Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

268. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 2, 1957¹

Washington, October 2, 1957

SUBJECT

• Call on the Secretary of Bahi Ladgham, Acting Vice President and Secretary of State for Coordination and Defense of Tunisia
• Tunisian-French Relations and the Tunisian Arms Problem

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Bahi Ladgham, Acting Vice President and Secretary of State for Coordination and Defense of Tunisia
• Mongi Slim, Tunisian Ambassador
• Habib Bourguiba, Jr., Tunisian Ambassador-designate to Rome
• Ambassador James P. Richards
• Joseph Palmer 2nd, Deputy Assistant Secretary
• William J. Porter—AFN

Mr. Ladgham began the conversation by saying he brought to President Eisenhower and to the Secretary the warm greetings of President Bourguiba of Tunisia. The Tunisian Government and people, he said, deeply appreciate the support they have received from the United States, not only in the present difficult circumstances, but since Tunisia’s accession to independence. Tunisia’s nationalism, Mr. Ladgham continued, is of a different order than the nationalism of some other Arab countries. Mr. Bourguiba and his Party have never lost sight of the essentially liberal character and ideals of the Western World and they have therefore fought against the extreme type of nationalism with its xenophobia and suspicion. In this context Bourguiba has always tried to convince the Tunisian people that there are valuable elements in the French presence in Tunisia. Bourguiba always wanted independent Tunisia to emerge with a simple nationalism that would be unencumbered by extreme ideologies which would prevent or make difficult cooperation with France and the West. Tunisia, however, demanded that relations with France be on a basis of equality and had been endeavoring to place their relations on such a basis ever since she acquired her independence.

The French conception of what their relations should be with Tunisia creates many difficulties for the Tunisian Government, Mr. Ladgham said, and he went on to cite economic matters as an example. Many areas of French-Tunisian relations remain unsettled simply because the French attitude was not that of one free country negotiating with another.

Turning to Algeria, Mr. Ladgham said that the Algerian problem is not ready for solution mainly because the French are not ready to accept Algerian claims. Referring to French statements as to the doubtful role of an independent Algeria, Mr. Ladgham stated that Morocco and Tunisia are independent and have conserved their relations with the Free World, and he believed an independent Algeria would follow their example. On the international plane, he said, North Africa can be an element of stability, inclined toward cooperation with the Free World, a cooperation now rejected by some Arab countries. Such North African cooperation, in close association with France, would be most desirable. When the Tunisians support the Algerians in present circumstances, Mr. Ladgham told the Secretary, it was not because they are against France, but simply because they are for Algerian freedom.

Mr. Ladgham stated that the Algerian War cannot be limited simply by controlling frontiers. The Algerian movement, not being governmental in character, has no sense of international obligation. The movement has developed sources of arms supply that spread far beyond any particular frontier, and Mr. Ladgham said he might add, in connection with France’s feelings about the Tunisians supplying arms to the Algerians, that the Algerians have no need for Tunisian arms. They are in fact better supplied with arms than the Tunisians themselves. The French of course believe that the crossing of Tunisian frontiers by Algerians has a marked effect on the war in Algiera. But this is an aspect of the struggle which the Tunisians cannot prevent because if the Tunisians oppose the Algerians in that respect this would place Tunisia on the side of France in waging the Algerian war, a politically impossible position for the Tunisians or any other Arab Government. Mr. Ladgham added that he would mention, in connection with earlier French allegations that the Tunisians were providing arms to the Algerians, that Mr. Pineau himself had admitted recently that not one Tunisian rifle had been found in Algerian possession.

The Secretary inquired whether Algerian troops are disarmed or interned when they cross into Tunisia. Mr. Ladgham replied that they are not. He said that this is a delicate question, but that essentially it involved the fact that French armed forces are crossing the frontier more or less at will and the Tunisian Government would be meting out unequal treatment if it attempted to disarm or intern the Algerians. Mr. Ladgham subsequently corrected himself, in response to a comment by Ambassador Slim, and said that the Tunisian Government disarmed such Algerian groups when it could. He said that just as the French could not control the passage of arms when they held military positions on both sides of the frontier, neither can the Tunisian Government prevent such passage. He said that about 50 rifles a day are going into Algeria, this coming to a respectable total of 1500 a month. He said that as matters stand, however, most of the weapons in the possession of the Algerians have come from the French Army and that Communists in that Army have been active in the supply of arms to the Algerians. The Tunisian Government’s efforts on frontier control, Mr. Ladgham said, consist of endeavoring to disband the Algerians in areas where there are Tunisian military units. The Tunisian Government has about 3,000 men along the whole frontier, but these are generally concentrated at important points and the mountain areas could not be said to be under control. Mr. Ladgham said that Algerian thinking was stimulated by the examples of independent Morocco and Tunisia, and the Algerians believe that the French will eventually accord independence to Algeria also. The danger in this, the Minister said, is that the French military are aware of Algerian thought in that connection and believe that a new occupation of Tunisia by the French Army would tend to eliminate such Algerian hopes.

The Tunisians were in the process of negotiating their future relations with France, Mr. Ladgham said, when they encountered French intentions to continue to occupy Tunisia militarily. He said that there is a very important French military organization now in Tunisia when one considers the size of the country. The French have made it clear that they wish to keep certain bases for strategic reasons connected with the defense of the Free World, but Mr. Ladgham asserted that with the exception of Bizerte the bases are not essential for that purpose. Such bases do, however, occupy an important place in French thinking on Algeria, and that Gafsa, for instance, is used for surveillance, communications and other matters connected with the war there. In the face of this French attitude, Mr. Ladgham stated, Tunisia will not be able to negotiate a common defense accord with France. French troops, he went on, are in small groups in many places in Tunisia and are kept there solely for the purpose of exercising pressure on the Tunisian Government. As this situation continues, the Tunisian Government loses prestige at home and abroad. In the meantime solicitations are received from various undesirable sources, and propaganda pours in with a view to undermining the pro-Western Government of the country. Citing the fact that a 400-man Tunisian unit near the frontier has no rifles, he said the men listen to the radio and ask questions about their Government while French grenades fall on them and while Russian, Czech and Egyptian propaganda and offers are being received. Soldiers without rifles begin to doubt, and conversation turns increasingly to the role of the Government. In such circumstances, Mr. Ladgham felt there was a great danger that the independence of Tunisia would become an object of ridicule, while her engagements with respect to the Free World are subjected to Arab and of course the Communist criticism. Increasingly, Mr. Ladgham remarked, the theme is heard that Tunisia’s claim to independence does not correspond to reality.

In this context, the Vice President said, the arms problem is critical. Tunisia had approached Belgium, Italy, Spain and Switzerland. The Belgiums said at first they were disposed to send light arms, especially NATO rifles. Later they said it was not possible to do so because the French Government was afraid the arms would find their way to Algeria. The Italians officially agreed to sell arms to the Tunisian Government but later they notified the Tunisian Government that their situation had changed because of French intervention. The Swiss and Spanish had for similar reason indicated an inability to send arms to Tunisia. Mr. Ladgham said that the Tunisian Government, as a recognized sovereign state, cannot adopt procedures common to the rebels of Algeria who procure contraband arms. This would not, the Tunisians feel, be compatible with their status and so they have turned away from that possibility.

With respect to the Egyptian offer of arms, this took the form of a proposed gift by Nasser to Mr. Mokaddam, the Tunisian Ambassador to Cairo. It occurred in conjunction with a Tunisian national campaign to raise funds to buy arms, which succeeded in raising a sum equal to $2.5 million, enough to procure weapons for 500 men. At that time the Tunisian Government appealed to friendly nations to help out, looking hopefully in the direction of the Turkish Government. However, only Egypt replied and while thanks were expressed by the Tunisian Government as a matter of form, it was clearly understood that the Egyptian gesture was merely symbolic of Arab friendship and it would be dealt with as “symbolic”. The Tunisian Government had made it clear that it did not intend to accept arms from Russia or Czechoslovakia and that remains its position because, in spite of all these difficulties, the Government adheres to the ideals and values of the Free World. It sees no reason, simply because of French errors, to turn against France completely or compromise its relations with the free nations.

The position of Tunisia, Mr. Ladgham said, of course is not like that of Jordan where arms had to be sent with great speed, but the position is, nevertheless, very delicate because it is a matter of making France understand that pressure on Tunisia by France is contrary to the best interests of the Free World. Essentially what Tunisia desires is that France raise the arms embargo. The Tunisian Government understands the United States is giving sympathetic study to the problem and the Tunisian Government is greatly touched by the solicitude shown by the United States Government, and believes that in this grave French-Tunisian crisis the U.S. has exercised a most helpful influence on France. Mr. Ladgham had noticed, for example, that during the period following the Tunisian appeal to the United States incidents had practically stopped on the frontier.

Returning to the French proposals to examine common problems anew, Mr. Ladgham said he regretted to say that the French were seeking a period in which to delay matters. He said Tunisia was disposed to examine all problems but was not prepared to retard purchases of arms and it was not possible to associate the need for arms with conversations on other matters. Tunisian arms needs, he said, are small and quite simple. If France didn’t wish to supply them, that is for France to decide, but the French should leave Tunisia free to obtain them elsewhere.

Mr. Ladgham concluded by saying that he knew that the Secretary is confronted by many serious problems but he hoped nevertheless that it would be recognized that Tunisia is a valuable example. Tunisia’s nationalism must not fail, as Mr. Bourguiba said, because it serves the common cause. However, even the prestige of Bourguiba and others cannot definitely survive pressures among those like the 400 men without arms whom he mentioned earlier in the conversation, and the many others who are asking if it is not a tragi-comedy which the Tunisian Government is playing. The United States can help very much to eliminate equivocation in this arms matter and thus stop the flow of contradictory reports which excite the Tunisian people.

The Secretary stated that the Tunisian Government was of course aware of the great sympathy with which the U.S. viewed the granting of independence to Tunisia and the start of the new national life of that country. The United States, once itself a colony, never lost sympathy for those who sought independence and who seemed qualified to exercise independence. Independence involves heavy responsibility, the Secretary said, and it is not gained and retained by a political fact alone. Discipline, self-control and educated people are needed. It must be understood that in the world today independence cannot be treated as incompatible with interdependence, though some nations feel independence must be absolute and with no interdependence. The Secretary was sure that that kind of independence would not last. He referred to a speech he made last April in this sense, in which he said that independence without interdependence moved fast into a twilight ending with a blackout.

The United States Government, the Secretary continued, rejoiced in the fact that the Tunisian Government and its distinguished leader accepted to an unusual degree the concept of interdependence with the Free World, and particularly with France. This wise and enlightened policy had won for the Government of Tunisia great respect and admiration. The Secretary said that in his speech, a copy of which he handed to Mr. Ladgham, he had made the point that communist doctrine teaches ways to amalgamate extreme nationalism by encouraging it to cut traditional ties with the West. Once this had been done, the task of amalgamating the country concerned with the Communist World became easier. Though the Tunisian Government is a young government, its mature judgment enables it to see the danger and avoid it. Thus, the Tunisian Government won the admiration of the U.S. and others who wished to see independence achieve its full meaning for the Tunisian people.

The Secretary said that with regard to the French, we must recognize they have been facing difficulties since the First World War. Losses of that war have affected the strength and quality of French leadership ever since. Many of those who might lead France today lie in the trenches of Verdun. France was so weakened that she has never since been able or felt herself strong enough to do the wise thing if that appeared to diminish French prestige. The French tend to refuse to accept change until it is inevitable and it then usually requires more serious concessions than would have been necessary earlier. After World War I, had the French been conciliatory there would never have been a Hitler.

In Indo-China, it had been very difficult to get the French to accept independence for Laos and Cambodia. The U.S. had been able to exercise a useful influence there, and the French eventually accorded them independence although again this involved concessions which went beyond those necessary in the earlier stages of that problem.

In the cases of Morocco and Tunisia, the Secretary said, it should be recognized that the French showed considerable statesmanship. With respect to Algeria, we must also recognize that this is a difficult problem for the French to deal with and we should look with a measure of sympathy at their situation. Tunisia is a country with a promising and expanding future, but the French future appears to hold diminishing prestige and power. This need not be the case for the French, the Secretary went on, as the British example proves. There is no need for loss of greatness and authority in meeting such problems, just as the United States did not lose by granting independence to the Philippines. Only the USSR clings to the belief that something acquired must never be let go, and that country proved its lack of greatness in its failure to release Hungary.

The Secretary then discussed the problem of Tunisia’s arms needs. He recalled that he had sent a message to Mr. Bourguiba on September 21 [22], 1957, recognizing that Tunisia as an independent country had the right to arm for its security, and assuring him that his needs would be met. The Secretary said he had expressed the assumption that arms would be used only for internal security and defense purposes and he added that he had assumed also that Tunisia would not find it difficult to agree to reasonable conditions of that kind. The Secretary assured Mr. Ladgham that his statement had been made deliberately and solemnly and that Mr. Ladgham could be confident that he would adhere to it. The Secretary said he did not wish to disguise the fact that the French are urging that we defer action until they had an opportunity to discuss with the Tunisians the possibility of the French supplying arms themselves to Tunisia. The Secretary commented that he was uncertain about the present status of the matter as the French Government did not appear now to be in a position to hold the kind of talks which it regards as necessary before it can meet the urgent desires of the Tunisian Government to obtain arms. We are therefore prepared to reexamine the problem with the Tunisians. He had talked to Mr. Pella, the Secretary continued, and Mr. Pella had then discussed the matter with Mr. Pineau, but the Secretary was not quite sure of the results. The Secretary then expressed the hope that the Tunisians would agree that the matter should not be handled either with respect to form or timing in a way which would unnecessarily injure the relations of the United States with France. There is no use in throwing U.S. influence away unnecessarily, the Secretary said. We must recognize this and avoid if possible a reaction in France. In saying this, the Secretary added, he was not offering it as a pretext for evasion or delay because the Tunisians had our promise and could count on it. It was essential to try to find a formula to meet Tunisia’s needs and to avoid an open breach with the French. If we could not avoid such a breach, the Secretary said, we accept that, but we must do everything we can to minimize its effects.

The Secretary indicated that we would ascertain the Italian position. It appeared, he said, that because of the fall of the French Government there would be more of a delay than anticipated in dealing with the problem. The Secretary added that he was somewhat surprised that the Governments of Spain and Switzerland, who are not allies of France, had given the Tunisians negative replies. Mr. Ladgham said the replies were not clearly negative, but could be called so by the general attitude of the two governments.

After an inquiry from Ambassador Richards as to the type of arms the Tunisians have in mind, Mr. Ladgham said that the list had been sent to us. Mr. Palmer confirmed that we had received it and it contains items different than those mentioned to Ambassador Richards in Tunisia earlier in this year. At that time the Tunisian Government was primarily concerned with obtaining transportation communications equipment.

Mr. Ladgham said that he was sorry to tell the Secretary that incidents had started again on the frontier. In the last day or so, the Secretary remarked, since the fall of the Government, the French army may not be under as close control as usual. He said that we must all recognize the danger and he reiterated his hope that the Tunisian Government would continue to show restraint and caution. It was easy, the Secretary said, to tear something up but hard to put it together again.

In the final discussion the Secretary indicated that he thought the U.S. and Tunisian Governments should work together to solve this problem as rapidly as possible in a way which would result in Tunisia obtaining its arms requirements but avoid an open breach with the French. He suggested to Mr. Palmer that additional meetings be held with the Tunisians to work the matter out in this spirit. Mr. Palmer said that we would give further attention to the questions discussed and be in touch with our Tunisian friends in the next few days. Both Mr. Ladgham and the Ambassador said that they would be in New York for another week and would be at our disposition.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.00/10–257. Secret. Drafted by Porter.