266. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1
1593. Embassy telegram 1518.2 In Ambassador’s absence on official visit to Bordeaux, Pineau handed to Yost this afternoon letter to the Secretary on arms to Tunis, text of which is transmitted in immediately following telegram.3 Pineau further commented along following lines.
He first requested utmost discretion handling of this message and particularly asked that neither its receipt nor its tenor be conveyed to GOT.
Second, referring to debate in Assembly yesterday (Embassy telegram 1566)4 and to corresponding views privately expressed by such political leaders as Pleven and Soustelle, he said it had now become difficult to see how arms could be delivered to Tunisia by any ally of France without producing parliamentary explosion and seriously damaging Atlantic alliance. Continued publicity is aggravating the situation. He cited article in this evening’s Monde from its Washington correspondent headlined “Washington tries to conciliate Bourguiba demands with the requirements of French security” and commencing “United States will aid Tunisia to procure the arms she needs”.
As a result Italians are showing themselves most reluctant to proceed with supply of arms. Pineau intends to discuss question with Pella tomorrow when latter passes through Paris. Belgians and Spaniards moreover are unwilling to supply without written consent from French which Pineau feels he cannot provide.
Recognizing however danger that Bourguiba will turn to East for arms, French Government has decided to make itself final effort to come to terms with him. In order to ensure utmost discretion, Gorse has been summoned to Paris to receive his instructions in person. He arrives this evening, will presumably return to Tunis tomorrow evening and will meet Bourguiba Sunday or Monday.
[Page 703]French will propose broad understanding by which they themselves will supply necessary arms to GOT in exchange for appropriate assurances concerning current matters at issue between two Governments. Pineau was reluctant to disclose to us exactly what would be accorded and asked, but he did make clear French would expect to retain troops in Tunisia at certain points which they understood had been previously agreed by GOT.
In response our query, Pineau said supply of arms to Tunisia by GOF would doubtless cause criticism in Assembly, but it would be less severe and less damaging to Atlantic alliance than if arms were supplied by one of France’s allies. He also mentioned Minister of Defense saw advantage in providing GOT with French arms which could be clearly identified if they fell into hands of Algerian rebels.
Pineau expressed hope that this final French effort with Tunisia would be successful and that United States might be prepared to give its support. When we suggested Department would presumably wish to have more precise understanding of what proposals comprised, Pineau replied that it would be disadvantageous for United States to become involved in negotiation and that he merely hoped that at appropriate moment we could say to Tunisians that we understand French are making new proposals to them and that we hope these proposals will be considered seriously and sympathetically.
Comment: It seems probable that French have concluded not only that supply of arms to Tunisia by one or more of France’s allies would arouse French opinion against those allies, but also that French position in Tunisia is being more and more reduced by increasing role which United States is playing there. We can certainly applaud renewed French effort to come to understanding with GOT. If it should succeed our immediate troubles there would be over. We very much fear however that position of French troops for Tunisia may prove extremely serious stumbling block since GOF obviously considers they have right to remain whereas GOT (Tunis 256 to Department)5 just as obviously looks on 5 or 6 present bases as only transitional. Nevertheless we very much hope that it will be possible for Department and Embassy Tunis to stave off any further action on arms matter at least until Gorse has presented new proposals to Bourguiba.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56/9–2657. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Rome and Tunis.↩
- Telegram 1518, September 23, reported that, after reading the Secretary’s message of September 22, Pineau commented that he could not act without the approval of the Council of Ministers. He noted that the arms question came at a very bad time when the Loi-Cadre for Algeria was being debated. (Ibid., 772.56/9–2357)↩
- Telegram 1594, September 26, transmitted Pineau’s message which complained about Tunisian efforts to compel the French to evacuate their base at Gafsa. (Ibid., 772.56/9–2657)↩
- Telegram 1566, September 25, reported the strong anti-Tunisian and anti-Loi-Cadre sentiments in the French Assembly. (Ibid., 751.00/9–2557)↩
- Telegram 256, September 25, reported that after France had withdrawn its division in Tunisia to reinforce forces in Algeria, Bourguiba had not agreed to the retention of any bases except Bizerte. The other bases France sought to keep were: Gabes, Sfax, Remada, the El Aouina airbase and Salammbo Headquarters (both in Tunis), and Bizerte. (Ibid., 651.72/9–2557)↩