154. Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting Held at the White House, Washington, November 4, 19571
Following dinner on Monday evening (November 4) the President met with the Chiefs and Secretaries of the Military Departments for discussion in the Red Room. He said he wanted to have a kind of seminar, throwing out some ideas and having the others challenge them or add thoughts of their own.
He began by saying that he had had three conferences earlier in the day,2 all of them greatly stressing that our people are deeply concerned over rivalry in our military establishment. The question was [Page 625] repeatedly raised, are we sufficiently unified? Are we getting the best personal judgment of our officers, rather than a parroting of service party lines? General White said he thought that the area of missile development is the one where there is least reality to the charges of harmful rivalry. There has been competition, but it has had a good effect. It is clear which service is to operate the various missiles, so rivalry of that kind has been eliminated. General Twining said that one of the great needs has been the need for timely decisions. If matters are allowed to drag on they will cause bad feeling. Now he has been assured by the Secretary that, when decisions are needed, they will be made. General Taylor said that a clear distinction should be made between missile development and missile use. In the case of the Army, they were not particularly interested initially in developing the 1500-mile missile, since their concern is with shorter-range weapons. However, they are pushing this project, with a full understanding that the product will be turned over to the Air Force. They do, however, feel the need for missiles of shorter range. General Twining intervened to say that this is one point that is clear—the Army is to have no missiles more than 200-mile range. He indicated that the Joint Chiefs were not agreed as to the Army having longer range weapons. The President said he did not accept the idea of such a fixed mile limitation. He saw great advantage in the Army having missiles that could be more centrally located, further back from the battle area which is bound to be a turbulent one, and able to fire on all parts of the sector. He thought that the Army should go ahead and take advantage of the possibilities of added range arising from lightened warheads, and then all of the services should consider how the resulting weapon could be effectively employed.
Mr. McElroy said that he is moving toward a more unified approach in the missiles field and cited the anti-ICBM as an example of a project of this kind. The President, referring to earlier discussion, said that the Joint Chiefs must be above narrow service considerations. He did not regard organization as an answer in itself, except as it leads individuals to take a broader outlook. He said each one should try to approach problems from a national standpoint accepting that he may be overridden on occasion. It is wrong to stress, or simply to press for Army, Navy, and other service interests. He recalled that in 1947 he had favored a tight merger of the services, but this had not been adopted. He indicated he still holds that view as the soundest solution.
He then went on to mention the excellent experiences he had had with integrated staffs in SHAEF and shape, and said he wanted to draw up another major proposal. He thought that the JCS should remain as they are presently constituted, that they should remove operational functions from the service staffs which thereafter would concern themselves with mobilization administration, logistics, etc. [Page 626] The joint staff should be organized on an integrated basis, reporting to the JCS as a corporate body. He said he would like to see every man on the joint staff given some special recognition. For example, after six months service he could be raised a grade if he were below the grade of Colonel. When he returned to his service, he could go to the top of the grade previously held. He thought the members of the JCS should turn over the executive direction of their service to their deputy and should concentrate on their joint responsibilities. He recalled previous discussions with them urging them to take the stance of soldier-states-men.3 He then asked for comments.
Admiral Burke said he would venture to disagree on some aspects of the President’s proposal. He said that the individual Chiefs have different experiences and qualifications going back many years, as do the service members of the joint staff. The disagreements in the JCS do not arise because of service, he said, but because of the individual experiences of the members. He said that he must have staff help and advice, for which he had to look to his own office. Many of the problems that arise are not susceptible of final solution, but must be worked at day by day. It would be easy to generate a group eager to please the top men, and it is essential to have the deep judgment to bring to the problem. The President intervened strongly asking why it would not be better to have composite, well-thought-out positions, reflecting the experience of many people of differing backgrounds and of differing services brought to him rather than the views of his own service. Admiral Burke said he wanted to have all the angles presented at the JCS table. He cited intelligence as an area in which, in one headquarters, he had seen a whole staff section become nothing more than “yes men.”
The President said he thought each major command such as the Continental Command, the Far East Command, the European Command, and the Strategic Air Command should report directly to the JCS. The services should be given orders to support these commands. The JCS would study their problems, taking account of all resources, and look to the joint staff for assistance as to how to use the resources operationally.
General Taylor said he thought the real problem is a budgetary problem—to relate the Commander’s needs to what can be provided from available funds. He thought the President’s proposal required an overhaul of the existing commands. The President said what he had in mind is that the Joint Chiefs could tell commanders what is generally available. They could then work out the best use of these resources.
[Page 627]The President said he wanted the American people to have a complete faith in the services—that is what he is working for. In consequence, he hates to see the services rush into print, each trying to better its own position, often at the expense of the others. As a result of this, the American public has lost a large measure of confidence in the services. Secretary Quarles said we have gotten to think the situation is quite bad. One reason is that we only concentrate on the bad things. The essence of the problem is that each service receives an appropriation from Congress. Each must then appeal to the people and to the Congress. The key seems to be such an amount of reorganization as would have appropriations made to the Defense establishment, to be apportioned as to optimize our military forces in terms of the threats facing us. The President said if there were just one public relations office, that change alone would have a very great benefit. He would like to see the step taken which would bring out that the first and the great loyalty of all members of the defense establishment is to the Defense Department, which means the United States of America.
Admiral Austin4 said that the joint staff has sometimes served in just the way the President has in mind. The Chiefs, when unable to agree, have on occasion asked, “What does the joint team think?”
The President said he thinks the United States is disturbed over the security situation. He does not want to be complacent about it, nor hysterical. But he thinks that our people now believe the services are more interested in the struggle with each other than against an outside foe. He said the people in Defense must give their heart to national interests and welfare. Mr. McElroy endorsed that. He said he would like to see, for example, at service association meetings the presentation of awards to members of other services. The President said that from the time a man is picked to serve on the joint staff, he should have a national spirit and outlook in all that he does.
Admiral Burke said he thought we have a rough six months or so ahead of us. He said he thought the Soviets would try to come forward with a series of events that would capture the world’s attention, and will try to compromise the United States all around the world with a series of charges and allegations. He thought that they would seek to dictate solutions in the Middle East, and attempt to play on the desires of minority groups. The President said he had no difference with this view. He thought, however, that when we are working on a broad front as we are, we must accept some “bulges” from time to time. We ought to remember the diversity and number of our accomplishments—our package power reactor, our many successful missiles, our atomic submarines, etc. In addition, he said he was very clear in his mind that there are many things we must do in the military, scientific [Page 628] and mutual security field. In the face of this challenge, it is deeply disappointing to see any of these top individuals devoting himself to his own service interests. He thought we have come to the time when we must forget these rivalries.
The President said he wanted to keep in close touch with the Chiefs and the Secretaries. In December we plan to have meetings with Congressional leaders. These will include a bipartisan meeting on foreign policy and defense.5 The President thought it was essential that the group stay close together. They must stand firmly behind a plan which, he realized, may not fully meet anyone else’s desires. Once they have agreed to it, however, they should say this is what we believe. The President mentioned that he is trying to achieve token reductions in departments such as Agriculture, HEW, and nonmilitary activities of the Atomic Energy Commission. He thought it was clear that requirements for defense will continue to rise. He thought this action raises the obligation, however, that if savings can be found in Defense, the group must be sure to make them.
Brigadier General, USA
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on November 6.↩
- For the record of one of these meetings, see supra .↩
- See Document 152.↩
- Vice Admiral Bernard L. Austin, USN, Director, Joint Staff,JCS.↩
- See Document 169.↩