Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX

152. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, October 31, 1957¹

Washington, October 31, 1957

OTHERS PRESENT

• General Twining
• General Goodpaster

The President began by saying he had discussed the atomic energy program with Admiral Strauss yesterday, and had asked him to cut down all overhead, construction, administrative costs—everything but the weapons production.² He said that Admiral Strauss had, in explaining what AEC would do if cut $200 million, said they would take the major part of the cut out of weapons. The President then went on to ask what is going to be done with this tremendous number of enormous weapons. When we get into such figures, it is clear we are providing for elaborate reserves, and making very pessimistic estimates as to what can get to the target. However, the B–52, he understands, still has great penetrating power. General Twining confirmed that this is correct and added that the Rascal missile (air to ground missile) has just been very successfully tested, and this will help with penetration. He indicated that he has been thinking we are getting about enough of the large-sized weapons. He would say that the Air Force will not be happy until they get one for every aircraft plus a sizeable reserve.

The President asked whether the figures shown to him by General Twining in a memorandum setting forth JCS agreed recommendations on the atomic weapons stockpile objective for 1950 [1960?] could be reached without additional building or expansion of facilities.³ He asked General Twining to take this paper to Admiral Strauss, indicating the President has seen his paper, and asked him to provide a statement that the AEC has facilities in commission and active operation to build these without additional construction costs. The President indicated he would hold up action on this matter until he received the letter from Admiral Strauss,³ at which time he would plan to advise General Twining that the memorandum was approved.

The President then said he had two matters he wished to discuss. The first was the NATO atomic stockpile. He suggested that General Norstad might prepare a specific plan for this project prior to the NATO meeting, and suggested that General Twining send a man over to work with General Norstad as to what could be done under existing law. General Twining said that his office is now working up a plan which he would have taken over to be discussed and cleared with General Norstad at an early date. The President said it should go into all the major questions involved such as facilities, training, units, custody, etc.

The President said the second subject he wished to discuss arose out of his experience and observations as SHAEF and shape. He thought the joint staff should be organized functionally, with each section headed by a single person—in other words, a truly integrated staff. The individual heading each section would give a single recommendation (showing a nonconcurrence if one of his officers held a deep-seated contrary view). He said he would support legislation to give special recognition and special status to officers serving on the joint staff. For example, if the Director and Chairman approved his service for the first six months, he could be given an extra grade, under a provision that he would revert to the top of his previous grade when he left his joint assignment. The big thing is to create a national outlook so that when Chiefs ask for an answer they get, not what each service thinks, but what highly selected, highly intelligent men think to be the best solution.

General Twining told the President there have been no split papers by the Chiefs since he assumed his post. He also said that Mr. McElroy has promised him that when a minor point of disagreement is sent up for decision he will decide it promptly. General Twining thought real progress is being made in the joint operations.

The President reverted to his idea that we should put service on the joint staff in such a position that it is difficult to get an assignment, and an assignment is highly sought. He said he thought we should give a mark of distinction to people serving on the staff, and asked General Twining to look for a way to do this.

The President suggested that there might be great value in cutting down the service public information offices, and putting them in Defense, with the exception of very tiny groups which would simply answer questions.

General Twining thought there was much to be gained in this direction. He then said that he had drawn to the attention of the Chiefs service documents providing guidelines for speeches which in many cases simply tell how to criticize the other services. He had no quarrel with a man “bragging” on his own service, but thought it was harmful when he criticized another.

General Twining said he had also gotten out of the file Admiral Radford had left him many memoranda giving the President’s views on the functioning of the JCS. They had discussed these and found the observations very helpful.

The President spoke strongly in favor of raising the prestige of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in every possible way. He asked General Twining to see how the office could be organized for this purpose. He suggested first making the Director a true Chief of Staff, and second, letting each section be headed by a single man.

G

Brigadier General USA

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on October 31. A cover sheet bears the typed notation: “with General Twining on rivalries, etc.”
2. No record of this meeting has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.
3. Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.
3. Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.