262. Telegram From the Legation in Laos to the Department of State1
255. During his initial call yesterday Colonel Hure, new chief French training mission, mentioned difficulty confronting mission and Lao Government in making any military plans for current year until they know amount of budget support US will supply. I told Colonel that I doubted US would provide full amount requested, alluded to excessive numbers enlisted personnel in Lao Army in relation to available officer cadres and to high cost of supporting Lao soldier compared to Cambodian or Vietnamese, and said I hope to be authorized to undertake detailed negotiations on these matters in very near future.
I believe it would be to US advantage, in view of fact we are already publicly committed to provide direct aid for support Lao armed forces, promptly to address letter to Lao Government along [Page 583] lines suggested Legtel 1912 and at earliest possible moment to push ahead with negotiations to determine exact amount and character of our aid. As long as we continue on present provisional and informal basis we are, on one hand, supporting forces larger in numbers and higher in cost than we believe necessary and, on other hand, since our provisional credits are intended to cover only pay, allowances, and food, failing to provide for essential logistic expenses of Lao Army. This delay on our part seems neither economical nor prudent.
Subsequent to meeting with Ambassador Collins and McClintock reported Saigon 2636 repeated Paris 770,3 MAAG Saigon prepared at my request future refinement their estimate annual cost of 23,600 force for Laos. New figure is $41.2 million. It is agreed, however, that this figure remains an estimate, based to large extent on Vietnamese and Cambodian costs which have been more carefully investigated, and that firm program can be worked out only by detained study of Lao military budget, organization and procedures on the spot in consultation with Lao and French military authorities. As pointed out Saigon 2636 and previous telegrams in order carry out this study qualified personnel should be assigned either Army Attaché or USOM Vientiane.
There was some discussion during Saigon meeting of reducing Lao forces below 23,600 for reasons of economy. However, Ambassador Collins and McClintock accepted my strongly held judgment that, while further reduction may well be possible later, it would be most unwise politically and psychologically to attempt to force more drastic cut from present 30,000 figure as long as situation in north remains so explosive and possibility renewal of hostilities with Pathet Laos constantly impends.
It should be noted that estimate for support of Lao forces submitted from Saigon, as well as $41.2 million figure mentioned above, excludes requested amount for French training mission, it being combined judgment of Saigon meeting that cost of support these missions in three Associated States should properly be borne by French rather than US. Since this matter affects all three states, I should recommend that it be taken up first in Paris rather than locally. However, indications from French mission here are that they will not be surprised if we take this position.
[Page 584]I should greatly appreciate receiving Department’s early instructions on questions raised above.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files 751J.5–MSP/1–1555. Top Secret. Repeated to Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Paris.↩
- In telegram 191, December 20, 1954, the Legation proposed sending a letter to Katay offering direct U.S. assistance to Laos based on mutual agreement on the following issues: Lao armed force levels and plans of implementation of the Lao military program; procedures for control, post-audit, and end-use expenditures of military aid; matèriel aid for Lao armed forces; and disposition of foreign exchange arising out of financial support to the Lao military budget and from the economic aid program to Laos. (Ibid., 751J.5–MSP/12–2054)↩
- Dated January 8; for text, see vol. I, p. 25.↩