Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

270. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)¹

Washington, February 2, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Current Problems in Laos

1. Politico-Military Situation. The Communist Viet Minh-directed Pathet Lao have thus far, in violation of the Geneva Accords, blocked reestablishment of Royal Laotian Government authority in Phong Saly and Sam Neua, the two Pathet Lao regroupment zones, and are apparently working toward the achievement of de facto partition of the country. They have, moreover, attacked (January 13) two Franco-Laotian posts in the area, one of which fell and remains in Pathet Lao hands.² Fighting has temporarily ceased, but it is evident that Royal Government control can be restored only by force, which would be considered by the ICC as a violation of the Accords, by substantial political concessions, which we would oppose, by ICC action, which has so far proved ineffective, or by the pressure of international opinion. Toward the latter end, it is expected that the situation in Laos will be discussed at Bangkok, either in connection with the “security of the Treaty area” item on the agenda or in the tripartite side conversations. The Pathet Lao attacks have had the one salutary effect of partially awakening the Laotian Government to the true Communist nature of the Pathet Lao, whom it has heretofore regarded as misguided but redeemable Laotian brothers.

2. Laotian Force Basis. Minister Yost proposed on December 21 a force basis of 23,650 organized along U.S. division lines at a cost of $41.2 million. (Vientiane’s 193, 195,³ 255⁴ already in Mr. Murphy’s hands) This program, concurred in by MAAG Saigon, calls for reducing the present 30–31,000 to 23,650 by July 1, 1955, to accord with our concept of the Laotian Army’s pacification mission and above all with the exceedingly small number of Laotian officers (630), the principal limiting factor. Defense has handed down no decision, despite Yost’s repeated urgings (Vientiane’s 296⁵ is latest instance) that failure to do so means we are supporting an inefficient Lao Army organization at extravagant force levels and pay scales and, most important, are leaving the Laotian Government in doubt concerning the extent and duration of our aid at the very moment we are urging a stiffer attitude toward the Communist enemy. We understand that JCS has come through with a statement⁶ which is now in OSD waiting for Secretary Wilson to sign the covering letter to the Secretary.⁷ We have been told informally that, inasmuch as the Geneva Accords prevent the establishment of a MAAG in Laos, JCS wishes to make no recommendation regarding force levels. However, if for political considerations it is necessary to support the Laotian Army, it will interpose no objection to the figure proposed by Yost. The problem of end-items is completely ignored. The Deputy Under Secretary may wish to request expeditious action by OSD.

He may also wish to ascertain Defense’s attitude toward the problem of controllers to check the expenditure of U.S. funds for military purposes in Laos. Although Defense insists upon a hands-off position with respect to Laotian Army, its assistance will nevertheless be necessary in finding civilians with appropriate military background. … The Geneva Accords prohibit the introduction of foreign military personnel except for a fixed number of French.

3. Direct Forces Support Agreement. Although a Defense judgment on appropriate force levels is a logical prerequisite to the determination of an annual aid figure, lack of one has not been the reason for failure to negotiate a direct forces support agreement with Laos. Rather, absence of a decision on the disposition of Section 121 funds is to blame.⁸ If, as is expected, the President today (February 2) approves the allocation of these funds as proposed by Governor Stassen, $46 million will be set aside for Laos for CY 1955.

Thus far payments to support pay, allowance, and food requirements of the Laotian Army on a monthly basis have been made by means of a provisional exchange of notes which makes no commitment as to the duration or magnitude of U.S. aid. With a decision on Section 121 monies and with the completion by the Legal Division of definitive language for over-all agreements for Cambodia and Viet-Nam, it is anticipated that negotiations for a general direct forces support accord will shortly begin. Practically speaking, the chief need for such an agreement is psychological.

1. Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Southeast Asia. Secret. Drafted by Byrne.
2. According to telegram 276 from Vientiane, January 22, the airstrip at Nong Khang was back in the hands of the Lao Government but the Pathet Lao had burned equipment before withdrawing. (Ibid., 751G.00/1092155)
3. Telegrams 193 and 195, both December 21, 1954, neither printed. (Ibid., 751J.5/12–2154)
4. Document 262.
5. Supra.
6. Document 264.
7. Document 275.
8. Reference is to the Mutual Security Act of 1954, enacted August 26. Section 121 authorized the President to appropriate for fiscal year 1955, on terms and conditions he might specify, the sum of not more than $700 million for expenses necessary for the support of forces in Southeast Asia including direct assistance to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. For text of the act, see 68 Stat. 832.