Office of the Historian

139. Letter From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Acting Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Usher)1

Saigon, April 18, 1960.

Dear Dick: We have done a good deal of thinking about your letters of March 162 and 183 concerning the ways in which we may be of assistance to the Vietnamese in dealing with the problem of subversion. Our comments on the various matters raised in your letters are as follows:

1.
I certainly believe that we cannot support an increase in the Vietnamese Armed Forces. We have continued to make this clear to the GVN and you will note from our telegram 28854 that Diem has assured me and General Williams that he does not plan to go over the 150,000 force level at this time. Therefore, given the dangers of the present situation it appears to me that we cannot safely postpone providing the necessary guerrilla training.
2.

In my telegram 27995 I outlined the Country Team position and attendant background on anti-guerrilla training. Subsequent to this telegram several important actions have taken place. On 4 April 1960 the GVN DOD officially requested US Special Forces training assistance. After MAAG meetings with Mr. Dung, Assistant Secretary of State for Defense, and General Ty, the Chief of Staff RVNAF, the DOD of the GVN agreed to a MAAG outline plan for this training assistance. The outline plan is attached as Inclosure 1.

This plan was recommended to CINCPAC by MAAG on 11 April, and will be discussed by General Williams and Admiral Felt during the Pacific Command Chiefs MAAG Conference being held in Hawaii during the period 18–21 April 1960. In this connection, it is expected that decisions will be forthcoming shortly as to possible implementation of the plan. The US Department of Defense has been advised of this plan. It should be noted that the 30 Vietnamese presently in Okinawa, mentioned in your letter, are not receiving specialized guerrilla training but rather routine military training and have been sent to Okinawa rather than to the States because it is cheaper to do it this way.

3.
By now you have received our lists of essential items of extra military equipment insofar as we are aware of GVN desires, as well as our request for speeding up items already programmed. I hope that the necessary money can be obtained for those items which we recommended, but which have not previously been funded.
4.
I have very strong reservations with regard to the proposal to use Malayans, Filipinos and/or Chinese to assist in the Vietnamese administrative apparatus. In the first place I think it most unlikely that Diem would buy this idea except in the case of advisors who would be here for only a short time. Even then I do not think that Malayans, Filipinos or Chinese would be acceptable to him and I recall that he has in the past sought British officers from Malaya and not Malayans. With regard to the proposal to assign young Foreign Service officers to work with the Vietnamese Government I think it is highly unrealistic to think that we would be allowed to “interfere” in GVN affairs to this extent. Also it would be most difficult to find young FSO’s who have an adequate background for this sort of work and who could be assigned here in sufficient time to do any good. (In this connection early 1961 would appear to be too late.)

The President of Viet-Nam still appears attached to a “divide and rule” policy of not allowing individual generals, or administrative officials to obtain positions of centralized power but he has been showing signs of changing his ideas on this subject. The lack of security has reached a point where he may reluctantly decide to relax his [Page 394] grip somewhat and delegate adequate authority to the military on the one hand and the civilian administration on the other. This is, however, not a situation in which the injection of advisors for provincial administration is likely to help matters.

I realize the above comments have a pretty negative ring to them, however, I feel that we should be most careful in developing our position on this question in order to avoid going off in too many directions at the same time. While much can be learned from experiences in Malaya and elsewhere, we have to recognize that we are dealing with a somewhat more complicated situation in the case of the GVN and that we have left the “Lansdale days” behind.

Sincerely yours,

Elbridge Durbrow

[Enclosure]

MAAG OUTLINE PLAN APPROVED BY GVN

(Sent to CINCPAC, CINCUSARPAC as MAGCH–SO 494 DTG120811Z)

1.
Who Would Be Trained.
a.
General. Individuals not units would be trained by US SF personnel.
b.
CO’s and NCO’s of commando companies—to a volume which the final course loads will support.
c.
CO’s and NCO’s of rifle companies—to a degree they can be freed; this will be difficult.
d.
Bn and Regt CO’s and their S2 and S3 O’s—to a volume dependent upon availability.
e.
Senior commanders and selected key staff officers (Div, Corps, Field Comd, GS)—to a volume dependent on availability.
2.
Number of SF and Other Personnel Required.
a.
3 ten man SF teams.
b.
2 or 3 Combat Intelligence Instructors.
c.
2 or 3 Psy War Instructors.

TOTAL: 34 or 36 maximum.

3.
What Would be Taught to Individuals.
a.
How guerrillas fight—All aspects to include tactical, intelligence, administrative, Psy War, and political.
b.
How to Fight Guerrillas.—Follows the above at a. Emphasizes principles and doctrine.
4.
Where Would Training Be Conducted.
a.
At “base area” at Nha Trang—1 location.
b.
At 2 other locations: Danang and Song Mao.
c.
All three areas can be supported logistically and administratively.
5.
How Would Training Be Accomplished.
a.
Start 1st course at Nha Trang with priority to selected VN personnel who are to be the hard core assistant instructors, and eventually the principal instructors to take over from US SF personnel. Other students would be included as outlined in paragraph 1.
b.
The other two areas would commence instruction at the same time, or shortly thereafter, for personnel outlined in paragraph 1.
c.
The 5 Commando units at Nha Trang would be advised and assisted in their execution of the ARVN Commando POI, by US Advisors at NCO School, by VN instructors at NCO School and by supervisory visits of SF personnel as the latter are available.
d.
After the conduct of 3 or 4 courses at Nha Trang and at Song Mao and Danang, the SF teachers would be phased out and the VN instructors would act as the principal instructors. Similarly, the SF instructors at Danang and Song Mao would be replaced by the VN instructors trained at Nha Trang.
e.
The training center at Nha Trang would continue as long as required as a regular service school—perhaps to be called the “Ranger School”. The other training areas would continue as long as required.
6.
Training load.
a.
A check of the facilities available, and coordination as to the planned numbers of SF instructors to be made available indicates that perhaps 100 each can be handled at both Song Mao and Danang. Perhaps 100–125 could be handled at Nha Trang. This would mean that approximately 300–325 could be trained in one cycle using all 3 schools described.
b.
As an illustration only: (May take larger cadres, or smaller, from various units.)
  • 16 cadre x 25 commando companies—400
  • 4 cadre x 252 rifle companies—1208
  • 4 cadre x Marine companies—48
  • CO and S2, S3 x 21 rifle regiments—63
  • CO and S2, S3 x 63 rifle Bns—189
  • CO and S2, G3 x 7 Divs—21
  • CO and G2, G3 x 3 Corps—9
  • CO and G2, G3 x 5 Regions—15
  • Selected Senior O’s and General Staff and some Air Force and Navy—25

Illustrative Total—1978

  1. Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 16. VN 1960—Emb. Saigon. Secret; Official–Informal.↩
  2. Document 117.↩
  3. See footnote 2, Document 120.↩
  4. Document 132.↩
  5. Document 125.↩