Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

264. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)¹

Washington, January 21, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Laotian Force Levels

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, dated 27 December 1954,² subject as above.

2. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as previously conveyed to you in their memorandum dated 17 November 1954, subject: “Indochina”, have not changed.³ From the military point of view, the Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot recommend the provision of MDAP support of Laotian forces, over which the United States under the terms of the Geneva Treaty would have no control. Should political considerations be overriding, however, their views as to Laotian force levels which would be required to maintain internal security are set forth hereinafter.

3. In view of the prohibition against the introduction of U.S. military personnel into Laos by the terms of the Geneva Armistice Agreement, there is little, if any, opportunity for the United States to exercise appropriate controls of any U.S. military assistance that may be furnished to Laos. Such assistance necessarily would be administered and supervised primarily by the French military mission of 1,500 personnel authorized under the terms of the Geneva Armistice Agreement. Possibly U.S. civilians with military experience could be used also, providing [provided?] the necessary liaison and administrative arrangements could be effected with the French and Laotian authorities, but it is anticipated that such action would be considerably less effective than desired and would result in a division of responsibility.

4. Force levels in Laos for the purpose of maintaining internal security are contained in the Appendix hereto. These force levels should be considered as supplementary to and in the same light as the forces previously recommended for Vietnam and Cambodia. Further, continued U.S. support of Laotian forces should be contingent upon the following:

a. Effectiveness of the Laotian armed force in absorbing and assimilating the U.S. support provided.

b. Effectiveness and rate of progress of the French military mission in training Laotian personnel, both officers and enlisted, to man properly the forces to be supported.

c. Developments in the military and political situation in Vietnam.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the estimates of $2,000 per man, per year, should be re-examined in light of the comment by the U.S. Minister to Laos and the recent report by the American Ambassador to Cambodia concerning current costs of support of the Cambodian Army.⁴

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to iterate their view that Indochina is an important part of Southeast Asia and merits limited U.S. support in the implementation of national policy in that area. However, until such time as there appears to be a reasonable prospect of solving the political problems, such support to Laos should be selectively furnished and not at the expense of other U.S. military programs which offer greater promise in the development of effective and reliable allied forces elsewhere.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arthur Radford⁵
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

Appendix

FORCE LEVELS FOR LAOS

1. Forces

	Tentative for Year ending 30 June 1955
a. Army
1 Headquarters	700
1 Division, Light (territorial)	8,450
1 Division, Light (territorial)	8,450
Army Troops	3,450
COM Troops	900
Schools and Camps	800
Pipeline	900
	23,650
b. Navy—None.
c. Air Force—None.

2. Estimated Costs

Exclusive of initial equipment costs which it is estimated can be furnished from current stocks in Indochina that are excess to existing needs, the estimated cost of this program should not exceed $40 million per year.

(Note: On 22 December 1954, the annual cost of the above program was estimated to be approximately $47.3 million. However, comments from U.S. Representatives in Indochina point out that the basic cost figure of $2,000 per man per year is probably higher than necessary. Accordingly, a reexamination of the cost figure $2,000 should be made. Under these circumstances the United States should establish a ceiling of $40 million per year with monetary disbursements predicated upon a satisfactory and comprehensive resolution of the contingencies enumerated in paragraph 5 of the memorandum for the Secretary of Defense.)

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5/2–1655. Top Secret. Transmitted to the Department of State under cover of Document 275.
2. Not printed. (JCS Records, CCS–2 Asia (6–25–48))
3. Not printed. (Ibid.)
4. Apparent reference to a detailed cost analysis summarized in telegram MG 008 P, January 8, from the Chief, MAAG Saigon to the Secretary of State. According to this summary, the cost of the 30,100-man Cambodian force would be $42,263,280, or approximately $1,400 per man. (Department of State, Central Files, 751H.5–MSP/1–855)
5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.