Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

267. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 1, 1957¹

Washington, October 1, 1957

SUBJECT

• The Supply of Arms to Tunisia

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador Herve Alphand, French Ambassador
• Minister Charles Lucet, French Embassy
• Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, Assistant Secretary, EUR
• Mr. H.G. Torbert, Jr., WE

Ambassador Alphand, who called on Mr. Elbrick at his own request, said that he had been instructed by his Foreign Office to present to the Department in the strongest possible terms the new situation faced by the French Government in view of yesterday’s loss of the confidence vote in regard to the Tunisian arms question.² He had also been requested to ask for clarification of a reported statement on September 30 by a Department spokesman to the effect that the Department had no knowledge of a French request to the U.S. to reconsider the position on this question and that we had promised Bourguiba to make up “any deficit” if supply from other sources was not adequate.

With regard to the first part of his instructions, Ambassador Alphand held forth at some length on the exceedingly difficult situation in which the French Government found itself. He said that the publicity regarding United States pressure and French concession on the supplying of arms to Tunisia had made it a cause celebre in French politics, particularly in conservative circles. The French regarded Bourguiba as directly responsible for supporting military action in which Frenchmen were being killed and it was therefore unpopular, to say the least, to entertain the thought of France supplying these arms. He stated without equivocation that this issue alone was responsible for the adverse confidence vote of October 1, since a swing of only about 15 votes would have changed the decision and he was certain that at least 15 votes hinged on this issue.

Mr. Elbrick replied that we fully appreciated the French dilemma in this situation and the exceedingly delicate political issue which was raised. On the other hand, we were faced with the prospect as assessed by our experts on the area that if some very prompt action was not taken the Tunisians would accept arms from Soviet or satellite sources through Egypt or by some other channel. This was a prospect which we could only regard as a disaster. While we might not disagree with the Ambassador’s assessment that Bourguiba was pushing the situation for all the traffic would bear and was trying to panic us into action, nonetheless the fact remained that he could show a perfectly justifiable requirement for arms for his own internal defense. He had committed himself to the Tunisian public to procure arms from Western sources during October. We had indicated that we would assist in obtaining the arms although we had never mentioned October. Nonetheless, Bourguiba had put himself in this position and would have to do something to produce. The situation was a most unhappy one as far as we are concerned and we could only hope that the French would be able to give most urgent attention to the problem and perhaps reach some understanding with Bourguiba before some other steps had to be taken to reach a solution.

Ambassador Alphand indicated great doubt that anything could be done prior to the formation of a new government. He did concede under questioning that there was a possibility that discussions could be undertaken which might lead to an agreement which could be sponsored by the new government. He urged most strongly that the United States adopt a position with Bourguiba that he would have to understand the very difficult position in which France was placed by the cabinet crisis which had not been foreseen at the time of earlier conversations and commitments, and urge him to exercise restraint and attempt to keep the situation in Tunisia calm until a new French Government could be formed and the situation worked out. Ambassador Alphand was most pessimistic as to the situation which would result in French-American relations should we persist in providing or urging others to provide arms to Bourguiba rather than letting the French work the problem out themselves. He said he felt strongly that this would have a profound effect on relations between our two peoples and on the Western alliance which was of much greater importance than our direct relations with Bourguiba although he realized the seriousness of this problem too. He suggested that a new government could be formed in two or three weeks and that there was still a possibility that an agreement could be reached and some shipments of arms could be received in Tunisia before the end of October thus fulfilling Bourguiba’s promise to his people.

Mr. Elbrick said that this was a most difficult problem for us. However, he would urge this position upon the Department and hoped that we might be able to hold this line for a while. He expressed himself as exceedingly pessimistic that this would be successful in keeping Bourguiba quiet, even on the short term, not to mention the unhappy outlook that any new agreement would have to be ratified by the French Parliament and might thus be delayed indefinitely. He indicated that we would, of course, have to go on making plans for an alternative arrangement but would attempt to be as discreet in the matter as possible.

In answer to a second part of this representation Mr. Elbrick and Mr. Torbert indicated that they were not aware of any statement made September 30 by a Department spokesman. (It later developed a statement, in answer to a question, was made by Mr. White similar to but not exactly in the terms quoted.) The Ambassador claimed to have seen the text of such a statement in his Embassy but on telephoning to the Embassy it was discovered that this was a text of a statement on September 26. Mr. Torbert stated that to the best of his recollection the Department had received a report on the 27th of a meeting between Mr. Pineau and Mr. Yost,³ in which Mr. Yost was told that the French had reconsidered their decision agreeing to have Italy supply arms to Tunisia. They now preferred to arrange to supply the arms herself within the framework of an agreement with Tunisia on the various outstanding military questions. As nearly as could be remembered this message did not contain a definite request to the United States to reconsider its position although a message to this general effect was contained in a cable received from Paris on the morning of September 30.⁴

Throughout the conversation Ambassador Alphand indicated on several occasions that he had been totally unaware, except through press sources, of the history of our discussions with France on this matter until yesterday morning. He said that he understood there had been correspondence between the Secretary and Pineau but that he knew nothing about it. He observed that French-American relationship could be carried on better if important matters were handled both through our Ambassador in Paris and through him here in Washington. Toward the end of the meeting Mr. Torbert remarked to Mr. Lucet that we had in fact kept the Embassy advised on a number of details of these developments. Mr. Lucet acknowledged this to be a fact.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56/10–157. Secret. Drafted by Torbert.
2. On September 30, the Bourgès-Maunoury government lost a vote of confidence on the Loi-Cadre for Algeria by 253 to 279.
3. See supra. Telegram 1630, September 27, summarized a similar discussion between Yost and the Prime Minister. (Department of State, Central Files, 772.56/9–2757)
4. Telegram 1656, September 30, reported that in his remarks to the Assembly that day Pineau stated: “We are, of course, asking our allies that no decision be taken with regard to the possible delivery of arms” until the results of the negotiations between France and Tunisia are known. (Ibid., 772.56/9–3057) This address was summarized in greater detail in telegram 1680, October 1. (Ibid., 772.56/10–157) Pineau met with Ambassador Houghton on October 1 to protest the statement by Department spokesman Lincoln White on September 30. He asked that the United States make no arms commitments to Tunisia during the French Government crisis for that might prolong the present difficulty and endanger NATO solidarity. (Telegram 1692 from Paris, October 1; ibid.)