174. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie)1

SUBJECT

  • JCS Report of October 11, 1956 on Korean Force Levels2

The JCS concludes that based on current U.S. objectives in Korea (NSC 5514) the enemy situation and the status of the ROK reserve divisions are now such as to permit a reduction of UNC forces. Were the U.S. forces and equipment in Korea to be “modernized,” and it is clearly stated that such modernization would include “atomic capable forces,” the reduction contemplated would consist essentially of a shift of four ROK infantry divisions to reserve status.

When the JCS report is considered by the Planning Board, the following questions should be raised:

1.
The extent of ROK force reduction recommended from a military viewpoint if U.S. troops are not given atomic capability. The effect of such a reduction on the will to resist Communism within south Korea, and throughout the Far East must, of course, be considered.
2.
The initial cost of “modernizing” the UNC forces (U.S., ROK, Turkish, British Commonwealth, etc.) to include within the U.S. forces atomic capability. Future maintenance costs are also pertinent.
3.
The net saving to the U.S. in military aid and defense support and to the ROK military budget of a shift in four ROK divisions to reserve status. The problem and cost of providing employment for those released, perhaps through U.S. financed development projects, should also be considered.
4.
The crucial and fundamental question raised by the JCS recommendation involves the decision as to whether the U.S. is prepared [Page 330] to introduce [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] into the Republic of Korea. This matter is not only of major significance but overshadows all other aspects of the JCS recommendations. Accordingly, it would be desirable to have this question settled before giving fuller consideration to the other parts of the report and before we proceed to consider revision of NSC 5514—which was suggested in your memorandum to me on October 3, 1956.3

The force levels set by the JCS, if accompanied by the proposed JCS “modernization” would, I believe, be acceptable to the ROK and would not result in any serious or adverse political, economic, or psychological repercussions within the Republic of Korea. (Ambassador Dowling concurs in this appraisal.)4 This, however, raises the very fundamental issue of our policy with respect to continued adherence to Article 13(d) of the Armistice Agreement. It has consistently been L’s opinion that the introduction of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] into south Korea would be a clear violation of the provisions of this Article. Reaction throughout the world and in the UN is an even more important factor to be considered. Introduction of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] must in the end depend, among other things, upon its effect on U.S. world-wide policies, objectives, and position. In my opinion, the introduction of such weapons could be justified only were we to possess incontrovertible evidence of a similar violation on the part of the Communists. To my knowledge, such evidence is not at hand. The Department has already in principle concurred in “modernization” of forces in Korea, short of atomic weapons, under a liberal interpretation of Article 13(d).

  1. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 62 D 1, Korea, US Objectives and Courses of Action (NSC 5514). Top Secret. Drafted by Nes and cleared with L, UNP, and EUR.
  2. Document 172.
  3. See footnote 4, Document 170.
  4. See telegram 356, Supra.