132. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State1
2885. During course conversation with Diem on other subjects 6th, he outlined to me as he said he had done earlier to General Williams, his latest analysis of current Communist tactics. Using a map on which were drawn about ten circles in the area from about 50 miles north of Saigon to the tip of the peninsula he explained it is now becoming clear Communists were trying to set up bases in isolated areas circled on map. It was therefore imperative to isolate and stop Communists’ efforts to set up these bases. In order do this he needed more paratroops, marines and civil guards. Paratroops would be dropped in “base” areas and ARVN and/or marines would surround area and work in conjunction paratroops eliminate enemy. Since good part ARVN engaged these operations he needed about 4,000 more civil guards to reenforce units already protecting isolated villages near base areas to assure protection of population. Diem added that if population not assured protection they would not cooperate with GVN and denounce known Communists. I agreed it essential give adequate protection to population but added thought this could be done if present civil guard of about 50,000 is properly utilized. Diem replied present CG units needed guard bridges, installations and villages, etc. Therefore 4,000 extra needed especially for isolated village protection. I repeated primary need is not more security forces but to set up unified intelligence organization at national, province and district level as was done in Malaya in order gain intelligence from population and evaluate in one organization all intelligence available in order learn Communists’ plans ahead of time and thus break them up. I added further efforts should be made to penetrate Communist organizations to obtain such intelligence. Diem stated he realized in the past there were too many intelligence agencies here, each doing its own evaluating and seldom passing on information between organizations. Without saying how he planned rectify this, he indicated he plans do something along suggested lines.
I noted some of circles near Cambodian border and asked if RKG still cooperating. He replied they are in minor way but don’t have enough forces and many officials have been bribed by Communists. I said nevertheless GVN should try obtain further RKG cooperation.
Diem then told me in confidence had just learned from GVN agent who has penetrated higher Communist echelons, Viet Cong [Page 379] convinced GVN will follow same defensive pattern used by French during Indochina war, i.e., defend only large towns and main communication routes since GVN does not have sufficient men or equipment engage Communists in their isolated bases. Communists also convinced GVN will not receive sufficient specialized equipment from us to attack their bases and therefore VC hoped gain control most of countryside and paralyze GVN. This GVN agent urged Diem to let it be known whether true or not that US making special effort increase monetary and materiel military aid. Agent convinced if VC led to believe US willing help GVN take offensive against Communists they will not continue present aggressive tactics. I replied I had just informed him of US decision contribute additional $4.6 million to military budget and felt certain US could step up deliveries of some programmed MAP equipment useful fighting guerrillas so that in fact we would assist GVN in carrying out offensive.
I added nevertheless we still continue receive reports province officials acting in too arbitrary way and demanding too much “free work” from peasants. I expressed strong conviction this must be stopped and concentrated efforts made to win over population. Diem replied he cognizant of this and in future efforts obtain assistance from population, number laborers actually needed would be obtained on voluntary basis, particularly among the youth, and province chiefs have been ordered explain in detail object govt’s operations and benefits to be received therefrom.
Diem ended conversation by stating he had recruited about 3,000 volunteers from ARVN for his commando group and at least for the moment would not endeavor recruit more. He emphasized that while some vacant ARVN spaces brought about by departure of commando volunteers might be filled by reservists, the total number in armed forces would not exceed 150,000. I told him I was reassured to hear this since reconvinced present situation can be handled by effective use forces in being.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/4–860. Secret. Repeated for information to CINCPAC PolAd, Vientiane, Bangkok, and Phnom Penh.↩