Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Korea, Volume XXIII, Part 2

124. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 8, 1956¹

Washington, March 8, 1956

SUBJECT

• Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador Boheman, Swedish Embassy
• Mr. William J. Sebald, Acting Assistant Secretary, FE
• Mr. William G. Jones, Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs, NA
• Mr. William T. Nunley, EUR

Mr. Sebald opened the meeting by asking Ambassador Boheman if he had heard anything new with respect to the Swiss and Swedish negotiations with the Communists to obtain agreement on the withdrawal of all NNSC inspection teams to the Demilitarized Zone.

Ambassador Boheman said there was nothing very much new, but that his Government, two or three days ago, had made another démarche to Peiping asking for a reply to the Swedish rejection of the Communist counterproposal to retain one inspection team each in the north and south. The Ambassador said that the Swedish demarche had implied that the Swiss and Swedes would not remain on the NNSC if the Communists did not agree to the proposal to withdraw all inspection teams to the Demilitarized Zone.

Mr. Sebald pointed out that today ended the three-month period during which President Rhee had agreed to call off the anti-NNSC demonstrations. We felt, therefore, that this issue was likely to come to a head. We were gravely concerned that it may become increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to avoid a serious incident because of the continued presence of the Czechs and Poles on Republic of Korea territory. Time was now of the essence and we felt that we had to know with some degree of certainty just where we stand on the matter. We needed to know whether there would be progress toward the solution of this problem and if so when a solution could be expected. This was particularly important in light of the Secretary’s visit to Korea on March 17, and in order to get information to him by that time it would have to be in our hands by March 15.

Mr. Sebald said that about ten days ago, and following our conversations with the Swiss and Swedes, we had reported for the first time to President Rhee in general terms the progress being made by the Swiss and Swedes on the problem of the inspection teams.² President Rhee feels that he has been eminently patient and reasonable. It is important now that the Secretary be able to say with a degree of certainty, although not specifying the means, that the Czechs and Poles will be removed shortly. If the Secretary can give President Rhee such definite assurances, we perhaps can hold the line a little while longer. Mr. Sebald emphasized the appreciation of the U.S. for the Swiss and Swedish participation on the NNSC and our gratitude for their recent efforts to find a solution to this difficult problem. In stating our position to Ambassador Boheman, we were not trying to place pressure on the Swedes. We felt that in view of our close and friendly relations we could explain this situation openly and frankly. Ambassador Willis had been asked to make a similar approach in Bern.

Ambassador Boheman said that the Swiss and Swedes were pushing as hard as they could and that it was his impression from his Government and from conversations with the Swiss that if the Communists failed to reply favorably in a short time, the Swiss and Swedes will remove their members from the inspection teams. The Swedes were very anxious to get out. The idea of retaining one team in each Zone was absolutely ridiculous, and the Swedes did not want to continue to have responsibilities which they were unable to carry out.

Mr. Sebald asked whether it would be possible for the Ambassador to get from his Government a fairly definite idea of the time element involved in their negotiations and the course of action his Government might take in the event no favorable reply is received from the Communists. In view of the strength of President Rhee’s feeling on this matter, the Secretary would have to be able to speak with considerable certainty and definiteness.

Ambassador Boheman clearly understood the U.S. need to give President Rhee a more definite understanding. He said he would cable his Government and urge they try to get an answer from the Communists. Failing that, he would suggest his Government tell the U.S. by March 15 more definitely about their concept of the timing and the course of action they would follow in event of no favorable answer by the Communists.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/3–856. Secret. Drafted by Jones on March 12 and initialed as correct by Sebald.
2. See Document 121.
3. In telegram 879 from Stockholm, March 12, the Embassy reported that Sweden had made another approach to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the People’s Republic of China to reiterate that Sweden could not accept the proposal to leave one inspection team each in North and South Korea. According to a Foreign Office official, however, Sweden did not request a reply by a specific date, nor imply unilateral action if the Swedish position was not accepted. (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/3–1256)