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  4. Document 193

193. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)1

Washington , January 4, 1957.

SUBJECT

  • U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea
1.
Reference is made to your memorandum dated 7 November 1956,2 subject as above, and to a memorandum for you by the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated 11 October 1956,3 on the same subject.
2.
The military reasons for the retention of significant U.S. forces in South Korea are:
a.
To assist in the defense of South Korea in the event of a renewal of hostilities by the Communists.
b.
To constitute the major element of the United Nations Command (UNC), other than ROK forces.
3.
An effective UNC in Korea is essential until the present Armistice Agreement is replaced by a more permanent arrangement. In addition, the operational control exercised by the UNC over the ROK is a deterrent to Communist aggression as well as to ROK unilateral military action. If the UNC were to lose control over the ROK forces, its usefulness as an influence in Far Eastern affairs would be drastically reduced. The retention of an effective UNC, and consequent control over the ROK forces, requires a sizeable U.S. force in Korea.
4.
In your memorandum of 7 November you requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the minimum level of forces in Korea under the assumption that neither (a) the maintenance of internal political stability, nor (b) the element of precipitous action by the Korean Government are involved. It is impossible to separate economic and political factors from military considerations when the United States is responsible for providing practically all the equipment and supplies and for training and guidance of the ROK forces.
5.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the upheaval and disruption which may very well occur during the choice of a successor to President Rhee could, and probably would, open Korea to internal strife and to infiltration by the Communists, thus placing the U.S. [Page 372] position, not only in Korea but throughout the Far East, in jeopardy. A firm control over the ROK forces during this period, such as is currently provided by the United Nations Commander, is mandatory from a military viewpoint in order to safeguard U.S. interests. Although it is possible that unilateral ROK military action is sufficiently remote as to be assumed out of consideration, this does not eliminate the grave military danger to the United States should such an action take place. For the above reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that safeguarding against the two possible situations outlined above is of sufficient military importance to demand full consideration in the establishment of any force levels for Korea.
6.
From a long-range viewpoint, it is not militarily feasible to reduce the deterrent force in South Korea until an atomic equipped U.N. Command is in being in South Korea. However, when it is feasible to support the ROK Army with a U.S. atomic capable ground force, it may well be that further reductions in ROK and U.S. forces in Korea will be possible.
7.
In view of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that their previous recommendations on the minimum level of U.S. and ROK forces which U.S. interests require be maintained in Korea are still valid. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, reaffirm their previous recommendations to you on this subject.
8.
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, did not participate in the action of the Joint Chiefs of Staff outlined in this memorandum.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Arleigh Burke 2
Chief of Naval Operations
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45)(2). Top Secret. A covering note, of the same date, from the Secretary to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General R. D. Wentworth, indicates that this memorandum was derived from JCS 1776/566, “Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea,” December 26, a copy of which was attached to the source text but is not printed.↩
  2. Not found.↩
  3. Document 172.↩
  4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩