggested that bilateral talks (UK-Greek, UK-Turks, Greek-Turk) should be preliminary to a tripartite conference, and that he as Secretary General, with perhaps help from others (this could embrace our suggestion of a three-power advisory committee) could sit down at the table with the Greek, Turkish and UK permanent representatives. We also believe Mr. Spaak is correct in arguing that there must be a single focus for discussions, which the British plan affords. Perhaps Mr. Spaak could avoid wrangling over whether the British proposals are a basic document or a point of departure, by simply summing up the consensus of the NAC that “all parties, recognizing the right and responsibility of HMG as sovereign of Cyprus to advance proposals respecting the status of the Island, agree to discuss these proposals in the spirit of the alliance. In entering upon these discussions, they are free to reserve their position with respect to any or all of the details of the British proposals.”

If the NAC discussions should leave the British proposals behind and seem to be embarking with some chance of profit into a wider discussion of possible solutions, including final solutions, we should then offer to discuss with the British our detailed views on the possible implementation of the solution providing for a Turkish base and unitary self-determination for the rest of the Island. We do not believe the British have either pushed the base concept vigorously enough with the Turks or given sufficient study to the possibility of its effective application.

4. Timing to be Observed

It would be advisable to wait and gauge the response of the Greek and Turkish Governments and the Cypriots to the British proposals and to assess the readiness of the British in the face of that response to attempt to carry out their proposals. (We do not believe they can put their plan into practicable operation against the strong objections of one or both of the Cypriot communities or of the Greek and Turkish Governments. If, as is likely, the British run into serious difficulties over their proposals, they might be more amenable than at present to suggested modifications of their proposals. There is always the chance, also, that during this time the Greeks and Turks might themselves come forth with constructive suggestions.

5. United States Role

We have welcomed the idea of discussions in the NAC and have advanced for consideration by Mr. Spaak and the HMG a proposal for a three-power advisory committee on which we would, albeit reluctantly, be willing to serve.⁴ In addition, we have urged the British, independently of Mr. Spaak’s urging, to delay their Parliamentary announcement to permit further discussion in the NAC.⁵ We have also urged the Greek and the Turkish Governments to give the UK plan the same serious consideration and careful study that the British clearly did in preparing their plan, and have cautioned against a public position that would make it difficult to participate in further discussions under NATO auspices.⁶

Although our substantive changes are designed to develop a situation where the UK will be implementing a plan that requires neither the acceptance nor the participation of the Greek or Turkish Governments, we do not believe that it can be realistically hoped that these two governments can be disengaged from the Cyprus problem. In order, therefore, to get any plan accepted, the cooperation and support of these two governments will be essential. It is not believed that this can be accomplished without the NATO generally and the United States in particular playing an active role. The Greeks in particular might look more favorably upon NAC discussions if they knew that the United States would play an active part.

We believe that the United States should be prepared to exercise an initiative in the NAC in any one of the following three contingencies: (a) if we detect that the British are faltering in their resolve to proceed with their proposals; (b) if the British display a determination to proceed and we have strong reason to believe that proceeding with the plan would evoke a dangerous situation in Cyprus or in the relations between Greece and Turkey; (c) if the British turn to us for help.

0. Source: Department of State, NEA/GTI Files: Lot 61 D 220, Negotiations—June 1958. Secret. Drafted by Blood and Jones.
1. Polto 4267, June 19, reported on the North Atlantic Council meeting. (Ibid., Central Files, 747C.00/6–1958)
2. For text of Macmillan’s statement, see House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, vol. 589, cols. 1315–1318.
3. The Greek Government publicly rejected the British plan on June 21.
4. See Document 233.
5. These proposals were sent to the Embassy in London in telegram 8956, June 15; see footnote 4, Document 228.
6. See Documents 234 and 235.