Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus

234. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State⁰

Athens, June 17, 1958, 3 p.m.

3557. 1. I have just had long talk with Averoff during which he emphasized in strongest possible terms danger situation here and Cyprus, repeatedly stating “we are facing chaos” and asserting even military dictatorship would be ineffective. He cited inter alia information GOG has received recently on disaffection among lower ranks army officers.

2. When I was able carry out instructions paragraph 2, Deptel 3711¹ Averoff insisted public opinion would not accept discussions or negotiations under NATO aegis. When I pointed out advantages to Greece Averoff said he agreed with me personally but reiterated it absolutely impossible and too dangerous even try persuade public which convinced NATO is “colonialist organization”. Averoff at same time inconsistently repeated he and Karamanlis ready to run great risk of supporting settlement based on elimination both enosis and partition. Believe overwrought nerves may partly account for this inconsistency but insofar as it is logical believe it is based on conviction that time is of the essence and it is therefore worth taking risk on something which would lead to quick solution but not on procedural step which would probably result in long drawn out discussion or negotiation. He expressed great disappointment that his plan had not been brought up in NATO meeting yesterday (Embtel 3538).²

3. I was able to get no firm commitment from him but we finally agreed in general terms on following:

(A) Another NAC meeting is necessary as that body is in fact seized of problem.

(B) This meeting should be held as promptly as possible, preferably tomorrow morning.

(C) At meeting, problem should be passed for separate simultaneous or seriatim bilateral discussion between British and GOG and British and GOT (Averoff insisted Greeks could not afford to go into tripartite discussions for same reasons they rejected British offer last August–September).³

(D) These discussions should concentrate on reaching prompt agreement on some solution. That is they should not be allowed drag on into negotiations on details of self-government, etc. For its part GOG prepared consider elimination enosis and partition or even—if Cypriots agreed, which Averoff doubted they would—self-government with moratorium for period of years on any final solution.

4. I must emphasize that although Greeks will probably go along with something on above lines, others must supply initiative and pressure. We wonder therefore whether Spaak or some other NATO representative could not be persuaded to carry ball. By so doing real progress might be made in 48 hours remaining before British announcement. Averoff said that if such progress could be made GOG might be able stall off Greek Parliament another week.

Riddleberger

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–1758. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Ankara, Paris for USRO, and Nicosia.
1. Telegram 3711 to Athens is the same as telegram 3722 to Ankara; see footnote 2, Document 231.
2. Telegram 3538 from Athens, June 16, reads: “Deptel 3691 received garbled and meaning not yet entirely clear. We have nevertheless let Averoff know in general terms that his ideas welcome and he said he will phone Melas Paris to lend support. He emphasized that GOG can not take lead but will be receptive to initiative by US, Spaak or anyone else.” (Department of State, Central Files, 711.11–EI/6–1658) Regarding telegram 3691, see footnote 2, Document 227.
3. The British proposal for a tripartite conference excluded a settlement based on either Enosis or partition.