Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Korea, Volume XXIII, Part 2

129. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Hemmendinger) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)¹

Washington, March 27, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Problems of the Korean Armistice

There have been no developments on the NNSC since your visit to Seoul on March 17. In view of the inconclusive results of our recent démarches to the Swiss and Swedes,² it now seems appropriate to take another look at the alternative courses of action open to us. In so doing I believe we should consider the problem of paragraph 13(d), the reinforcing restrictions of the Armistice, in conjunction with our consideration of the NNSC problem.

Of these two issues, the NNSC and paragraph 13(d), the latter is of far more fundamental importance. The importance of the NNSC is in the context of an irritant to U.S.-ROK relations. The importance of action on paragraph 13(d) is the rectification of the serious military disadvantage in which the UN Command has been placed. Our position on these issues has been to follow action by the Swiss and Swedes on the NNSC with UN Command action a month later to permit replacement of obsolete equipment. In my memorandum to you of February 29,³ I suggested a possible alternative, namely, that if it were determined that unilateral action should be taken by the UN Command to remove the Czech and Polish components of the inspection teams it might be best to take simultaneous action on the question of paragraph 13(d).

I now would like to suggest a third course of action which I believe is even more desirable. This course of action would involve: (1) continued efforts to persuade the Swiss and Swedes to take action on the NNSC, but recognition of the possibility that they may be very slow in doing so; (2) giving highest priority to the question of paragraph 13(d), move as rapidly as possible and independently of action on the NNSC to permit the UN Command to introduce more modern conventional type weapons. We would, of course, need to inform the Sixteen of our plans to take action on paragraph 13(d) and should seek their concurrence, although not make their concurrence a necessary prerequisite to our action. This course of action has the following advantages:

(1) It deals first with the most fundamental problem and the problem most understandable to our Allies.

(2) This course of action could be explained to President Rhee in such a way as to forestall a renewal of demonstrations against the NNSC for several months, thus permitting the Swiss and Swedes to continue their efforts to reach agreement with the Communists. He could be told that we have decided to deal with the most fundamental problem first and that in view of this contemplated action we feel strongly we must let the NNSC issue coast a while longer.

(3) We should inform the Swiss and Swedes of our contemplated action on paragraph 13(d) as soon as we have informed the Sixteen making clear to them we cannot delay any longer in the introduction of more modern weapons. They almost certainly will claim that action on reinforcement will render more difficult the task of working out an NNSC agreement. However, the prospect of this action as well as the action itself will probably add to the discomfort of their position and may, therefore, have the ultimate effect of stimulating them to either reach agreement with the Communists or withdraw themselves to the Demilitarized Zone.

(4) From a propaganda standpoint, action to replace obsolete weapons would be more acceptable, if action by the UN Command to remove the inspection teams was delayed for several months, as this would underline the open-and-above-board nature of our action.

(5) This course of action should be acceptable to Defense, since they are genuinely concerned with strengthening the arms of UN Command forces in Korea.

Before embarking on the above course of action, and indeed in any event, I believe it would be useful and appropriate to call in Ambassador Boheman and tell him that in view of the démarches we had recently made and of the Swiss and Swedish second request of the Communists for a reply you felt it would be useful to exchange notes with him on the subject of the NNSC.

Tab A is a series of points which I think you might want to use in talking with Ambassador Boheman.⁴ I believe Ambassador Willis should be instructed to make a similar approach in Bern.

Recommendations

1. That you approve setting up a meeting with Ambassador Boheman in order to inform him along the lines set forth in Tab A, and that Ambassador Willis be instructed to carry out a similar approach in Bern.

2. In a letter to Secretary Gray—which we will prepare—you suggest that we consider taking action on paragraph 13(d) first and delay action on the NNSC.⁵

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/3–2756. Secret. Drafted by Jones and concurred in by L/UNA, FE, UNP, and EUR.
2. See Documents 123 and 124.
3. Not printed. (Department of State, NA Files: Lot 59 D 407, Memos and Mem-cons 1956 NNSC)
4. Not found attached.
5. Robertson initialed his approval of recommendation 1 and his disapproval of recommendation 2.