Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

271. Telegram From the Legation in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, February 4, 1955—7 p.m.

310. Saigon pass MAAG. Deptel 237 rptd Saigon 3224, Paris 2719, Phnom Penh 334.² According best information obtainable, Lao forces need no additional arms and equipment for any operations in North likely to occur in near future. Bar to military reoccupation two provinces not lack equipment but other considerations outlined below.

Re financial need, recommendation was set forth Legation telegram 277 January 22³ for granting Lao army soonest obligational authority at least 62 million piastres (over and above $2 million for February cash outlays) to maintain pipelines essential requirements and to meet extraordinary expenses in connection with situation in north.

This recommendation was rejected provisionally by Department telegram 235⁴ but we hope decision will be reconsidered in light concern expressed Department telegram 237.

At present Lao army is being provided with U.S. funds for pay, allowance and food only and, in view very meager alternative financial resources Lao Government and lack of basis on which to plan future expenditures, is restricting operations to absolute minimum. For instance, 2 parachute companies have been airlifted from South to reinforce Xieng Khouang garrisons at cost 733 thousand piastres but projected airlift remainder parachute battalion and infantry battalion, at estimated cost 3,570,000 piastres, being held up for lack of funds. This example is only illustrative; operations generally will be severely handicapped until U.S. and Lao Governments negotiate agreement on Lao annual military budgets.

Failure to react tactically to Pathet Lao occupation two northern provinces is not primarily due to French. French have for months been urging Laotians to act more vigorously but latter have made it very clear that, in military as in other matters, French are no longer in driver’s seat. Department is of course aware all command positions in Lao army have been turned over to Laotians and French remain purely as advisors. This is reality not a fiction.

Lao military are ready and eager to reoccupy whole of two provinces and believe they could do so easily if Viets did not intervene. As previously reported Lao forces in Sam Neua are now being covertly reinforced. Reasons why Lao Government does not authorize more extensive action are (1) belief of Katay group that possibilities of negotiation with Pathets should first be exhausted; (2) belief of Crown Prince and others that, in absence more specific guarantee by Manila Pact powers, Viets would react by massive intervention beyond powers of Lao forces to repulse (Legation telegram 284⁵). In our discussions this problem with Lao leaders, we have, while constantly urging more vigorous action, had in mind stipulation contained Department telegram 116 December 3⁶ “believe Department should not give advice which might result in resumption hostilities”.

As indicated in previous telegrams, we believe following timetable of measures best calculated for dealing with this situation: (1) While warning Lao Government against dangerous concessions, to accept without other objection continuance government-Pathet negotiations until end this month, in order further expose Viet-Pathet intentions to Katay and provoke Lao appeal to ICC; (2) to support declaration by powers at Bangkok Conference along lines desired by Crown Prince, which will reduce insofar as possible likelihood further Viet armed interventions; (3) thereafter, to encourage and assist Lao Government to take whatever measures political or military, are necessary to restore its authority in two provinces and bring about demobilization Pathet armed forces.

Army attachè concurs.

Yost

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/2–455. Secret. Repeated to Saigon, Paris, and Phnom Penh.
2. In telegram 237, February 1, the Department informed the Legation of U.S. concern at French failure to react to Pathet Lao occupation of the two northern provinces. Methods of assisting Laos were being considered. In addition to discussing Laos at the upcoming SEATO Council meeting at Bangkok, the Department suggested U.S. assistance to Lao forces by redistribution of surplus equipment from Vietnam. The Department requested the views of the Legation and the military attachè. (Ibid., 751G.00/1–2655)
3. See footnote 3, Document 266.
4. Telegram 235, January 31, reads in part as follows:

   “Pending President’s approval allocation Section 121 funds expected this week, Department unable authorize commitment more than $2 million already allotted February.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5–MSP/1–2255)

5. See footnote 2, Document 267.
6. Dated November 26, 1954, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/11–2254)