Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

258. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, September 12, 1957—7 p.m.

183. 1. I managed to get to Bourguiba, who had Ladgham and Foreign Secretary Mokaddem with him, fifteen minutes before he was scheduled to record his weekly address. He looked grim and worried. As he listened with great care to numbered points Department niact 140,² he relaxed visibly. (Note: I felt justified in almost strong-arming my way into Bouguiba because Tom Brady of NYT, who interviewed him last night, had told me earlier this morning that he had found Bourguiba in bitter mood against US and west generally. Bourguiba told him he would say in his speech today that failure of west to respond to Tunisians’ needs made his forthright support west no more than meaningless sentimental attachment. According Brady, Bourguiba planned say he had learned through his recent experience to sympathize with Syria and now he would have to tell Tunisian people he must seek arms elsewhere to preserve Tunisian territorial integrity. Brady says he filed story to that effect last night).

2. Bourguiba asked me to thank Department for its message and commented: “They say they are going to talk to the French. This is good. They must do this”. Then, having arranged his thoughts; Bourguiba, with great sincerity and considerable emotion, spoke in the following sense:

3. “I understand problems of US. I understand why decision to give us arms is difficult for you. It represents a question of political choice. I can even understand US deciding for its own reasons to choose solidarity with France. But I too have to make a political choice. I have from outset chosen to be on side of west—above all on side of US. I as a politician have brought all Tunisia with me into western camp. However Tunisian people have right to ask what benefits have come for them from my policies. What answer can I give? Their economic development needs are great and are growing. Their need for arms to defend Tunisian soil is pressing, immediate and even greater. In first field, there is little to show; I can tell them only to hope. Re arms I must confess no results at all. It is not blackmail if I say we must go elsewhere for arms and other aid; it would be decision forced upon me by French behavior toward my country. I must be able to show people Tunisia is sovereign independent state which powers having capability of supplying arms regard as worthy of being helped in Tunisia’s own right”.

4. He went on: “I thank Department for information US studying problem but time is pressing upon me. Department should avoid getting bogged down in discussions with Quai d’Orsay whose only aim will be to gain time to propagate false story French forces are winning in Algeria. Arguments between Department and Quai d’Orsay will not help us. Tunisian people have recently noted that US mounted with great speed airlift of arms to Jordan (he mentioned this twice), which is a country lacking courage to say, as I have done that it is on side of US”.

5. He continued: “France is in state of crisis and is driven by complexes. There is desire to kill, crush, stifle. French find it impossible act with good faith in their dealings with Maghreb where manifestations of France’s psychological turmoil are destroying what France might well preserve. Only your country, by living up to its responsibilities and by being true to its ideals, can save situation: But it must not delay”.

6. Thinking of recording machine waiting in next room, I directed his particular attention to paragraph 5 Depreftel adding thought that references to “elsewhere” created additional difficulties in dealing with US public opinion. Bourguiba took the point and remarked “I am glad you got to me before my speech. I will now speak with more serenity (sérénité). I hope to have Department’s decision very soon”.

7. Miscellaneous points:

a. Bourguiba very pleased Secretary [Ambassador?] received Mongi Slim September 11.³ He said he had just decided Ladgham would head Tunisian UNGA delegation “since he knows your country and deserves some rest. I hope very much Mr. Dulles will have time to see him to discuss our common problems (Embtel 158).”⁴ I replied along lines Depcirtel 191.⁵

b. Ladgham promised provide information requested paragraph 6 Depreftel. He said Belgian Ambassador had offered supply “NATO-type rifles” but that later, “obviously under French pressure”, had withdrawn offer. He said quantity rifles needed together with ammo is 5,000. He said this not excessive figure taking into account needs of young men recently called to military service; “actually”, he said, “we have about 6,000 men in barracks”.

c. Re Italy Ladgham said inquiries for pistols and submachine-guns had been made through Italian Ambassador who at first said Italian firms would be glad send representative here take orders but later made excuses indicating Italy, “again under French pressure” unwilling supply.

d. Bourguiba himself brought up question arms given GOT leaking to Algeria. He said this could not happen because GOT keeps careful records arms equipment and holds each soldier fully responsible for arms issued. I said: “can you give a categoric assurance that arms given GOT would [not?] go to Algerians?” He replied, “I can and do”.

e. Bourguiba and others deeply incensed by “false and ever-changing” communiqués issued from Algeria. They assert facts exactly as presented Tunisian communiqués (Embtel 175,⁶ 159,⁷ 144⁸) re border incidents and names kidnapped Tunisians fully known. It was evident they have no faith in sagacity, good-will or humanity French military Algeria who, Ladgham asserted, “refuse even to return Tunisian bodies because we would see how cruelly they were killed”.

8. Comment: Deptel 140 arrived just in time. It should have effect somewhat tempering Bourguiba’s speech, but I suspect from Bourguiba’s mood of anger and frustration, speech will still be fairly rough. He will expect us to follow up on third sentence paragraph 2 and will, being Bourguiba, set great store by principle underlying decision (see paragraph 3 above and paragraph 5 Embtel 148).⁹

9. Comment continued: From start Bourguiba’s concept has been “to win with the west”; this has brought him few friends in Arab and Communist-dominated world. A phase of problem perhaps more important than arms or no arms is possibility of setting up Tunisia as a martyr which neutralist and anti-western world can propagandize as proof positive of what happens to friends of west at hands of US when conflicting interests are involved.

Jones

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 651.72/9–1257. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris and Rabat.
2. Supra.
3. Slim informed Ambassador Lodge at the United Nations on September 11 that Tunisia was considering bringing a complaint against France in the Security Council due to further acts of violence on September 7. (Memorandum from Rountree to Dulles, September 13; Department of State, Central Files, 611.72/9–1357)
4. Telegram 158, September 6, reported Mokkadem’s hopes that Dulles would be able to see him during the General Assembly session in New York. (Ibid., 320/9–657)
5. Circular telegram 191, August 31, advised the addressees of the Secretary’s availability during and following the General Assembly meeting. (Ibid., 320/8–3157)
6. Telegram 175, September 11, referred to the government’s communiqué regarding its protest to France of border incidents. (Ibid., 651.72/9–1157)
7. Telegram 159, September 7, dealt with press accounts of the government communiqué protesting the French military intrusion on that date. (Ibid., 651.72/9–757)
8. Telegram 144, September 3, referred to Ladgham’s press conference of the previous day on the Haidra incident. (Ibid., 651.72/9–357)
9. Document 256.