Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

275. Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, February 16, 1955.

Dear Mr. Secretary: I refer to the request of the U.S. Minister to Laos, as outlined in Legtel 193 from Vientiane, dated 22 December 1954,² and to other pertinent messages and despatches related thereto, whereby he requests a Joint Chiefs of Staff review of a concept for proposed U.S. support of Laotian Forces.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed Minister Yost’s recommendations and consider that, from a military point of view, they cannot recommend the provision of Mutual Defense Assistance Program support of Laotian forces over which the United States, under the terms of the Geneva Accords, would have no control. However, in view of the fact that political considerations may be overriding, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did set forth their views,³ not to be considered as a recommendation, as to Laotian forces which would be required in order to maintain internal security in that country.

In considering the Geneva Accords restriction against the introduction of military personnel into Laos, which specifically mentions instructors other than French, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that there would be only a negligible opportunity for the United States to exercise appropriate control over any U.S. military assistance furnished to Laos.

In relation to the above, there are three possible courses of action for providing supervision over the end-use of U.S. military equipment by Laotian forces, all of which would require the cooperation of, and liaison and administrative arrangements with the French. They are as follows:

a. Monitor the end-use of U.S. military matériel and equipment provided Laotian forces by using only French military personnel in supervisory roles.

b. Authorize supervision, in conjunction with the French, by the U.S. Army attaché section attached to the Legation, Vientiane.

c. Provide qualified U.S. civilian personnel to be attached to the U.S. Embassy, Vientiane and to work in a supervisory role in conjunction with the French.

The complete lack of U.S. supervision if course of action a were adopted would be unacceptable from a military standpoint for obvious reasons.

The Army attachés at Vientiane (course of action b.), have a primary mission with which end-use supervision of aid programs would seriously interfere; an appreciable build-up of the attaché section would make the U.S. suspect to violation of the Geneva Accords; only general supervision through liaison with the French could be exercised; and the division of responsibility, with considerably less than effective results from a military point of view, would make this arrangement completely unsatisfactory.

Course of action c., although not considered feasible by the Department of Defense, is the only one which possibly offers a minimum opportunity for U.S. supervision. Even though civilians with military backgrounds might be employed for this purpose, the number obtainable probably would limit U.S. supervision to that of a general nature. The division of responsibility, with considerably less than effective results from a military point of view, would make this arrangement unsatisfactory.

The Department of Defense concurs in the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this subject, including their statement on force levels. However, for political reasons, the Department of Defense will agree to the selection and financial support of U.S. civilians to be employed for the supervision of military aid programs to Laos provided the Department of State or the Foreign Operations Administration will assume responsibility for the necessary administrative support, including housing, messing and clerical assistance. Therefore, it is requested that the Department of State determine, through Minister Yost, the number of civilian personnel required.⁴ When this information has been provided to the Department of Defense, and the Department of State has indicated concurrence in the proposal relating to administrative support as outlined above, the Department of Defense will select and assign suitable personnel for this mission.

Continued U.S. military support of Laotian forces will be contingent upon the effectiveness of these forces in absorbing and assimilating U.S. military aid; the effectiveness and rate of progress of the French military mission in training Laotian personnel, both officers and enlisted, to man properly the forces to be supported; and future developments in the military and political situation in VietNam.

Sincerely yours,

C.E. Wilson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5/2–1655. Top Secret.
2. See footnote 3, Document 270.
3. See Document 264.
4. This was done in telegram 304 to Vientiane, February 25. In addition, the telegram noted that it was “imperative [Lao] Army be quickly reorganized into tighter, more efficient force” at the 23,650 level with divisional organization. Wilson’s letter of February 16 and the JCS memorandum of January 21 were summarized in this telegram. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5–MSP/2–1855)