175. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at the Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Washington, October 19, 1956, 3:30 p.m.1
[Here follow a list of 25 persons present and discussion of item 1. Attending for the Joint Chiefs of Staff were Admiral Radford, General Twining, General Taylor, and Admiral Burke. The Marine Corps was represented by Assistant Commandant General V.E. Megee. [Page 331] Assistant Secretary Gray also represented the Department of Defense. The Department of State officials included Murphy, Mac-Arthur, Phleger, Robertson, Bowie, Parsons, and Bennett. Gleason attended for the NSC.]
2. Equipment for Korea
Admiral Radford inquired as to whether there are any new developments with respect to Clause 13(d) of the Armistice Agreement in Korea and mentioned his understanding that the question had been turned over to the lawyers for interpretation. Mr. Robertson replied that the lawyers have now given their opinion that the U.N. forces can move in anything they want to with the exception of two categories ([less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and jet aircraft). Admiral Radford commented this was not good enough from the military point of view and remarked humorously that he had expected this opinion, and that is why he had not wanted in the first place to have the issue referred to the lawyers.
3. Personalities in Korea
General Taylor spoke on this item on which discussion had been requested by the JCS. General Taylor spoke of recent correspondence received from General Lemnitzer regarding the internal political situation in Korea. He said unfortunately General Yee,2 Chief of Staff of the Army, was living up to the poor expectations we had had of him. He said that there was a close alliance between General Yee and the new Minister of Defense, Kim3 The two had been intriguing to get General Chong,4 Chairman of the Korean JCS, out of the country as the Korean representative on the United Nations Military Committee until finally Ambassador Dowling and General Lemnitzer had to intervene with President Rhee to keep Chong there. General Yee had made a demagogic public speech on October 1 calling for the unification of Korea by force, and he has also been reported as saying that he was sick and tired of General Lemnitzer’s opposition to his political views. Many changes are being made down the line to put pro-Yee men into positions of influence. General Taylor remarked that it is a very sobering thing to have a man of General Yee’s views in charge of the ground troops in an area of such importance to us. Admiral Radford commented that General Yee is the most dangerous man in the Korean picture today, and Mr. Robertson agreed with this view. General Taylor asked whether it would not be possible for Ambassador Dowling to have a frank talk with President Rhee and [Page 332] point out frankly that the retention of General Yee in a position of such importance will inevitably affect US-Korean relations and the extent that the US is able to cooperate with the Korean armed forces. Mr. Robertson agreed that this step should be taken, although he pointed out that President Rhee is a very old man and in many ways is a virtual prisoner of the forces around him. He said that he did not know how such a conversation would turn out. He agreed that Dowling should talk to the President but stressed that it was a delicate and difficult situation. General Taylor suggested that the excesses of General Yee’s October 1st speech might be used as a basis for approaching the President. Admiral Radford and Admiral Burke referred to the position of Admiral Sohn.5 They recognized that he had lost out for the present in a test of strength with Yee but thought there was a possibility that he would come back from his round-the-world tour with the full confidence of President Rhee and this might lead to his moving back into the center of the picture. All agreed that enhancement of Sohn’s influence would be in US interests, but Mr. Robertson was less optimistic than Admiral Radford over the possibility of Sohn’s return to a position of preeminence. In that connection, Mr. Robertson spoke of his satisfaction over the fact that President Rhee has great confidence in both Ambassador Dowling and General Lemnitzer. He expressed the view that President Rhee has perhaps more trust and confidence in Dowling than in any American representative during his (Robertson’s) tenure as Assistant Secretary. He emphasized that Dowling and Lemnitzer make an extraordinarily fine team to represent US interests in Korea.
Admiral Radford said that the deteriorating internal situation in Korea, together with our frustrations over Section 13(d) of the Armistice, left him with two major preoccupations: (1) the status and safety of our forces in Korea and (2) the position of President Rhee and how far we can go with him. General Taylor said that we could not overlook the fact that, as things are going in Korea now, we might one of these days be faced with an outbreak of civil war in the South; he raised the question whether we want to be there with our forces if that should happen. Mr. Murphy interposed to remark that, if large scale trouble should break out in Korea, we would be better off to have forces there than to have removed them. Mr. Robertson asserted that the presence of our forces in Korea is a major factor in ensuring that there will not be a civil war. Admiral Radford agreed with Mr. Robertson, and Admiral Burke foresaw that, if there should be civil war or chaotic political conditions in the Republic of Korea, the communists would inevitably increase their influence and would almost surely take over as an aftermath of the situation. General [Page 333] Taylor pointed out that at one time we were so organized in Korea as to enable us to exercise tight control over Korean gas and oil stocks; now we do not have that control. Admiral Radford called attention to the fact that we would not have any control at all if we should move out of Korea but went on to declare that the problem raised by General Taylor offers another strong reason for getting rid of General Yee. General Taylor referred to the proposal to invite Defense Minister Kim to the US for a visit. He said that he was opposed to inviting Kim here as long as he was not a proved friend on our side. [Here follows discussion of the remaining items.]