Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Korea, Volume XXIII, Part 2

192. Memorandum of a Conversation, Seoul, December 18, 1956¹

Seoul, December 18, 1956

SUBJECT

• Dr. Syngman Rhee’s Views on the Armistice Agreement, the U.S. Position vis-à-vis the Communist Orbit, and ROK-Japanese Relations

PARTICIPANTS

• President Syngman Rhee
• Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State
• Dr. Cho Chung-hwan, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs
• Mr. Walter Dowling, Ambassador
• Mr. Howard P. Jones, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
• Mr. Eliot Weil, Deputy Chief of Mission

Mr. Robertson called on President Rhee at the Kyung Mu Dai at 4:15 p.m. December 18. In the course of the conversation, which lasted approximately ninety minutes, Dr. Rhee expressed his views on three principal subjects—the desirability of denouncing the Armistice; the position of the United States vis-à-vis Communist expansion and brutality; and Japanese-ROK relations.

For ten minutes or so after Mr. Robertson’s arrival, the President indulged in small talk. He appeared hesitant about introducing substantive topics. Eventually, he said he had many questions to ask and wished Mr. Robertson could remain for a week during which these questions could be discussed. When urged by Mr. Robertson to proceed, Dr. Rhee declared the time had come to denounce the Armistice. He said the Koreans’ hands were tied; unification had not been achieved; the Communists were building up their forces in the North; the ROKs were prevented from strengthening their forces because the United States adhered to the Armistice Agreement. He said Admiral Radford had told him the United States had the weapons needed to strengthen the ROK forces but was prevented from turning over these weapons by strict adherence to the Armistice Agreement.

Dr. Rhee stressed the dangers inherent in the location of the truce line. He said Communist forces were so close to Inchon that in case of hostilities Seoul could be quickly encircled. He spoke at length of the brutality and ruthlessness of the Communists; said the population of North Korea had been substantially reduced because people who did not accept the regime were killed. He reminded his listeners of the savagery of the Communist troops when they invaded South Korea, and mentioned Communist violations of the Armistice Agreement.

Mr. Robertson asked Dr. Rhee what he thought would happen if the Armistice Agreement were denounced. Dr. Rhee said the ROK would not go to war “the day after”, but having been freed from the restrictions of the Armistice Agreement would see what could be done about unification.

Mr. Robertson pointed out the advantages of abiding by the Armistice Agreement. He reminded Dr. Rhee that in view of the United States-ROK mutual security arrangements the Communists would not attack South Korea until such time as they were prepared to fight the United States and 15 other UN nations who were pledged to come to the aid of the ROK. Mr. Robertson asked what, in view of these circumstances, could be gained by a denunciation of the Agreement. Dr. Rhee then launched into a discussion of the worldwide threat of Communist power, and said the Communists were counting upon the fact America would not fight. Mr. Robertson reminded him that many Americans had died in Korea in defense of the liberty of his country.

Dr. Rhee discussed at length his view that Communist power was extending itself in many parts of the world without effective opposition from the United States. In this connection, he mentioned current developments in the Middle East and asked why the Russians were being allowed to crush the Hungarian revolt without interference by the United States. He said people were being murdered in Hungary but the United States simply said, “You are very brave,” and offered money for relief.

Mr. Robertson reminded Dr. Rhee of what the United States was doing to deter Communist expansion; that we had mutual security treaties with more than thirty nations threatened by Communist power—including Korea, Vietnam and the Chinese Republic; that we had put the Communists on notice that if they attacked these countries the United States would come to their assistance. Mr. Robertson told Dr. Rhee that the horrors of thermo-nuclear warfare defied imagination; that people who would not be killed by explosions would likely be killed or maimed by the fall-out; that anyone who had attended a briefing on thermo-nuclear weapons realized that a thermo-nuclear war could literally destroy civilization. Mr. Robertson said our President would never be responsible for starting such a war.

Dr. Rhee said he wished he could talk to the President. He said he felt the President had an opportunity to assume a position of strong moral leadership. With reference to a remark by Mr. Robertson to the effect that Communist power is deterred by fear of the atomic superiority of the United States, Dr. Rhee asked why the President did not utilize fear of American power to stop the Communist powers from threatening the countries on their borders, and from treating people the way they were treating the Hungarians. He said that as a result of its present policy the United States was losing prestige throughout the world.

Mr. Robertson said the United States was fully aware of the evils of Communism and hated Communism just as much as Dr. Rhee, but the President hoped to solve the problem by peaceful means. Mr. Robertson pointed out that Communism was so evil that it carried the seeds of its own destruction and eventually would destroy itself. He said there were already cracks in the Communist structure. Dr. Rhee repeated his fear that if the United States simply stood by while the Communists behaved as they pleased, and hoped that some day the Communist orbit and the rest of the world would be friends, the Communists would win the struggle. Mr. Robertson made it clear that the United States was not counting on the Communist orbit’s becoming friends, and was well aware of their goal of world domination. He reiterated the fact that the President believed his present policy was best for the Free World, and reminded Dr. Rhee that we expected our Allies to make every effort to solve their problems peacefully.

In this connection, Mr. Robertson told Dr. Rhee that if the ROK started hostilities it could not expect the support of the United States and other United Nations. He reminded Dr. Rhee that when the British and French resorted to hostilities in Egypt, the United States refused to support them. He said the British and French had mounted their attack without any consultation with the United States; and that we could not allow ourselves to be forced by our Allies into actions which we would not have approved had we been consulted.

Dr. Rhee said the British were a treacherous nation, and always had been, and added that the Japanese were treacherous. He said they wanted to reconquer Korea, and they were even worse enemies than the Communists. He complained that the United States allowed them to go ahead and re-establish relations with Soviet Russia.

Mr. Robertson said the United States did not make a practice of telling other nations what to do—that it was not our policy to try to dictate to other countries.

Dr. Rhee cited his familiar grievances—real and imagined— against the Japanese. When he alleged that the Japanese were building a new military machine with American aid, Mr. Robertson pointed out that while the presence of American troops in Japan had brought certain economic advantages, Japan was not receiving any economic aid from the United States and, furthermore, seemed unwilling to appropriate funds for anything resembling a substantial military establishment. When Dr. Rhee condemned the Japanese for claiming “85% of Korean assets”, Mr. Robertson said that in so far as he was aware the Japanese had not made such a claim. When Dr. Rhee asked why the United States did not see to it that the Japanese lived up to the San Francisco Treaty and why it did not assume a position on Japanese claims, Mr. Robertson and the Ambassador reminded Dr. Rhee that the United States had taken a position, and that this had been communicated to the ROK Government. Dr. Rhee then asked why the United States did not make this position public.

Mr. Robertson asked Dr. Rhee why the Koreans and the Japanese could not sit around a table and settle their differences. Dr. Rhee alleged that the Japanese were unwilling to do so.

At this point the Ambassador reminded Mr. Robertson that a briefing by certain Cabinet members had been scheduled for five o’clock.² As Mr. Robertson left, Dr. Rhee exhibited the same cordiality which was evident at the beginning of the conversation.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/12–1856. Secret. Drafted by Weil.
2. After leaving President Rhee, Robertson, Lemnitzer, Dowling, and Jones met with Acting Foreign Minister Cho Chung-hwan, Defense Minister Kim Yong-u, and Minister of Reconstruction Kim Hyon-chol. A South Korean Army officer conducted a briefing designed to point out the growing danger of attack from North Korea and the need to strengthen the armed forces of the Republic of Korea. The Minister of Reconstruction proposed denunciation of the Armistice, and Robertson responded, as he had with President Rhee, with a discourse on the dangers of nuclear war. (Memorandum by Weil, December 19; ibid., FE Files: Lot 58 D 209, Korea 1956)