272. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 15, 19571
SUBJECT
- Tunisian Arms Request
PARTICIPANTS
- Selwyn Lloyd, British Foreign Secretary
- Sir Harold Caccia, K.C.M.G., Ambassador of Great Britain
- Lord Hood, Minister, Embassy of Great Britain
- Dennis Laskey, Assistant to British Foreign Secretary
- Willie Morris, First Secretary, Embassy of Great Britain
- The Secretary
- C. Burke Elbrick, Assistant Secretary, EUR
- Joseph Palmer 2nd, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
- William N. Dale, BNA
- John A. Bovey, Jr., AFN
The Secretary remarked that the United Kingdom and the United States seemed close to agreement on the handling of the Tunisian arms request, and that it only remained to clear up questions of timing. He explained that we had already undertaken a commitment to Bourguiba to see that Tunisia’s arms needs were met.
Mr. Lloyd said that the only real point of difference the British had with our proposals for handling this matter was that they felt it essential that we both first inform the French of what we propose to do.
Mr. Palmer explained that although we had committed ourselves to see that Tunisia’s needs were met, we had not as yet set any date with the Tunisians after which the United States would be prepared to act. This was a new element in the proposed joint action.
The Secretary said that we would probably not be able to find other sources of supply, and that he felt it was neither practical nor dignified to “shop around”. We had taken the position that Tunisia was a sovereign and independent nation and we should therefore be prepared to make available a modest quantity of arms destined for Tunisia’s own security needs and not to be transferred elsewhere. He said that he hoped the impact of joint US–UK action would provide insurance against the French reacting violently against either of us. The Secretary said it was unlikely that the Belgians or Italians would relish the prospect of doing an unpleasant job for us. Mr. Pella, for example, had seemed genuinely convinced of the need for helping out the Tunisians when he was here, but Italian relations with [Page 722] France had obviously made it necessary for him to accede to French objections in the matter.
Mr. Lloyd said that the British Ambassador in Paris2 was unhappy over the prospect of British action in this matter but felt the situation would be somewhat improved by acting in concert with the United States. The Secretary said our Embassy naturally had misgivings too but that he thought we must move ahead.
Mr. Lloyd said that he still saw advantages in informing the Italians and the Belgians of our course even if they were unable to act in supplying arms, and Mr. Caccia added that they would be more likely to act if the United States and United Kingdom made clear that we were already committed. The Secretary said he saw no harm in approaching the Belgians and Italians providing this involved no undue delay and providing we did not create the impression we were trying to back out of our own responsibilities and to get some one else to do a disagreeable job for us. The wider the responsibilities in such an operation were spread, the better it would be for all.3
Mr. Lloyd made clear that the British proposals to us did not envisage any British commitment to Bourguiba at this point beyond stating that the United Kingdom was prepared to consider making available a modest amount of arms without commitment as to types or dates of delivery. They had as yet no specific request from the Tunisians. Mr. Palmer said we had as yet no commitment on dates and that the October deadline was one imposed by Mr. Bourguiba on himself in speaking to the Tunisian public. The Secretary said that the important thing was not simultaneous deliveries but rather our making it clear that the United States and the United Kingdom were acting in concert. He suggested we might divide between us responsibility for the various items on the list submitted to us by the Tunisians.
Mr. Lloyd felt that our representations to the French should be made on the basis that we were going to proceed to make arms available if the French were unable to do it. It was pointed out that the French would probably be unable to move during the present government crisis.
[Page 723]The Secretary said that our approaches in Paris should probably be made severally but on the same day. Mr. Lloyd agreed to guide the British part of the operation from here and it was left that the Department would work out instructions in collaboration with the British Embassy here.
The Secretary said—and Mr. Lloyd indicated agreement—that it would be a tragedy if the whole Western position in Europe should be jeopardized by inaction in Tunisia and the loss of North Africa.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56/10–1557. Secret. Drafted by Bovey,↩
- Sir Hubert Miles Gladwyn Jebb.↩
- Telegrams 626 to Brussels and 1598 to Rome, both October 16, instructed the Embassies to make coordinated approaches with the British to discover whether Belgium or Italy would be willing to join in the undertaking to provide arms to Tunisia for internal security purposes. (Department of State, Central Files, 772.56/10–1657) Telegram 1449, from Rome, October 19, reported that the Italians were unwilling to make an immediate commitment due to the difficulties it might create for the French. (Ibid., 772.56/10–1957) Telegram 572 from Brussels, October 19, stated that the Belgians were unwilling to act without consulting the French. (Ibid.)↩