Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

274. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 18, 1957¹

Washington, October 18, 1957

SUBJECT

• Tunisian Arms Request

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Herve Alphand, French Ambassador
• Mr. Charles Lucet, French Minister
• Mr. John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State
• Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, Assistant Secretary, EUR
• Mr. Joseph Palmer 2nd, Deputy Assistant Secretary, AF

Ambassador Alphand said that Mr. Pineau had received the Secretary’s most recent message with respect to the Tunisian arms request and had asked him to convey certain reactions.² The Ambassador continued by saying that the French entirely understand the United States reasoning in this matter. They appreciate that the shipment involved would be of a token nature, that the arms would be used only in Tunisia and that we are attempting to prevent the Tunisians from purchasing the arms from the Soviet bloc. Mr. Pineau wished to emphasize to the Secretary, however, that he was highly worried about the U.S. and the UK taking any action on this problem in the absence of a French Government. Particularly in light of Mr. Bourguiba’s speech of yesterday in which he had expressed his pleasure at the recent improvement in French-Tunisian relations, it is impossible to believe that the United States and the United Kingdom could not postpone action on the arms request until after a new French Government has been formed. If the proposed U.S.–UK action should become publicly known in France, it would, in Mr. Pineau’s opinion, be impossible to avoid a disastrous effect on French opinion. The Communists and neutrals would use this information to charge that there is no solidarity in NATO and that the British and Americans are making arms available to the Tunisians which will enable the latter to kill French soldiers. The Ambassador said that he knew, of course, that such charges would have no foundation in fact, but they would be widely believed in France. He went on to say that there was of course a particular need for close solidarity in the NATO alliance during the present world crisis. Under these circumstances, he strongly urged that the United States Government defer further action on this matter until a new French Government had been formed. He felt certain that the Tunisian problem would, in fact, be one of the first things dealt with by a new government.

The Secretary said there was no U.S. desire to do anything which would be either embarrassing to France in its present governmental crisis nor which would affect the solidarity of NATO. He added we were not going to do anything in this matter any sooner than is necessary to prevent a major disaster in North Africa. He could not say when events might require such action. We have tried our best to delay as long as possible and the more time we can gain, the better. But when the time comes when decisive action is called for, we cannot afford to wait any longer in making at least a token delivery. We do not intend to take such action one day sooner than is necessary to save the situation. At the same time, we cannot undertake to delay until after a French Government is formed. The Secretary concluded by saying that obviously the Ambassador could not give us any assurance as to when a French Government could be formed and, in those circumstances, France could not expect the whole world to stand still until the parliamentary crisis was resolved.

Ambassador Alphand reiterated his concern about exploitation by leftist elements in France and again urged that no action be taken until a French Government was formed. The Secretary reiterated the reasons why it was impossible for us to give such a commitment. The Ambassador then said that if it were possible to give such an assurance, he would be willing to give personal commitments that as soon as a new French Government were formed he would (1) recommend that it approve the proposed U.S.–UK action and (2) that France itself undertake the supply of arms… .

The Secretary said that he did not regard Bourguiba’s appeal as blackmail. He said that no newly independent government could accept a situation in which it is denied the right to purchase arms for its legitimate self-defense requirements. If it did so, it could not then be regarded as independent. He pointed out that Tunisia has the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter and that Bourguiba has no choice except to exercise that right by buying arms where he can. Otherwise, he could not survive in office. The Secretary pointed out that the Tunisian arms request is a logical consequence of the French action in having granted independence to Tunisia and that it would be nothing but a mockery if the West, under these circumstances, denied arms to Tunisia.

The French Ambassador observed that if Tunisia were in fact a truly independent state, it should behave like one by denying aid to the Algerians. The fact that it gave assistance to the Algerian cause through the arms traffic, maintenance of hospitals and training centers for the FLN, etc., indicated that it was not truly independent.

The Secretary said he could not agree with this analysis. The facts adduced by Mr. Alphand did not demonstrate that Tunisia was not independent but merely that it followed policies which were regarded by France as inimical to her.

Mr. Alphand said that he did not believe that it would be useful to pursue these arguments further. He noted that Ambassador Houghton had mentioned the date of October 23 when the United States and the UK might approach the Tunisian Government with respect to our further plans. He again pled that we postpone such action.

The Secretary reiterated that we could not allow a situation to develop which might permit the Soviets to gain control of Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria. Such action might result in the loss of Europe. We see the greatest dangers in this situation and so do the British. Since the Ambassador is prepared to recommend action to a new government, so presumably does he. In such circumstances, we cannot stand aside and allow this to happen merely because the French Government cannot act. The problem involved is primarily one of timing. If we can postpone action, we shall do so. With respect to the date of October 23, this was a possible date we had in mind to acquaint Mr. Bourguiba of our plans. Bourguiba has been promising his people that he would have arms by the end of October. If we can get him to accept the idea of prolongation, we shall do so. If, however, it appears necessary that we move ahead, we shall have to feel free to adopt that course.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56/10–1857. Secret. Drafted by Palmer.
2. In telegram 1959 from Paris, October 17, Ambassador Houghton indicated that he had presented the Department’s aide-mémoire to Pineau earlier that day. Since the French Government had officially resigned. Pineau could only offer his personal assessment that France’s reaction would be most bitter if the United States went through with its intention to supply arms to Tunisia during the interregnum. Houghton urged delay until investiture of a new French Government and recommended that the United States ask Bourguiba not to publicize the U.S. assurance that he would soon be receiving arms. (Ibid., 772.56/10–1757)