Office of the Historian

130. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 9, 19561

Washington, April 9, 1956

SUBJECT

  • Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC)

PARTICIPANTS

  • Count Douglas, Minister Plenipotentiary, Swedish Embassy
  • Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
  • Mr. Christopher A. Norred, Acting Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs, NA
  • Mr. Edwin D. Crowley, BNA

Mr. Robertson said that approximately one month has passed since the Swiss and Swedes handed their latest note to the Communists on the NNSC, and that the U.S. is concerned because the Communists appear to be delaying solution of this problem.

Count Douglas said he had asked the Swedish Foreign Office late last week whether any reply had been received and had been told there had not. He agreed that approximately one month had elapsed since the Swiss and Swedes had presented a so-called “compromise” proposal. The Communists had previously suggested that the fixed inspection teams be reduced to one in each zone. The Swiss-Swedish “compromise” proposal was in effect the original Swedish position: It suggested that the proposals be compromised by withdrawing all teams to the Demilitarized Zone after which teams [Page 240] might be sent out as agreed within the Commission.2 Count Douglas explained that the Swedish intention was that no fixed teams would hereafter be agreed to.

Mr. Robertson said he believes the Communists are simply drawing out the negotiations. He cited the experience of Ambassador Dean in negotiations to arrange a Korean political conference, and his own experience in the China truce negotiations. He said the Communists would try to avoid accepting the Swiss-Swedish proposal until they were confronted with an unacceptable alternative. The Communists clearly desire that the NNSC continue in existence. Now that the Swiss and Swedes have stated their position firmly it would be desirable for them to press the Communists to accept it by giving the alternative of Swiss-Swedish withdrawal from the NNSC. We persuaded President Rhee to halt the demonstrations for a time in order to facilitate the Swiss and Swedish negotiations with the Communists, but this situation cannot endure indefinitely. An incident might occur at any time which would upset the tranquillity now existing in Korea. None of us wants to see this happen except the Communists, who may in fact be protracting the negotiations for this very purpose.

Mr. Robertson asked that Count Douglas communicate to the Swedish Government on an urgent basis the U.S. request to press the Communists for a reply in this manner.3

Count Douglas said that he would do so.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/4–956. Secret. Drafted by Norred.↩
  2. This is the first report that the Swedish démarche contained such a compromise proposal. Previous information indicated merely that the Swedes pressed for a reply and implied they would be forced to withdraw if the Communists did not agree to movement of the inspection teams to the Demilitarized Zone. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
  3. The Department sent a summary of this conversation to Stockholm in telegram 1086, April 10, and instructed the Embassy to emphasize to the Swedish Government the “desirability confronting Communists with alternative of Swiss-Swedish withdrawal.” (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/4–1056)↩