273. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 17, 19571
SUBJECT
- U.S.-British discussions—The Tunisian Arms Question
PARTICIPANTS
- Ambassador Hervé Alphand, French Ambassador
- Mr. Jean de la Grandville, Counselor, French Embassy
- Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, Assistant Secretary, EUR
- Mr. H.G. Torbert, Jr., WE
Ambassador Alphand called at his request and stated that his primary interest was in learning what had occurred at the discussions between the Secretary and Selwyn Lloyd. Mr. Elbrick said that he had not been present for the whole conversation and that a very large part had dealt with the Middle East. He thought that the Ambassador should talk to someone in NEA to get the report on this subject at first hand since they had the whole story.
Mr. Elbrick read Ambassador Alphand the ticker item from London regarding the visit of Prime Minister Macmillan to the United States on Tuesday and Wednesday of next week.2 He said that we were under some apprehension that this might be interpreted as a sign that there was a more grave crisis in world affairs than perhaps actually existed. However, we hope world opinion would interpret the meeting for what it actually is, namely, an opportunity to discuss serious current problems between the Chiefs of Government of two countries with great many mutual interests. [Page 724] Selwyn Lloyd was already here and would remain in this country for the meetings.
[Here follows discussion of the Yugoslav-German problem.]
Mr. Elbrick then said the Secretary and Mr. Lloyd had discussed the problem of the urgent necessity of furnishing arms to the Tunisian Government. The British had indicated they shared our opinion that a positive solution of this problem cannot be longer postponed. As a result Ambassador Jebb and Ambassador Houghton both made representations to the French Foreign Office today to the effect that it was necessary to draw up an immediate plan of action and that we felt that at least token shipments of arms must be made to Tunisia during October.3 We still hope the French will see their way clear to do this themselves or will associate themselves with our action. We are also talking to the Belgians and the Italians in the same sense. If the French find themselves unable to take any action on this matter or to associate themselves with it, the United Kingdom and the United States will feel obliged to proceed, in any event. He inquired whether Ambassador Alphand had any further word on this subject from Paris.
The Ambassador reacted strongly …. He said that he had understood that nothing would be done on this subject until he had a chance to talk to the Secretary about it. He had advised his Government in this sense and he was completely astounded that we were taking a position on this matter without having talked to him further. Mr. Elbrick said that he had had no such understanding. His recollection was that he had told Ambassador Alphand that if it were advantageous for him to see the Secretary, he would see that the Ambassador had an appointment to explain the French position. He had, in fact, suggested that the Ambassador do so in any case. Meanwhile we had had several further conversations in Paris and had the French Government’s reactions and these were available to the Secretary. We had hoped to delay the matter and had, indeed, delayed it for a while but the situation did not develop favorably as we had hoped.
The Ambassador … observed that the United States was obviously taking a decision affecting France without consulting her. Mr. Elbrick pointed out that that was exactly what we were doing today and, in fact, had been doing for some time. The Ambassador said this was not consultation but an ultimatum. It was a most serious action. Perhaps it would enable us to keep Tunisia but he did not know about France. France had a caretaker government, was in a most delicate position, and it was unthinkable that we should do [Page 725] such a thing to an ally. Furthermore, the thing was being done behind his back and he felt most bitterly about it. Mr. Elbrick said it was not being done behind his back at all. We were advising him and trying to give the French every possible chance to meet a danger which we see but apparently France does not see. Ambassador Alphand said he saw no alternative but for him to see the Secretary immediately. He thought the United States policy was disastrous. He had thought so a year ago at the time of the Suez Crisis and could not understand our action then. He said he could not understand it now. We had made one mistake after another throughout the Middle East and in North Africa.
Mr. Elbrick said that he did not think the Secretary was unaware of the serious issues involved here or the French views on the matter but if the Ambassador desired he would arrange an appointment with the Secretary as soon as possible. As to our taking a decision in the last day or so behind his back, the actual decision was taken some weeks ago when we committed ourselves to Bourguiba that we would see that he received a supply of arms. The only thing that remained was the question of timing and the exact source. We had consulted France through every stage and were consulting her now, and hope that she will see her way clear to solve the problem. Meanwhile, Mr. Elbrick said he would have to protest the attitude that everything France did was right and that everything the United States did was wrong. He could point out quite a number of mistakes in French policy. As a matter of fact, French North African policy left a great deal to be desired from our point of view.
Ambassador Alphand … observed … that he saw no hope for France without the alliance but did not see how the alliance could exist when we deliberately went against the interests of an important ally in a matter vital to it. Mr. Elbrick said that it was not a new thing for allies to disagree. It was unfortunate and we tried to agree as much as possible but sometimes there came an issue over which we could not see eye to eye. Close alliances were created in order to surmount such disagreements and there was no reason why this alliance should not continue on a close and friendly basis, even if we have to split on this one point. We were exceedingly sorry about the difficulties that France was having and we particularly realize that they were in an unpleasant situation at the present on Algeria. Mr. Alphand asked whether we saw any way of keeping these arms from going to Algeria. Mr. Elbrick indicated that they were being provided for defensive purposes and that he thought the supply provided at this time would not be significant as a possible source for Algeria even should the Tunisians wish to use them for this purpose. However, as they had no arms for their own security forces, he felt this unlikely.
[Page 726]Ambassador Alphand commented that the Communists would use this action very effectively and he thought that it might have most serious consequences in the formation of the new French Government. Mr. Elbrick said that we realize there were these possibilities, the Communists would always take advantage of such a situation, and it was a risk that we would have to take.
Mr. Elbrick asked whether he still wanted to see the Secretary. The Ambassador said that after all there was nothing he could say now. He would have to wait for instructions. (He later requested such a meeting for October 18.)
In departing, Ambassador Alphand said that he spoke as he had only because he was a close friend of Mr. Elbrick and of America, and felt he could do so. He hoped he had not given offense or damaged the friendship. He hoped that his assessment of the bad effects of this were wrong, but he was afraid they were not.