269. Letter From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Steeves) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow)1
Dear Durby: Before Jeff left for Paris, he asked me to reply to your letters of November 8 and November 302 which he had read with great interest. Your telegram No. 11513 has also received rather wide high-level attention among Washington agencies, and has been highly commended for its penetrating analysis.
What I think is perfectly clear to all of us is that there are two fundamental and urgent tasks which confront us in Viet-Nam; namely, to win the battle against the insurgents, and to win the support of the people for the Government. These two tasks cannot be wholly separated as each interacts very materially on the other. As you are no doubt quite aware, there is considerable divergence of opinion as to the weight which should be given to each of these elements. The Pentagon warmly supports Diem and, I think, tends to feel that if he could only beat the insurgents, his other problems would disappear. On the other hand, there is a fairly vocal school of thought around here which has little regard or hope for Diem, and [Page 738] tends to feel that Viet-Nam’s current problems can only be licked under a government more responsive to the people. Jeff and I feel that these are simply the two sides of the same coin, and that we must help Diem push forward on both fronts, to save himself and his people.
In this connection we are looking forward to receiving the overall counter-insurgency plan when it is completed. At that time we should be able to obtain a total Washington focus on the future of our policies and programs respecting Viet-Nam. We are hoping that things will work out so that you will be able to participate in this exercise.
Jeff and I share your reservations about the proposed 20,000 man increase in ARVN and even feel (as indicated in Deptel 8624) that it should not be used as a bait to obtain political objectives. We concur in your reasoning, particularly on the following points: 1) that available forces are not used as effectively as they should be; 2) that the proposed increase would encourage Diem to think in terms of force rather than in terms of reforms; 3) that it would be quicker to complete the training of the Civil Guard than to start with raw recruits, especially since the Civil Guard is designed for the type of fighting that is now going on; and 4) that it would intensify the already existing piaster shortage. We are somewhat less sanguine about the possibility of breaking up both corps and division headquarters, although serious slimming might be possible, particularly at the corps level. Also, in view of the attempted “invasion” north of Kontum, the increased guerrilla activity in Central Viet-Nam and the reported massing of troops north of the 17th parallel, it might be unwise to reduce the number of divisions in the High Plateaux.
I hope that both the weather and the political atmosphere have cooled a bit recently.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 16. VN 1960–Embassy Saigon, Official–Informal, Miscellaneous Letters. Secret; Official–Informal. Drafted by Cleveland and Wood and cleared by Anderson.↩
- Documents 214 and 253.↩
- Document 257.↩
- Document 262.↩