117. Letter From the Acting Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Usher) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow)1
Dear Mr. Ambassador: This letter is an attempt to give you our understanding of how things stand on the question of aiding the Vietnamese deal with subversion. We have sketched out the facts as we know them in the following paragraphs, and wherever we are wrong, please let us know.
- 1.
- You, Admiral Felt, and General Williams are in agreement that we cannot support an increase in the Vietnamese armed forces. We gather that as a corollary to this, Defense here and presumably [Page 332] CINCPAC feel that we should not enter into guerrilla training until this fact of life is accepted by President Diem.
- 2.
- As to guerrilla training, we understand from Defense that Admiral Felt would want the main emphasis on such a program to be in Okinawa but would agree that some people (number unspecified) could be sent to Saigon. However, such training should only commence after the Vietnamese had decided on which units of their existing forces should be given guerrilla training. At present there are perhaps 30 Vietnamese receiving guerrilla training in Okinawa. This is the first group to go there.
- 3.
- DOD is now studying what equipment can be made available to the Vietnamese. They are thinking quite concretely in terms of 100 sixteen foot patrol boats and of radio equipment which could be distributed widely amongst small units. They are looking into the question of additional L–19 liaison aircraft and C–47 troop carriers. They hope to come up rapidly with a list to be submitted to the GVN and they believe that extra money could be obtained, if necessary, from the President’s Contingency Fund. I am sure that we would support them in this.
- 4.
- On the difficult question of whether or not we can assist the Vietnamese in dealing with the civilian population, Ben Wood had a long talk this morning with Colonel Flesch and two Colonels from CAMG (Civil Affairs and Military Government).2 As is always the case in such discussions, it was agreed that the internal security problems of Viet-Nam could not be settled until the government and the troops were able to obtain the confidence of the population. After a great deal of talk on the difficulties involved due to the overlapping and often confused line of authority in the Vietnamese Government and their suspicions of foreign intervention, it was agreed to look into the following as a possible solution which might be of interest to you. A lot of ground work will be needed before such a suggestion could become a concrete offer and we would certainly like to have your thoughts while all this is simply in the idea stage. In brief:
Tentatively pick six to a dozen Malayans, Filipinos and/or Chinese experienced in dealing with civil populations during a time of insecurity. These men would be assigned individually to province chiefs in troubled areas. Assign two young Foreign Service Officers, one to the Department of Defense and the other to the Department of Interior in Saigon. The men in the field would work with the province chiefs and report to the young FSO s, keeping the Vietnamese informed of their reports. The FSO s would pass these reports up the line in the Vietnamese Government and would avoid offering comments or suggestions until a reasonably good working relationship had been evolved. They would also pass copies of these reports openly to the American Ambassador and others whom he might designate. These men would be assigned on an experimental basis and could be withdrawn promptly in case of personality conflicts or other trouble. On the other hand, if they worked out they could be kept at their jobs for three years in order to have time to establish confidence and good working relationships. The Asians assigned to the field could be either military of civilian. The FSO s in Saigon could, if considered desirable, be given six to eight months of training at the service schools run by CAMG before going to Saigon. If FSO s were not available, the military government people might be able to furnish young officers trained in civil affairs, psychological warfare, with some background in Asian history and culture, plus some language training. Such men would probably not be ready for assignment until early 1961. A third possibility would be to assign some young officers from USIA.
That about covers our knowledge of the situation as we know it here.
With kindest regards,
Yours sincerely,
Richard E. Usher