Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

256. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, September 4, 1957—5 p.m.

148. 1. Foreign Secretary Mokaddem sent for me urgently this morning. When I arrived he said he had just spoken on phone with President Bourguiba in Switzerland and that communication he was about to make should be considered as coming directly from Bourguiba who had specifically charged him to see me without delay.

2. Mokaddem said incident near Haidra (Embassy telegram 144)² where French troops crossed into Tunisia and attacked small unit Tunisian army threw limelight on GOT’s imperative necessity find arms equipment Tunisian army to (a) preserve internal order and (b) guard frontier. Tunisian defense near Haidra stopped when 30–40 rounds small arms ammunition carried by each man exhausted. This was all they had; similar situation prevails throughout Tunisian armed forces which for this reason cannot carry out their mission. “We have” he said, “absolute and immediate need for small arms and ammunition to use in legitimate self-defense. President Bourguiba has instructed me advise your government, through you, of situation and to request your urgent assistance.”

3. Mokaddem said it logical for GOT look to France for arms aid, but it had waited and waited without results. GOT now despaired French aid being forthcoming particularly in light events September 1 when French forces from Algeria acted against uniformed Tunisians under “specious and piratical doctrine of hot pursuit.” Not only did France refuse GOT arms, always linking them to Algeria, when GOT attempted buy small arms and ammunition in Italy and Belgium, GOF let governments these two countries know that France considered supply of arms to Tunisian forces as its province and that sales to GOT by Italian and Belgian firms would be considered “unfriendly” to France. Mokaddem said at time visit Richards mission GOT gained impression US not inclined help GOT’s internal security forces, even to extent of non-lethal equipment, out of deference France.

4. Mokaddem said he hoped US-Tunisian understanding so close I would not take it as attempt at blackmail when he said that Tunisian needs so great that if Tunisia, which has steadfastly rejected idea seeking arms from satellite countries, cannot get arms from France or from Western suppliers, it may be forced to unpleasant necessity of going “elsewhere.”

5. I referred to internal security survey requested by GOT and approved by ICA (Embassy despatch 514 of June 14³ and Icato 39 August 28)⁴ and said I hoped survey team would arrive soon, since report by its experts would be of assistance to GOT in establishing rationally its real security needs. He said he was glad to hear survey about begin, but GOT has practical and immediate need for small arms and small army weapons to maintain internal order and guard those border areas of Tunisia from which French forces have withdrawn recently with unforeseen speed. He said, “what President Bourguiba would value most highly is early US agreement in principle to assist GOT with its internal security needs and specifically its needs for small arms and small arms ammunition. This, in essence, is request President Bourguiba desires to put to Washington.”

6. I undertook to communicate Bourguiba’s message but counseled against great expectations.

7. Comment: By lying low and avoiding subject, Embassy has tried hard with some success to delay inevitable day when question now posed by Bourguiba would be brought up formally. For weeks and months Embassy has been reporting consistently frustrated hopes of French Embassy here that Paris would heed its recommendations provide equipment for even one battalion of Tunisian army which, although it has men in uniform, has little in way of weapons for them (Embassy telegram 132⁵ and previous). Embassy has reported also confirmation GOF using its influence persuade manufacturing countries not sell arms GOT. In effect, from point of view GOT, this is another case of French granting “independence minus.” For its internal security and as appurtenance of sovereignty, GOT has small army (about 4,000) which GOF for French reasons is preventing from securing small arms. Even before this approach we have known GOT resentment and anger at this treatment has been growing steadily. It is Bourguiba who, almost alone, has remained optimistic France would supply equipment. From what Mokaddem said this morning it appears that Bourguiba’s hopeful attitude has now altered.

8. Comment continued: As has so frequently been demonstrated, nightmare of GOT is to be “left alone with France”. Our economic aid program has value far beyond money involved in that it demonstrates US considers Tunisia independent sovereign state deserving US economic aid in its own right, i.e. US does not regard Tunisia as economic vassal of France. Worth special attention (paragraph 5 above) are words “agree in principle to assist GOT with its internal security needs”. This sounds like Bourguiba himself. Always seeking evidence that his country is regarded by great powers as truly independent and sovereign, Bourguiba has thus posed touchstone of US faith and esteem; of US willingness recognize merits of what he regards as clearly proven needs of solidly pro-West country for internal security equipment. On another plane of thought, Bourguiba probably feels that if US gives “agreement in principle” this will go far to relax attitude those Paris so opposed to giving Tunisian armed forces anything.

9. Comment continued: Happy partial solution problem from viewpoint US would, of course, be for GOF to do as French Embassy here has forcefully recommended—supply arms to Tunisian army without delay. Army Fortnight has focused attention on problem and this would be gesture of faith which Bourguiba and GOT would deeply appreciate and which would gain for France considerable kudos. If this is politically impossible, next best step would be for GOF quietly to advise Belgium and Italy that it would not object to sales GOT, thus ending informal blockade. Either course of action, however, does not avoid question of principle proposed by Bourguiba to US. In taking our decision, following, among other factors, should be weighed:

(a) Bourguiba’s consistently pro-West policy and wholehearted endorsement of ME doctrine;

(b) Bourguiba’s sharp reaction in Nabeul speech to refusal Richards mission supply army with trucks (Department will recall this speech evoked enough popular response along lines of big-fellow-vs-little-fellow to show what could happen here if Bourguiba deviated from his present pro-West line.);

(c) Fact arms and equipment are needed for Tunisian internal security;

(d) Tunisian army needs so desperate that in Embassy’s judgment most unlikely arms supplied to GOT would disappear into Algeria;

(e) Bourguiba has present and growing domestic problem on his hands in having soldiers without arms and ammo and having no prospects for obtaining his requirements except from US or curtain countries (see paragraph 4 above).

10. Comment continued: I suggest reply to GOT making following points should be considered:

(a) US recognizes that Tunisia, as sovereign independent state, possesses obligations to preserve internal security and right of self defense.

(b) US does not consider France possesses, either formally or informally, exclusive rights with regard to supply of arms to Tunisia although there are military virtues to standardization of arms, equipment and training.

(c) Internal security survey team, which should arrive shortly at request of GOT, is evidence that US has already taken note of internal security problem in Tunisia and agrees in principle to Tunisia’s eligibility for American internal security equipment and arms, either by sale, loan or grant, when need therefor for internal security purposes has been clearly established. In view of its many commitments elsewhere, US prefers that, as in case of its economic aid, any US assistance to Tunisia in security field will supplement, but not supplant, that received from other sources.

11. Comment continued: Reply of this kind, accompanied by speedup of arrival of internal security survey team would go far, I think, to meet present situation and would help resolve it, particularly if American Embassy Paris informs GOF in advance of our decision with explanation that we have sedulously held back (and indeed thereby have lost some ground) until last moment in hope French would set up Tunisia internal security forces as going concerns. Paris might add that if GOT forced go to curtain countries, even for small quantity arms, this act could well start process eventually disastrous to French and Western interest in all North Africa.

Jones

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 651.72/9–457. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris, Rome, Brussels, and London.
2. Telegram 144, September 3, gave the details of the border incident from the Tunisian perspective. The clash, which left four Tunisians dead and two others missing and presumed dead, did not involve, Mokaddem emphasized, Algerian insurgents, and thus the French justification of “hot pursuit” did not apply. (Ibid., 651.72/9–357) The French note to the Tunisian Government, however, on this matter insisted that the violence stemmed from an attack by Algerian rebels who retreated across the border to Tunisia. A summary of the note is attached to a memorandum from Elbrick to Dulles, September 12. (Ibid., 033.5111/9–1257)
3. Despatch 514 estimated the threat to Tunisia, the Tunisian capability to cope with the threat, the need for U.S. assistance, operational guidelines, and courses of action required to satisfy Tunisia’s needs; and included the list of items the Tunisians had concluded they needed. (Ibid., 772.5/6–1457)
4. Not printed.
5. Telegram 132, August 27, reported that Gorse informed the Embassy that Bourguiba’s recent comments on Algeria had not improved the likelihood that France would provide him with additional arms. (Department of State, Central Files, 651.72/8–2757)