Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

138. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Vietnam Affairs (Wood) to the Acting Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Usher)¹

Washington, April 15, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Viet-Nam—Provincial Relations

Problem

The GVN is increasingly aware that the guerrilla problem cannot be licked without the loyalty and cooperation of the provincial population. They have recently commenced the “agroville” program but it is not clear that this program has been sufficiently studied or that it is the best means of accomplishing this purpose. While President Diem travels frequently in the provinces, it is clear that many of his officials hold back unpleasant information thus reducing or distorting the basis on which he can make sound judgments.

The Vietnamese are always sensitive to outside suggestions, particularly if these deal with their relations with their own people. On the other hand, a great deal is at stake if the Vietnamese are not able to evolve a successful political program for the provinces.

Suggested US Program

During a meeting in Admiral O’Donnell’s office attended by Colonels Lansdale, Flesch, two officers from the Civil Affairs Division, and myself,² it was suggested that explorations be made along the following lines:

1. That we look into the availability of six to a dozen young Malayans or Filipinos who had had experience in guerrilla problems and who had reputations of being discreet and cooperative.

2. That we pick two young FSO s and possibly two young military officers with the best available experience in Asia; preferably the FSO s would be language and area officers. The Department of Defense has indicated that the FSO s could receive six to eight months training in Civil Affairs before their assignment. This seems a good idea.

3. That the Asians mentioned above be assigned one each to the staff of a province chief where there were security problems, these assignments to be decided on by the Vietnamese Government.

4. That one FSO and possibly one military officer be assigned to the Secretary of Defense in Saigon and that another FSO and possibly a military officer be assigned to the Department of the Interior. In addition to receiving reports from the field as outlined below, these officers would, with the full knowledge of the Vietnamese authorities, make regular field trips for the purpose of contacting their Asian colleagues in the field and the province chiefs to whom they were assigned.

5. These persons would be assigned for a minimum of three years with the clear understanding that if for any reason their relations with the Vietnamese were not successful, they would be immediately transferred.

6. These persons would be under strict instructions to make no recommendations during the first six months of their assignments and to withhold none of the information which they obtained from the Vietnamese authorities to whom they were assigned.

7. The Asians in the field, in addition to working with the province chiefs on the question of civil relations, would prepare short monthly reports on the situation in their provinces which would be made available to the province chiefs. Copies would be sent to the Americans assigned to Saigon who would turn them over to their superiors in the Vietnamese Government and to the American Chief of Mission. While these reports would receive the distribution mentioned above, they would be treated as Confidential by the Vietnamese and American Governments.

8. If personnel and money could be made available for such a program and if it were approved, Ambassador Durbrow would present it to President Diem on the grounds that this would make available to him on a continuing basis Asian experts on the subject of guerrilla activities and the civilian population. The function of the Americans in Saigon would be primarily one of liaison. If Diem rejected the offer firmly, it would not be pressed on him further.

Conclusion

Such a program, due to its delicacy, would have to start slowly. However, if the presence of these people were accepted, it can be assumed that useful information would eventually make its way to the President and to the Country Team. It would be more difficult for Vietnamese officials to hold back information from the President which they realized was available to the US Ambassador. Not sooner than six months from the start of the program and with the approval of the Country Team, it might be possible to put forward certain ideas and suggestions to the Vietnamese Government.

The use of Asians in the field would reduce the chances that the province chiefs will be labelled by the Communists as stooges of the Americans. The use of Americans in Saigon would serve to channel and coordinate the reporting of those in the field and demonstrate to the Vietnamese that those in the field had our full support.

The planning of field trips by the Americans should be done carefully and should not become so frequent as to cause resentment or suspicion.

1. Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 100. VN 1960—Internal Security. Secret.
2. See Document 120.