Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

265. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 26, 1957¹

Washington, September 26, 1957

SUBJECT

• Tunisian Arms Request

PARTICIPANTS

• H.E. Mongi Slim, Ambassador of Tunisia
• Mr. Habib Bourguiba, Jr., Tunisian Ambassador-designate to Italy
• Mr. Mhamed Esaafi, Secretary of the Tunisian Embassy
• Joseph Palmer 2nd, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
• Arthur B. Allen, AFN
• Donald R. Norland, AFN

The Ambassador called in order to be brought up to date on developments since his talk with Assistant Secretary Rountree on September 20th² concerning Tunisia’s request for assistance in obtaining arms. Mr. Palmer asked whether the Ambassador had anything he wished to communicate to the State Department and the Ambassador replied that his comments might more usefully follow Mr. Palmer’s. Mr. Palmer thereupon read to the Ambassador the Secretary’s message to President Bourguiba of September 22nd (Deptel 175), explaining that as a result of communications difficulties, the message had not been delivered until September 24th.

Mr. Palmer went on to say that as a result of our conversations with the French, we have been encouraged by the understanding which they have shown regarding this problem. At the same time and without in any way minimizing the internal political problems facing President Bourguiba, we believe it important to recognize that the French also face very serious internal political difficulties. We have therefore tried to work quietly toward a solution which would meet Tunisia’s needs but place the least strain on U.S. relations with France, which are of such importance to the entire free world. We hope that the Secretary’s message will reassure the Government of Tunisia that we recognize the need for a rapid solution to Tunisia’s problem and that it may be possible to achieve a period of quiet in which all concerned continue to work toward a solution. However, we recognize the pressures on President Bourguiba and have therefore informed him that if he feels it necessary, we would understand his making a public statement to the effect that the United States recognizes Tunisian internal security needs and is disposed to find a way of meeting them.

Mr. Palmer then referred to reports from Cairo that Tunisia had agreed to obtain arms from Egypt. He pointed out that, as Ambassador Slim would see from the above, our action had preceded and not been affected by this report. We have nevertheless been disturbed by it and would therefore appreciate any explanations which the Ambassador might wish to make.

Ambassador Slim thanked Mr. Palmer for the message, stating that it was what he had hoped for and expected, knowing the true sentiments of the American Government and people toward Tunisia. The Ambassador commented that he had feared that the United States answer would come a little too late. He went on to say he regretted only one thing; namely, that the United States was very often led into the position of being too solicitous of France in foreign policy considerations. The problem of arms to Tunisia could have been resolved at the time of the Richards Mission, when Tunisia had not asked for arms specifically but only for transportation and communications equipment. Even now, he commented, while a solution to the arms question appears to have been found, it does not yet appear certain. The Ambassador noted that the Italian Government had just made known its decision to allow Italian arms manufacturers to sell arms to Tunisia, observing however that there was always a considerable margin between intentions and realizations.

Ambassador Slim stressed the urgency of the question of arms assistance to Tunisia in view of continued aggression by the French military forces into Tunisian territory and emphasized that the current situation did not allow the Tunisian Government time to postpone its armament program nor develop it gradually and rationally over a period of years. Emphasizing the emergency nature of the situation, the Ambassador stated that a small amount of aid received quickly would be much more effective than a larger amount later.

Turning to the question of assurances as to the destinations of arms that might be provided Tunisia by Western nations, Ambassador Slim said he recognized the American “concern” and our desire for such assurances. Knowing the intentions of both the President and the Government of Tunisia, the Ambassador said he could, without specific instructions, assure the State Department that any arms provided Tunisia would be used only for purposes of internal security and legitimate self-defense. However, the Ambassador said, gesturing decisively, “if we are the object of aggression, we will fight back regardless of whether the attacking country is friendly or unfriendly. This would be in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.”³

On the question of arms from Egypt, Ambassador Slim reviewed the developments following the speech of President Bourguiba at Le Kef on August 8, 1957, when the “Army Fortnight” was launched. At that time, the President of Tunisia had appealed for funds and for arms assistance from “friendly and sister” nations in building the young Tunisian Army. Several days later Mr. Mokaddem, upon taking leave from his position at Cairo,⁴ was informed by President Nasser that the Government of Egypt had answered President Bourguiba’s appeal by offering a gift of arms. Mr. Mokaddem’s response at the time had been to thank the Egyptian President and to state that he would report the offer to President Bourguiba.

When the September incidents along the Tunisian-Algerian frontier became known, and the Tunisian Government’s lack of arms was noted widely in the press, Ambassador Slim continued, Egyptian newspapers recalled the previous Egyptian offer to the Tunisian Government. Two days ago the new Tunisian Ambassador to Egypt, Mr. Sahbani, after presenting his letters of credence to the Egyptian President, was confronted by the Egyptian press and badgered by them into making the statement that Tunisia accepted the Egyptian “gesture,” which was interpreted by the press as meaning that Tunisia accepted Egyptian arms aid.

Pausing at this point, Ambassador Slim explained that there had been no formal acceptance of the Egyptian offer, and no agreement or mission to determine Tunisian needs or to discuss the quantities of arms. However, Ambassador Slim said that the Tunisian Government could not refuse “a free gift” from a nation with which it is on friendly terms and could not reject such a gift unless it was from an unfriendly nation or under “unfriendly circumstances.” The Ambassador recalled in connection with the Egyptian offer what he had said earlier with regard to Italian aid—that there was a margin between acceptance in principle and its execution.

Reverting again to the great needs of the Tunisian military and police forces, Ambassador Slim stated that while he personally hoped that the United States would still find it possible to furnish Tunisian needs, Tunisian arms in any case should be of the same kind and not made up in part of arms from Western sources and in part from non-Western sources. He stated that Tunisia did not desire a diversity of armament, a statement he linked to a principle to which he held very firmly; namely, that Tunisia is and will be on the side of the free world. Therefore, he reasoned, Tunisian armament can only come from the free world.

Mr. Palmer stated he wished to comment on the Ambassador’s criticism that we are often too solicitous of France. He called particular attention to the fact that we have sought directness and equality in developing our relations with Tunisia. At the same time, our world responsibilities require that we take the widest possible view of all matters in order to minimize the effects of any given course of action on other countries of the free world. Mr. Palmer emphasized that he was not speaking of compromises on a matter of principle. In cases where principle is involved, we have differed fundamentally with our allies, as in the attack on Suez. We wish naturally, however, to avoid such splits and, while abiding by principle ourselves, to try to bring other countries to understand and act in accordance with the principle involved. In this sense we have attempted in recent discussions to be helpful also to France, and it is not, therefore, out of deference to French sensitivity but rather to achieve a wider understanding that we consult with the French.

Ambassador Slim remarked that he personally was sometimes accused of being too much influenced by the United States point of view (referring jokingly to Habib Bourguiba, Jr., at his side) and stated it was perhaps because he understood the United States Government’s method of acting. He agreed that action need not be spectacular or public, it should only be effective. Ambassador Slim recalled that last year when the French had committed acts of aggression within Tunisian territory, he was able to tell his Government that although he did not know what the United States had done, he knew that the United States had acted because a change had been noted within forty-eight hours and the French actions stopped. In the present instance, the Ambassador continued, it is a question not only of arms but of aggression, noting that as late as Monday (September 23rd) there were reports of French aggression, kidnappings, et cetera. As for arms and the United States Government’s desire to see Tunisia provided with light arms, the Ambassador said that although he did not see the possibility that United States arms would be provided now, he was taking a longer view of the matter. The Italian Government had stated Italian arms manufacturers could now sell arms to Tunisia. Would the United States see any objections to United States firms selling arms to Tunisia, the Ambassador asked?

Mr. Palmer replied that he would prefer to answer that question by again calling the Ambassador’s attention to the text of the Secretary’s message to President Bourguiba stating that if European sources failed, “other means” would be found.

Ambassador Slim acknowledged his understanding that the United States would seek other means to provide arms for Tunisia but emphasized that the Tunisian Government was pressed for time. If a result is not arrived at quickly in receiving Italian arms, could the United States delivery of arms be envisaged?

Mr. Palmer replied that he was fully aware of the urgency of the situation. He recalled, however, that the Tunisians had asked “assistance in obtaining arms” and said that we are working as hard as we can to find what sources of arms may be available.

Ambassador Slim said he had a final question concerning the possibility of ICA assistance in obtaining transportation and communications equipment. He recalled the answer previously given by the Department that such a program should be postponed until a program was developed for the new fiscal year. The Ambassador asked whether the Tunisian Government could hope for the receipt of about $1 million worth of transportation and communications equipment in the current ICA program.

Mr. Palmer replied that we have agreed to an internal security survey mission and have taken steps to expedite the arrival of the mission, which had been advanced to about October 15th. Among the matters to be studied by the mission would be transportation and communications equipment. Mr. Palmer stated that presumably the mission would consider all of Tunisia’s needs and that we should await the mission’s recommendation in the matter.

Mr. Palmer added an additional word on the subject of assurances by the Tunisian Government with regard to arms furnished to Tunisia, stating that the United States’ “concern” did not reflect any doubt on our part as to past promises of the Tunisian Government in this matter. He emphasized that such undertakings are normal in any event and that in this particular case are of importance to French-Tunisian understanding.

Ambassador Slim concluded by reiterating his appreciation of the actions taken and by saying that he understood very well that the United States, like Tunisia, was interested only in restoring peace and harmony to the area.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56/9–2657. Secret. Drafted by Norland and Allen.
2. Ambassador Slim had been scheduled to see the Secretary on September 13 but difficulties in travel arrangements forced him to miss the appointment. In his stead, Ahmed Mastiri, Attaché of the Tunisian Embassy, conveyed the note the Ambassador had intended to deliver. When Slim met with Rountree on September 20, he indicated that his two major concerns were frontier violations and the need for arms. He also emphasized his strong wish that the United States would furnish the required arms. (Memorandum of conversation by Tyler, September 20; ibid., 110.11–DU/9–1857)
3. Article 51 stated that nothing in the Charter precluded the right of self-defense if a nation was the victim of armed attack.
4. Tunisian Ambassador to Egypt.