Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus

240. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State⁰

Ankara, June 18, 1958, 7 p.m.

3128. Paris for USRO, West and Thurston. Rome for McSweeney. Re Embtel 3113.¹ Zorlu, in his usual imperious fashion, convoked me at 12:45 p.m. June 18 (although I explained to his secretary that I had official luncheon engagement at 1:00 p.m.). I had not received Polto 141 or Deptel 3735² at time our meeting.

Zorlu said he wanted to give me attitude GOT re NATO developments which had been formulated following GOT Cabinet meeting. He referred to GNA attitude on Cyprus in this connection (re Embtels 3107 and 3108).³ Indicating that instructions along following lines had been sent to Turkey permanent representative NATO (Sarper), expressing hope US permanent representative would help GOT in NATO, Zorlu gave GOT present position as follows:

(1) GOT has studied with great care discussions at last two NAC meetings.

(2) GOT looks at present situation from two angles:

(A) UK statement, which by setting forth the principles of new UK [plan], merely follows idea set out by Macmillan in message to Menderes and Karamanlis re final solution of problem and international status of Cyprus;⁴ declaration of Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd December 1956, which has been reiterated by UK, and which is only point on which there is agreement between GOT and HMG (partition).

(B) Statement by UK permanent representative NATO that HMG willing study “any change which may be proposed to their plan” (Embassy note: I asked Zorlu specifically to repeat this statement, which he did, and to tell me where statement had been made, to which he replied that it had been made in NAC).⁵

(3) Idea contained in subparagraph B above (Zorlu continued) was accepted and advanced by Spaak.

(4) GOT also took into consideration fact that UK said that they will allow no possibility for further terrorism on island. GOT, which is attached to partition, and which has always had very strong feeling that terrorism must be eliminated from island, pleased by this.

(5) GOT has been upset by attitude taken by GOG permanent representative who trying avoid tripartite negotiations. This attitude causes GOT to believe that GOG will continue its policy of terrorism.⁶

(6) Spaak stated that if parties immediately concerned desired tripartite conference, NATO in full agreement.

(7) GOT prefers tripartite conference be without Turk Cypriot or Greek Cypriot representation. Such representation could be arranged for later conference.

(8) To Spaak’s inquiry whether effort get together could be accomplished thru conference or thru normal diplomatic channels, GOT is expressing its view that conference more effective, even summit conference as proposed by Macmillan in message to Menderes and Karamanlis. GOT believes that “negotiation by correspondence” most difficult, and prefers “personal contact”. Conference should be modest, discreet, without publicity.

(9) Referring to Spaak’s suggestion that UK plan could be considered as “basic document” for conference or for other efforts to arrange discussion, Zorlu said: “Of course, we cannot consider it as a basic document (we would want it considered as a conference document). We ourselves would also want to present such a conference document. If the idea of tripartite conference is agreed upon, we could even accept a conference document from Greece. This is a slight difference, but an important one”.

(Embassy note: At this point I asked Zorlu if what he had just said meant that GOT would not attend conference if acceptance of UK plan as basic document were a condition of its being held. He was taken aback. After a pause, he said that GOT would not attend, but there was no conviction in his reply.)

(10) If idea of conference is accepted, Zorlu continued, “we think it obvious that calm and quietness must be brought about in public opinion of Turkey, Cyprus and Greece. This would mean, of course, no announcement in UK Parliament”.

For this expose, I expressed my conviction that UK could not accept idea of no statement to Parliament. I said that British also have public opinion to which HMG is accountable. Zorlu airily said that public opinion on this subject in Great Britain is not important. I retorted that perhaps British think public opinion in Turkey is not important. Zorlu responded that there was all difference in world. “We have 120,000 Turks on the island (he said) they (British) do not have anything appreciable.” In final reply, I stated that as friend of Turkey and of Greece, I must frankly say that in my opinion HMG could never accept such a thesis. Zorlu then summed up with statement that in that event there bound to be a conflict between GOT and HMG in conference.

At close of our interview, Zorlu emphasized that this constituted reply to demarche reported Embtel 3113.

I said that after I had had a chance study his reply, I might have certain questions to put to him. He encouraged me to return for further discussion.

Comment: We are coordinating with UK Embassy. Bowker is seeing Zorlu now, and results that meeting with my comments will follow.⁷

Warren

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–1858. Secret; Niact. Received at 5:59 p.m. Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to London, Paris, Athens, and Nicosia.
1. Document 235.
2. Polto 141 to Ankara, June 16, reported on the meeting of the North Atlantic Council that took place that day. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–1658) Telegram 3735 to Ankara, June 17, is the same as Topol 4690 to Paris; see footnotes 1 and 2, Document 239.
3. Telegram 3107 from Ankara, June 16, reported on press coverage of the Turkish Grand National Assembly debates on Cyprus. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–1658) Telegram 3108 from Ankara, June 17, reported on the efforts of the Turkish Government to display popular support for its Cyprus policies. (Ibid., 747C.00/6–1758)
4. Reference is to proposals outlined in Lloyd’s May 23 message to Dulles, Document 204.
5. Not further identified, but see Macmillan’s statements in Document 230.
6. Reference is to the encouragement of the pro-Enosis movement in Cyprus by the Greek State radio and the supplying of EOKA with arms and equipment by the Greek Government.
7. In telegram 3140 from Ankara, June 19, Warren reported that Zorlu had given Bowker “virtually the same treatment as myself (reported Embtel 3128)” and that the British Ambassador had pressed Zorlu to tone down anti-British press and radio comments. Bowker further commented that he felt that Zorlu was pursuing a tripartite conference on the assumption that the Greeks would boycott it and leave the way open for Turkey to press for partition of Cyprus. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–1958)