260. Memorandum From the Director for Intelligence and Research (Cumming) to the Secretary of State1

SUBJECT

  • Intelligence Note: Reported North Vietnamese Military Moves Against South Vietnam

Since the latter part of November, there have been several reports that the Communist North Vietnamese regime will launch a [Page 718] major terrorist-guerrilla campaign throughout South Vietnam and/or a military offensive across the North Vietnamese or Laos frontiers during the next week or so. Hanoi reportedly will induct 80,000 conscripts into the armed forces and is massing army units along the Vietnam Demilitarized Zone, allegedly in preparation for these moves. However, most of these reports, including the massing of forces, appear doubtful and seemed to have stemmed originally from the French Government representative in Hanoi who frequently is not reliable, despite the fact that he has greater contacts in North Vietnam than any other non-Bloc official. We doubt that an overt North Vietnamese attack on South Vietnam is in prospect but we expect the Vietnamese Communist clandestine network south of the 17th parallel to continue to expand its armed and other subversive operations against the government of President Diem.

Alleged secret directives from Hanoi to its cadres in South Vietnam since the early part of this year apparently have laid down a program of action in stages to be completed by the end of 1960 or very early in 1961. One stage, presumably now in effect, supposedly involves a take-over of most of the southern countryside (the area formerly known as Cochin China) designed to critically weaken and eventually precipitate the downfall of the Diem government. Although the Communists already appear to have made significant progress toward this end, it is highly unlikely that their armed cadres of 7,000 to 8,000 can actually take over most of the countryside any time soon without considerable assistance from North Vietnam. Hanoi probably must look forward to a protracted and difficult struggle, particularly if the Diem government increases its effectiveness against the internal Communist threat and takes critically needed political and psychological measures.

The resolutions of the Third Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party last September indicated that Hanoi would accelerate its efforts to extend its control over all of Vietnam. However, there is no evidence that the Bloc has yet sanctioned any new, large-scale Communist move against South Vietnam in support of Communist global strategy.

This analysis does not preclude, or assess, the possibility that the reported North Vietnamese military moves may be related to the current crisis in Laos.

  1. Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, GVNDRV Relations, 1960. Secret. Drafted by Louis G. Sarris and Alfred E. Wellons of the South Asia Division of the Office of Intelligence Research and Analysis for Asia. Cleared by the Asian Communist Areas Division of the Office of Research and Analysis for the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Printed from a carbon copy.