270. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 9, 19571

SUBJECT

  • Tunisian Arms

PARTICIPANTS

  • Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador
  • Viscount Hood, Minister, British Embassy
  • The Secretary
  • William M. Rountree, Assistant Secretary, NEA
  • Joseph Palmer 2nd, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
  • Horace G. Torbert, Jr., WE

The Secretary said that he understood that the Tunisians have requested British assistance in obtaining arms and that the Foreign Office is considering the United Kingdom position in this matter.2 He went on to say that, as the Ambassador undoubtedly was aware, we have had a similar request in response to which we have given the Tunisians assurances that we regard them as entitled to obtain arms for internal security and that we will assure that arrangements are made to supply them from the West. He said that we had been hopeful that the Italians might feel able to meet the Tunisian requirements and he had talked to Mr. Pella about this possibility.3 Apparently the Italians are now wavering, however, and the Tunisians are becoming highly critical of what they regard as Italy’s vacillating attitude. The Secretary indicated that he did not know what possibility there might be of the United Kingdom supplying arms, but that we would welcome such action if it were possible.

The Secretary continued by saying that this was a problem of considerable urgency to which we would have to face up in the next few days. He emphasized his view that it would be a scandal if Tunisia could not get arms from the West. Tunisia is a friendly nation. As a member of the United Nations, it enjoys the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter, as the Secretary had observed in a recent letter to Mr. Pineau on this subject.4 If, under these circumstances, the West denies arms to Tunisia, we would not be treating her as a sovereign state but as a dependency of France [Page 717] and Tunisia would be justified in obtaining her arms where she could. The Secretary said he felt the stakes were too high to permit this to happen. We do not want to make the French governmental crisis any more difficult than it is, but we cannot permit this consideration to dominate our policy to the extent that it might result in the loss of Tunisia and North Africa to the West. He felt perhaps it would be possible for us to defer actual delivery of arms until after a new French Government had assumed office, but that we could not delay establishing and identifying the source of arms and making the necessary arrangements for procurement and eventual delivery. The Secretary went on to say that it would be highly desirable if responsibility for the supply of arms could be shared. Sir Harold intervened to confirm the agreement of his Government with this thought.

The Secretary emphasized the great threat that would be posed to Western Europe and the West if the Soviets were to obtain a foothold in this area which enabled them to extend their domination over North Africa. He said that he had always believed that Africa is the natural hinterland of Europe. It contains the raw materials, the opportunities for investment, etc., which can keep Europe strong and vital. The loss of North Africa would not only endanger Europe in a strategic sense, but would very likely result in the loss of the whole African continent. The Secretary emphasized that Western Europe simply cannot afford to see this happen.

Sir Harold confirmed the fact that the British had been approached by the Tunisians with respect to arms. He said that he felt that the British Government saw the problem very much as we did. He said that he would draw the Secretary’s views to the attention of his government and would let us have further indication of what the British feel should be done about the situation.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56/10–957. Secret. Drafted by Palmer.
  2. First Secretary of the British Embassy, Willie Morris, informed Bovey on October 7 that the Tunisians had requested arms on September 27. (Memorandum of conversation by Bovey, October 7; ibid., 772.56/10–757)
  3. Dulles and Italian Foreign Minister Giuseppe Pella discussed this subject briefly on September 25, during a visit to Washington by Pella. (Memorandum of conversation by Torbert; ibid., 772.56/9–2557)
  4. Summarized in telegram 1306, supra.