Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

269. Telegram From the Legation in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, January 29, 1955—1 p.m.

296. Reference Legation telegram 255 repeated Saigon 334, Paris 53,² Legation telegram 267,³ Legation telegram 277 repeated Saigon 357.⁴ I am much concerned at probable effects of our failure even to commence negotiations for financial support Lao armed forces. It is true that, if our recommendations regarding obligational authority set forth Legation telegram 277 are approved within next few days, most immediate needs of Lao forces will be met for the moment. However, delays in negotiating overall agreement and annual program has following harmful effects:

(1) It prolongs existence of organization which we consider inefficient and therefore reduces capability of Lao forces to cope with an emergency which is constantly threatening;

(2) It continues existing force levels and pay scales which we consider extravagant and therefore imposes extra burden on US budget;

(3) Most important from political point of view, it creates doubt in minds of Lao leaders, at time when we are most anxious to stiffen their backs, whether US support is really firm and reliable.

We are engaged here in exerting daily pressure on Lao leaders to ensure that they be steadfast and courageous in face of their powerful Communist neighbors, that they make no dangerous concessions to Pathet Lao in current negotiations, and that they organize vigorously in order to win next summer’s elections. We can achieve these objectives only if Laotians feel confident US is not going to run out on them after a few months. There is much to be said for not concluding negotiations on military support until Pathet Lao negotiations have passed critical state, and for using our proffered support as leverage to ensure government does not go too far in making concessions. If we refuse then to commence negotiations, however, far from being leverage we encourage Lao Government to make best bargain it can with Communists.

We are perfectly aware that Lao military force we will be supporting will be far from satisfactory, that French Military Mission is not as effective as it should be, and that US MAAG would be far preferable. I hope that somewhat later, perhaps after elections, we may be able to introduce a MAAG and that in meantime we can exert a strong influence through our hold on purse strings, through such US advisors as may be attached to Legation and USOM, and through training Lao officers in Thailand. (Thai Minister tells me his government strongly favors latter expedient.) For the present, however, we must work with such instruments as we have at hand and not sulk because we have no better ones.

This message is written on the assumption that US Government has taken decision that exclusion of Chinese Communists and Viet Minh from Southeast Asia including Laos is important US national interest, that this objective can be achieved, at least for time being, only with help of substantial US military and economic support supplied directly to Associated States Governments, and that such support, within reasonable limits, will be supplied.

Yost

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5–MSP/1–2955. Top Secret. Repeated to Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Paris.
2. Document 262.
3. In telegram 267, January 18, the Legation transmitted to the Department the summary of a note from the Royal Lao Government requesting that negotiations with the United States be started in order to conclude an agreement on direct U.S. financial assistance to the Lao National Army. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5–MSP/1–1855)
4. See footnote 3, Document 266.