Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

259. Memorandum From Jerome T. French of the Office of Special Operations, Department of Defense, to the Secretary of Defense’s Assistant for Special Operations (Erskine)¹

Washington, December 6, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Report of Trip to Asia, 28 October 1960 to 26 November 1960

The following is a brief résumé of places visited, activities undertaken and impressions obtained during the subject trip.

Vietnam

I was enroute by air to Saigon when the Coup attempt occurred on 11 November and the flight was rerouted to Phnom Penh. On advice of U.S. Embassy officials in Phnom Penh I returned to Bangkok the following day and proceeded from there to Saigon as directed on the 14th. I remained until the 17th and had extensive discussions with General McGarr and other MAAG officers on the situation in Saigon as a result of the Coup attempt and on the general military situation in Vietnam with respect to Viet Cong activities. I was given briefings by the plans and operations sections of MAAG and also talked with MAAG advisors concerned with psychological warfare and intelligence activities, on the status of U.S. assistance to the Vietnamese Armed Forces in the counter-insurgent field, especially actions taken by MAAG since the meeting held in Washington in August which was chaired by Deputy Secretary Douglas.² I was furnished with a copy of the counter-insurgency plan prepared by MAAG³ for which Country Team and Vietnamese Government support is currently being sought. Some of the recommendations contained in this plan have already been discussed with the Vietnamese and are in the process of implementation as has been reported, however, I have serious doubts as to whether the full plan can be sufficiently implemented in time to recoup the internal security situation which appears to be deteriorating rapidly.

I was also able during my brief stay to see Mr. Thuan, the Assistant Secretary of State for Defense, and Mr. Vo Van Hai, Secretary to the President, both of whom are personal friends. My conversations with these gentlemen were largely personal and unofficial in nature, however they did provide me with information relative to the Coup attempt, its effect on the internal security situation in the country and current Viet Cong activities. I relayed this information in detail to General McGarr and that pertaining to the Coup has subsequently been covered in various official reports from Saigon.

A brief statement of my personal views with respect to the situation in Vietnam based upon impressions obtained during my visit is attached as Annex “A”.

. . . . . . .

Conclusion

My trip was thrown badly out of kilter by the events in Saigon which served to dramatically emphasize the ferment which dominates the area.

Although the trip was abbreviated and I did not have the opportunity to talk with nearly as many people as would have been desirable or long enough with others, it does seem to me that U.S. prestige and our position in Asia vis-à-vis the communists has deteriorated to an alarming extent since my visit of last year at this time.

Vietnam exemplifies the fact that we have not yet, after so many bitter years of experience, developed the necessary capability for assisting foreign armed forces in dealing with Mao-type guerrilla warfare. I believe there is much truth to the statement made to me by one individual that “not only have we made ourselves weak, but worse yet we have made our allies weak as well.”

The problem of making most effective use of military assets in the cold war is exemplified in the present situation with respect to the activities of B&VA PAC. Perhaps OSO in conjunction with JSAD and the Army could jointly study the question of how greater use might be made of this organization in support of the Defense cold war effort, with the object of providing detailed guidance to CINCPAC and/or USARPAC on its employment.

It does not appear that effective utilization of the STC is likely unless the response in the PACOM area to recent Washington directives on increasing counter-guerrilla and related training under MAP, is so great that other U.S. training resources are over-committed such as is presently the case at the ALS. In this event the present CINCPAC position against insisting on MAAG utilization of STC for offshore training may be reversed. Unless this occurs or can be brought about, it would seem that the only alternative is to permit utilization of the facility of the Philippine Government for its own purposes.

Jerome T. French

Annex “A”

THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

A. Coup Attempt

1. The abortive coup was an attempt by a few officers together with some civilian relatives to take advantage of U.S. and Vietnamese dissatisfaction with the Diem Regime in furtherance of their own ends.

2. They counted on support from the remainder of Army and the U.S. which was not forthcoming.

3. Popular dissatisfaction with the government does exist and is aggravated by the worsening security situation and rumors. The basic cause of dissatisfaction is government by a few and the social and political injustices which apparently have occurred but which have been greatly magnified by rumors and hearsay. Diem appears to have lost much of his identification with the people in Saigon who were politically apathetic during coup attempt. It was apparent however that the popular dissatisfaction is directed not so much at him personally as at his political entourage. I believe it is significant that two people both of whom are extremely loyal to Diem and who have been with him since his underground days, expressed to me their disgust with political intrigues and arbitrary actions by the government and the need for reforms. These people are both in the present government with little to gain from a change and were not sympathetic to rebels. Both are held in high regard by Diem but are apparently unable to influence him in this area. However, I believe the fact that they were able to speak frankly to me without apparent fear of reprisal is indicative that the rigid dictatorship in Vietnam which some have alluded to simply does not exist.

4. Possible After-Effects.

a. The coup attempt may make Diem more intransigent and suspicious than before and less likely to broaden the base of his government and relax his autocratic methods. It also seems likely that the purge threatened by the anti-coup committee will permit political power seekers within the military and government to advance their own interests at the expense of good and loyal people. Chief MAAG is doing his best to prevent this within the military.

b. Unfortunately it would appear that many people in the U.S. community in Saigon have forfeited their ability to render a constructive influence on the Vietnamese Government by short-sighted and ill-conceived words and actions during and immediately following the Coup attempt. These people, apparently victims of rumors and their own bias against Diem, were quick to assume the Coup attempt was a popular movement and Diem would be toppled. Their expressions of sympathy for the rebel cause, both during and after the Coup attempt, have been extremely damaging to U.S. interests in Vietnam. At the present time. General McGarr is the only senior U.S. official welcome at Palace and the GVN is convinced many U.S. officials were sympathetic to and even actively supporting the Coup Group. This will serve to preclude the intimate U.S.-Vietnamese relationship which I believe is necessary in order to effectively reduce the rapidly worsening internal security situation.

B.V.C. Situation

1. The Viet Cong are rapidly moving towards a pre-Geneva situation wherein V.C. will control country-side and GVN will control larger cities and main roads during the day.

2. They have secure base areas throughout country and are beginning to consolidate these areas in the South. They are capable of launching raids virtually anywhere in the country outside of Saigon at any time.

3. They are concentrating on disrupting the economic base of the country and rural government administration in order to bring down the Diem government.

4. They need only to maintain present scale of activities to accomplish this as long as government military operations continue on the defensive and mainly ineffective as at present. (Static Defense and sweeps.)

5. MAAG Vietnam has prepared a detailed plan for reorganization and re-employment of military and other security forces, which is currently being coordinated with other elements of the Country Team prior to presentation to the GVN. The most important aspect of this plan is a streamlining of the military command and the removal of non-military authority over military employed in security operations. I believe the greatest weakness of the plan to be that it fails to give adequate weight to the time factor. To be effective I believe it must be telescoped. The type of offensive operations which are envisioned after reorganization of the armed forces must be begun immediately.

6. In my opinion we will not be able to obtain full support of GVN unless Diem is convinced of the sincerity of the U.S. Government and that he has its full support. We must show that we view the situation as critical and are willing to provide extraordinary support, if we expect the Vietnamese Government to take the extraordinary measures which are necessary to recoup the situation. In this connection, I believe it would be highly desirable to provide immediately the additional assistance which President Diem and his military leaders are convinced is necessary and which MAAG and CINCPAC support, i.e., H–34 helicopters, approval and support for the proposed 20,000-man Army increase, and additional special forces instructors. In addition, all other military assistance to Vietnam should be handled on a high priority basis in view of the emergency situation which exists.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, FRC 63 A 1803: Lansdale Papers, J.T. French Trip File. Extracts. Secret. The omitted material includes an account of French’s stops in Tokyo, Manila, Bangkok, and Okinawa.
2. No memorandum of this meeting has been found.
3. Document 210.