Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX

153. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, November 4, 1957¹

Washington, November 4, 1957

OTHERS PRESENT²

• Mr. Gordon Gray
• Dr. Killian
• Mr. Wm. Foster
• Mr. McCloy
• Mr. Gaither
• Mr. Lovett
• General Cutler
• Mr. Stanton
• Gen. Doolittle
• Mr. Sprague
• Admiral Carney
• General Goodpaster

General Cutler began by saying the group had carried out its work pursuant to an instruction to examine active and passive defense of the United States.³ He said the full report would be made to the Council on Thursday,⁴ and recommendations would then go to the departments for study and comment.

Mr. Gaither made the presentation. He said the group had concentrated its attention primarily on the deterrent. They had therefore studied security in the broadest possible sense of survival in the atomic age. He had six principal points to make. The group appraised the threat very thoroughly. They had found that our active defenses are almost insignificant. They felt that our strategic air force could be knocked out on the ground today and that by 1959 SAC will be highly vulnerable to the ICBM, and our population critically vulnerable. They considered that the long-term risk to our people is increasing and will continue to increase. They felt that we must expand our basic strength, both that of the United States and that of the free world.

As to the threat, the group saw no change in Soviet objectives and felt that the growth of the threat therefore lies in the growing power of Soviet forces—e.g. their weapons, jets, new missiles, etc. The peril to the United States must be measured in megatonnage in the years ahead.

They felt that today our deterrent force is inadequate. In event of hostilities, we would have to expect population casualties of up to 50%.

They thought it was highly important to give greater security to our strategic offensive power through reducing response time and increasing warning time, through dispersing, and through providing a better active defense of SAC. They consider that we should increase our strategic offensive power through the introduction of diversified missiles. At least until we have the ICBM we should deploy IRBMs overseas beginning in 1959, when the Soviets may be expected to have ICBMs available.

The group thought we must improve our defenses. They were not decided with regard to blast shelters, feeling the matter needed more study. They were inclined to give priority to the strategic offensive over provision of blast shelters. With regard to fallout shelters, the group was initially skeptical but is now less skeptical (although not apparently decided). It is necessary to bear in mind that active defenses would not give an assurance of protection.

He then went on to deal with certain more fundamental points. He thought it was necessary to make every effort to improve the management of our security resources, referring to organization, communications, and decision-making. He said the group was heartened by plans for the mobilization of the resources of the free world. In conclusion, he said the group thought the American people could be brought to support the necessary programs. The President said all military strength is of course relative to what a possible adversary has. He did, however, feel that we are getting close to absolutes when the ability exists to inflict 50% casualties on an enemy. In those circumstances there is in reality no defense except to retaliate. He said he thought our strategic forces are stronger than the group may have indicated. Our bases overseas give a great capacity for dispersion. With regard to the ICBM, here is one case in which a central position is not an advantage to the Soviets. The free world holds the periphery and can pose a threat from a multitude of points. He felt that maximum massive retaliation remains the crux of our defense.

He was inclined to think that what we put into defense measures should be put into the security of our striking forces. For the next five years he thought that aircraft would still be the primary means of carrying out destruction, and during this period we have the capability of delivering the greater blow. The true critical period could be foreseen five years from now. He recalled that a scientific group in his office a few days ago had made just this point—that we are not behind now, but we must make great exertions in order not to fall behind.⁵ This means we must educate our people for the scientific and technological needs, and must also educate our people so they will support what is required.

The difficult thing is that, in our democracies, we can apparently only do this with crisis, and we do not think government by crisis is the right process. The crux is, therefore, how to keep up interest and support without hysteria. He pointed out that to retain a free enterprise system we must retain incentives, and noted that the group’s study had not embraced these complications. This to his mind was the most difficult problem. Americans will carry a challenging load for a couple of years, but it is very hard to obtain the commitments to indefinite burdens.

He agreed with the recommendations on the dispersal of SAC, but pointed out that this seems to go very slowly. He agreed to the need for protection of fuels and weapons. In this connection he mentioned that we have dispersed many of our weapons. He thought it was hard to put across the necessity for a choice between guns and butter, but considered that this is what we face. He cited the need to have a plan to improve and strengthen our forces year by year, rather than to fluctuate and go by fits and starts. He said he was much encouraged by the fact that this group had come to these conclusions, in view of the influence he knew its members to have.

The President said he was inclined to think that shelters rank rather low in the list of priorities. He recognized that some might be developed on a local basis. In general, he thought it would be better to use the same funds for other things. Mr. McCloy said that the study on shelters had indicated a cost of the order of $100 per life possibly saved. The President said he was not opposed to shelters, and recognized that knowledge of a shelter capability in the United States would tend to deter the Soviets from attempting an attack, and that this consideration puts a little different light on the matter. But if 50% destruction of our industries and cities occurred, he did not see how the nation could survive as an organized society.

Mr. McCloy then cited the need for organizational improvement. He said there is a feeling in the country that interservice bickering and rivalry is hurting us a great deal. The President referred to proposals for a Manhattan project for missiles but said he had been advised five years ago when he considered this proposal, and had just been advised again, that development is so embedded in the services that a change would involve uprooting which would delay or hamper the program. He said that Mr. McElroy is preparing for all future development to go under a single director, and will go for authority, perhaps involving new legislation, to allow the top missiles man in Defense more power to control missile development. Mr. McCloy said that the interservice rivalry is now spreading to industry, universities, etc. which are tending to be tied to particular services.

The President said the key question is why can’t we be one in national defense. He mentioned that he was having the top military and civilian people in the Defense Department to a stag dinner that evening.⁶ He said he is coming to think that the services should become training, logistical and administrative establishments, and that the joint staff should be made completely unified and integrated. There is advantage in having a new Secretary of Defense at this time, because he can take these steps without fixing blame or engaging in recriminations. With regard to the ballistic missiles, the President pointed out that we really began work in 1954 and 1955, when the light warhead came in sight.

Mr. McCloy referred to a feeling that is developing among our allies. They are now tending to recognize that the United States cannot wholly provide security—that they must themselves participate if security is to be maintained. In order to do so, however, there must be an exchange of information. The President said he hoped the group would educate some of those opposing exchange of information. Mr. McCloy said he thought the President could “blow the opposition out of the water.” The President recalled that he is a minority President with respect to Congress, and that he cannot alienate the Democratic party by attacking some of its leading members. Mr. Stanton said he recognized there is a difficult problem on the Hill, but thought that public education would help a great deal. The President said he is going to do his best to avoid partisanship in his speeches, trying to make them dispassionate, but will try desperately to get the facts across.

Mr. McCloy said that he did not see any tax reduction in the present situation. He pointed out that the proposals involve some increases in expenditures. The President said he wants at least token reduction in the “butter” side of government. He would be in better position to have defense costs go up in that case. He mentioned the $38 billion figure and recalled that the department kept coming to him and asking what will you give us. The JCS had estimated a $38 billion requirement during their visit to Puerto Rico in early 1955. He had said he hoped he would never have to go above $39 billion. Finally, he went in for $38 billion in the last Congress and was cut to less than $36. He recognized that an increase above $38 billion is inevitable. Inflation alone had resulted in a 6% rise in prices since that figure was established.

The President said that groups must be organized throughout universities, business groups, and other elements of influence, including all those who have taken an inside part in governmental affairs, to put across the needs of the situation. Mr. Foster said that the President is the one man who could accomplish this. He could go out and get support of nonpartisan groups. The President recalled the difficulties that must be foreseen. He mentioned that he had gone all out in two speeches last spring, had obtained splendid popular support, but that the effect on Congress was almost nil. He did feel that there is a spiral of confidence and optimism; if we clarify one major problem in the minds of the people, confidence will spread, he thought. He mentioned that someone had advised him recently not to say this is a problem that will last forty years, but simply to call for a spurt of activity now. He thought this was an inaccurate picture, and besides we must bring ourselves to carry the load until the Soviets change internally.

Mr. Stanton suggested that the opening speech of the President’s speech series would be much more effective if given from the White House, and soon. The President said he would restudy the scheduling of this speech with the idea of possibly giving it from the White House on Thursday November 7th.⁷ In concluding the discussion, the President said he did not see any chance of the group finishing their job. He thought it would be well for the group to be kept together to review the matter every now and then.

G

Brigadier General, USA

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on November 6.
2. All those present at the meeting (except for the President, Gray, Cutler, and Goodpaster) were members of the Security Resources Panel of the ODM Science Advisory Committee; see Document 159. William C. Foster was executive vice president and director of the Olin-Mathieson Chemical Corporation. John J. McCloy was Chairman of the Board of the Chase Manhattan Bank. Robert A. Lovett, a former Secretary of Defense, was now a lawyer in private practice. Dr. Frank Stanton was President of the Columbia Broadcasting System. Robert C. Sprague was Chairman of the Board and Treasurer of Sprague Electric Company. Admiral Carney had joined the Westinghouse Electric Company in 1957.
3. NSC Action No. 1691–b–(2); see footnote 7, Document 114.
4. See Document 156.
5. See Document 148.
6. A memorandum of record of the meeting following that dinner is infra.
7. See Document 159.