169. Minutes of a Bipartisan Congressional Meeting, Washington, December 3, 1957, 9:05 a.m.–2 p.m.1
THE FOLLOWING WERE PRESENT
- President Eisenhower
- Vice President Nixon
- Sen. Bridges
- Sen. Dirksen
- Sen. Knowland
- Sen. Ed Martin
- Sen. Saltonstall
- Sen. Alexander Smith
- Sen. Wiley
- Sen. Anderson
- Sen. Byrd
- Sen. Fulbright
- Sen. Hayden
- Sen. Hennings
- Sen. Lyndon Johnson
- Sen. Russell
- Rep. Allen
- Rep. Arends
- Rep. Chiperfield
- Rep. Halleck
- Rep. Joseph Martin
- Rep. Reed
- Rep. Taber
- Rep. Van Zandt
- Rep. Vorys
- Rep. Albert
- Rep. Cannon
- Rep. Cooper
- Rep. Durham
- Rep. McCormack
- Rep. Morgan
- Rep. Rayburn
- Rep. Vinson
- Sec. Dulles, State
- Mr. Christian Herter
- Mr. C. Douglas Dillon
- Mr. Wm. B. Macomber
- Mr. George Allen, USIA
- Sec. McElroy, Defense
- Mr. Donald A. Quarles
- Mr. John Sprague
- Mr. William Francis
- Mr. W.J. McNeil
- Mr. William Holaday
- Sec. Weeks
- Mr. Brundage, BoB
- Gen. Twining, JCS
- Adm. Strauss, AEC
- Mr. Adlai Stevenson
- Gen. Persons
- Mr. Harlow
- Mr. Martin
- Dr. Killian
- Mr. Hagerty
- Gen. Goodpaster
- Mr. Minnich
The President opened the meeting by commenting that while he apparently had no physical defects as the result of his most recent illness,2 he still had a little difficulty articulating; hence he would leave the discussion mostly to others.
[Here follows discussion on unrelated subjects.]
Defense Program—(The President rejoined the meeting for this item.)
Mr. McElroy introduced his presentation with a personal statement of his own desire to Cooperate closely with the Congress, especially as he looked upon investigating committees as being desirable and essential to an informed public opinion.
Mr. McElroy recounted how the FY ’59 program was reassessed late in the year in the light of Sputnik, and how a number of high priority projects were added to the program previously developed. Coordinately, the program was reviewed for marginal items that could be dropped, but its total cost for the future is somewhat higher than this year’s program. He noted that the reductions made would inevitably result in complaints from those affected, but Defense would endeavor to handle them in such a way as to minimize the impact. He noted especially that the new, more powerful, complex weapons were very expensive but would lead to a declining force level though improvement in quality.
Mr. McElroy said he was not asking the Leadership to concur in all of these, but rather to think about the problem along the lines that Defense had to consider and to remember that our defense posture is not based on force levels alone.
General Twining, with the aid of charts,3 went over the proposed arrangements for the various forces noting such things as the reduction of one division in the Army, the increase of missile battalions, the reduction of four tactical combat wings from the Air Force, etc. He pointed out the projected strength of the various services for the end of FY ’59, showing particularly a 30,000 reduction for the Army. He then went over the proposed geographical location of forces, noting particularly [Page 700] that the number of Air Force squadrons earmarked for NATO would be maintained at 75 but more would be held in place in the United States than was originally programmed.
Mr. Quarles recounted the procedures followed in developing this budget. Starting with a $38 billion “guidelines” target, an exercise was conducted to see what could best be done at that level. The programs set forth by the Services were then reviewed both by DoD and JCS, with a resultant feeling that the “guidelines” budget was a close approximation to the best possible at that level. Then the departments were asked to submit lists of augmentations they would welcome, and these became—naturally—very long and expensive. The JCS unanimously recommended that Defense emphasize eight of them: SAC alert and dispersal, ballistic missile detection, ballistic missile acceleration, satellite and outer space programs, anti-submarine warfare, research and development, Pentomic division modernization, and implementation of the Cordiner Report in part.
Speaker Rayburn was interested in progress made in ballistic missile detection. Mr. Quarles said that the principles have been established and that we have an experimental unit already developed substantially like what would be achieved by the budget item for three of the new type installations.
Re ballistic missiles, Mr. Quarles said that five long range ones were under development—2 intermediate, 2 intercontinental, and 1 shipbased (Polaris). Sen. Anderson asked about the Snark and was informed that it was not a ballistic-type; it would be discussed later. Mr. Quarles said that Titan was not being accelerated at present because its development was more remote, but Polaris would be accelerated and the submarines were expected to be operational at the end of FY ’61, two years earlier than heretofore expected.
Mr. Quarles pointed out that the Secretary of Defense intends to set up a development agency within DoD for satellite and outer space programs.
Sen. Anderson inquired about a report, perhaps unfounded, that the new submarine would have less speed than the Nautilus. Mr. Quarles promised to check that out.
Mr. Quarles commented briefly on the increased funds for research and development, particularly for fundamental research activities. On the Cordiner Report, Mr. Quarles emphasized the importance of improving the technical ability of personnel, hence legislation would be proposed for some if not all of the most important specific recommendations. Sen. Russell4 commented at length on the need for going very carefully over any pay bill and recognizing the new character [Page 701] of the Armed Services. He thought it desirable to develop new ranks bearing new names, and to oppose any across-the-board increase.
In response to a query, Mr. Quarles pointed out that the eight augmentation items would require an additional $2 billion or more in authorizations for FY ’59 and ’60.
Rep. Cannon5 asked about activities dropped out. Mr. Quarles pointed to the reduction of the force level from 2.8 million to 2.5, also to the cutback in logistical support (bases, camps, posts, warehouses, etc.) made possible as the number of divisions and wings goes down.
Sen. Anderson thought it would be very difficult to drop posts and bases. He then returned to the subject of missiles and expressed a strong view that there were too many different kinds, involving much duplication, as witness the failure to make use in a new missile, like Polaris, of what had been done in connection with Thor and Jupiter. Mr. McElroy believed it not possible to use the same propellant in a submarine missile. He saw a possibility that Polaris might lead to having a successor type to the Thor and Jupiter. Sen. Anderson referred to what Sen. Byrd6 might be expected to say about this program which would require an increase in the debt limit; then he went on to cite Navajo as a perfect example of wasted effort, as was Falcon which has been under revision for three years, he said, with nothing but a little change in the paint job. Then he referred to an anti-tank missile which would probably never be needed. He thought perhaps a committee ought to survey the whole business and drastically eliminate duplicating items.
Mr. McElroy said he was in general agreement with the basic purpose of the Senator’s argument though he could not agree on each of the specifics. Sen. Anderson thought that the cost of changing from Corporal to Sergeant went way beyond anything that could be tolerated in a business undertaking. The President turned to “Clinton” and said that he had had at least 30 full dress briefings on all of this and that the whole trouble lay in finding what made something truly effective tactically. He said that the development effort was going ahead on a dozen different tangents, something on which he had spoken with some bitterness, frankly, to Mr. Guy Holaday. The experts had argued however, that another $40 or $45 million might be just the difference needed to make Redstone a magnificent weapon. But, the President agreed, the matter of spending $5.2 billion without putting a single weapon in the arsenals seemed terrible—yet the experts were of a different view and the question of what to take out was virtually insoluble; so the Administration policy had been to concentrate [Page 702] on those that looked the most likely and to go slow with those that seemed least likely to succeed. He invited Sen. Anderson to go over to the Defense Department where they would brief him for two solid days—and leave him thoroughly confused!
Mr. McElroy again noted the evolutionary stage of missile development, something that would not go on indefinitely. He mentioned that the Sergeant is a solid propellant missile, thus completely different from the Corporal. He said that Defense had cut out some of the missiles under study and more would be cut as time goes on.
Rep. McCormack7 noted the President’s appointment of Dr. Killian, a man who commanded great admiration among Democrats as well as Republicans. Mr. McCormack hoped that the President would give him great support. The President responded that he would not otherwise have appointed Dr. Killian! He went on to say that Killian should be able to do a lot in straightening out these puzzles. Even though operating responsibility was delegated from the President to the Secretary of Defense and Killian had none of it, nevertheless he would be in a position to be very helpful to both.
[Here follows discussion on mutual security.]
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Confidential. Drafted by Minnich.↩
- The President suffered a slight occlusion of the cerebral artery on November 25 and was indisposed for a few days.↩
- Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.↩
- Senator Richard B. Russell (D–Ga.).↩
- Representative Clarence Cannon (D–Mo.).↩
- Senator Harry Flood Byrd (D–Va.).↩
- Representative John W. McCormack (D–Mass.).↩