Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

271. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, October 15, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Status of and Program of Action on the Tunisian Arms Request

Discussion:

1. Our assessment of the Tunisian political situation indicates that the time remaining for Bourguiba to deal with the arms problem is dwindling rapidly. More than five weeks have passed since he requested United States assistance and three weeks since we assured him of our help. During this period our appeals to the French have been of no avail. Pineau has indicated that it is “out of the question” for the caretaker government to take effective action on this matter which was an issue in the debate leading up to its fall to the present caretaker government. He also warned that if the U.S. should supply arms before a new government takes office, it could have an extremely adverse effect on the internal French political scene. Meanwhile, Bourguiba and his pro-moderate colleagues find themselves increasingly subjected to the internal pressures of public opinion and the external pressures created by continuing border incidents and Egyptian propaganda. In his weekly speech of October 10, Bourguiba felt it necessary to reiterate his earlier public promise that Tunisia would have arms delivered in the country by the end of October. He added, in this connection, that Tunisian representatives had been sent to Italy, Sweden, Egypt, Belgium and the United States. It is, in fact, increasingly apparent that if we are to meet the situation in Tunisia, we must have publicly identified a source of arms and have effected at least a partial token delivery by October 30. It is, of course, possible that even this date could be made unrealistic as the result of another military incident between French and Tunisian forces.

2. Since your conversation with Ambassador Caccia on October 9, we have been in close touch with the British Embassy which has provided us with an informal summary of Mr. Selwyn Lloyd’s views on this problem. This summary is attached at Tab A² and may be summarized as follows:

A. Lloyd considers it a vital Western interest that Bourguiba obtain arms from the West and not from the Communists and feels Bourguiba should not be put in the position of having to choose between asking the Communists for arms and accepting French conditions.

B. Lloyd suggests the U.S. and U.K. give Tunisia a confidential commitment that the two countries would be prepared to consider a modest request for arms without any commitment as to types and delivery dates.

C. Lloyd also suggests that first the U.S. and then the U.K. inform the French of the foregoing, with every regard to French sensibilities. In view of indications from the French Foreign Office at the working level that they may wish to use the denial of arms to Tunisia as a bargaining weapon in any negotiations with that country, the British would propose to suggest to the French that actual deliveries could probably be delayed until Franco-Tunisian talks were under way. At the same time, Lloyd recognizes that the risks of making Bourguiba await the outcome of a Franco-Tunisian conference are too great.

D. Finally, Lloyd suggests parallel U.S. and U.K. approaches to the Belgian and Italian Governments to inform them of our concern in an effort to get them to help persuade the French of the need for action.

3. We have reacted to the foregoing as follows:

A. We have warmly welcomed the British interest, noting that our general assessments of the dangers in Tunisia are similar.

B. We have clarified the nature of our commitment to the Tunisians, pointing out that it is more far-reaching than that which the British contemplate and that we believe we have passed the point where confidential assurances can hold the position in Tunisia. We have added that we think that we must very shortly give Bourguiba definite assurances as to the source of his arms and delivery plans. We may, in fact, have to assure token deliveries by the end of October.

C. In light of the need for rapid action, we have put urgently to the British a list of questions calculated to ascertain their reactions to the elements of the plan of action set forth under “Recommendations” below. The list of questions is attached at Tab B.³ We have not yet had the British replies, which will probably be communicated to you by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd.

Recommendations:

1. That you endeavor to obtain Mr. Selwyn Lloyd’s urgent agreement to the following plan of action:

A. The U.S. and U.K. would immediately inform President Bourguiba that if we are not successful in finding a source of arms for him in Western Europe by October 23, the two Governments will undertake to supply the Tunisian Government’s legitimate needs. (The date of October 23 is chosen as the day before Bourguiba’s regular weekly broadcast when he will probably be under the most pressure.)

B. At about the same time as A, the U.S. and U.K. would make coordinated approaches to Sweden, Italy, Belgium and Denmark with a view towards ascertaining whether those governments would be willing to make arms available to Tunisia on an immediate basis.

C. At about the same time as A and B, the U.S. and U.K. would inform the French of the foregoing and join to make a final appeal to Mr. Pineau to find some way which would permit France to deal with Tunisian arms requirements. Thus we could reiterate our strong hope that France itself would find it possible to supply arms to Tunisia, thereby obviating the need for alternative arrangements. We could also make it clear that if Mr. Pineau does not feel France can move alone in this matter, we would be delighted to have France join our two countries in supplying the arms.

D. If the foregoing approaches should fail to produce results by October 23, the U.S. and U.K. would immediately begin talks with Tunisia to decide on types, quantities and delivery dates and would, in any event, proceed to send a token shipment of arms to Tunisia before the end of October.

2. That if the foregoing is acceptable to Mr. Lloyd as a basis for proceeding, you suggest our two staffs immediately proceed to work out the implementing details.

3. That if Mr. Lloyd does not feel the U.K. can go along with the foregoing and has no satisfactory alternative plan, you inform him that we feel we must proceed on these lines and express the hope that the U.K. will use its influence with the French to assure their understanding.

I shall accompany Mr. Selwyn Lloyd when he calls on you.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56/10–1557. Secret. Drafted by Palmer and Porter.
2. Not printed.
3. Not printed.