257. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia1

140. FYI Department giving urgent attention present Tunisian situation in light considerations set forth Tunis’ 1482 and 165.3 As Emb will recognize, Tunisia’s desire for US assistance in obtaining arms poses far-reaching problems for us which necessitate our assuring we proceed in manner which best accords our interests in both North Africa and France. We obviously prefer that any supply of arms should come from France or other Western country rather than US. While matter receives our consideration we wish make every [Page 684] effort prevent situation from deteriorating further. We are particularly concerned as to what Bourguiba may say in speech tomorrow night and believe it matter of utmost importance you endeavor talk to him beforehand along following lines. End FYI.

1.
Department deeply concerned deterioration Franco-Tunisian relations with all that is implied for our Tunisian friends and further instability in vital North African region.
2.
We recognize Tunisia’s concern re safeguarding its sovereignty. We believe we have since Tunisian independence given evidence of our concern that Tunisia emerge as strong and stable state. Toward this end we have furnished considerable economic assistance and have recently agreed to survey Tunisia’s internal security requirements.
3.
We are giving most urgent attention present situation including Foreign Minister’s desire for US assistance in obtaining arms. To our mind problem is to find solution which will best assure Tunisia’s sovereign rights and responsibilities and contribute to area stability. We hope instruct you discuss this matter further with Bourguiba in very near future. We intend similarly discuss matter with French, indicating our grave concern at present situation.
4.
If US is to be helpful in this situation it is of greatest importance that every effort be made prevent further deterioration in situation while we are studying matter. As indicated above we will endeavor expedite consideration just as much as possible, but meanwhile we hope Bourguiba will make every effort encourage Tunisian Government and people exercise all possible restraint. We intend speak to French in similar sense.
5.
We need hardly add that we hope Bourguiba meanwhile will ponder carefully his remarks re possibility obtaining arms “elsewhere” if not available West. Even talk of this kind if publicly known can encourage Soviet interventions to detriment area stability and best interests Tunisia for which we entertain deepest solicitude.
6.
We would appreciate receiving from Bourguiba further facts on this matter. While we are aware of previous explanation made by members GOT of problems encountered in effort equip Tunisian Army, it would be helpful if GOT could tell us as precisely as possible what equipment has been requested from France, what commitments or schedule of delivery if any France had agreed to, and what equipment France has delivered or withheld. Also what requests have been made in Belgium, Italy, or other Western countries and through what channels.
Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 651.72/9–957. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Paris and Rabat. Drafted and approved by Palmer and cleared in draft with G, EUR, and RA.
  2. Supra.
  3. Dated September 9; it reads in part as follows:

    “Deterioration Tunisian pro-West orientation because of what Tunisians regard as Western arms blockade so rapid and marked that I no longer believe reply suggested paragraph 10 Embtel 148 would cover situation unless closely followed by delivery some US equipment.”

    Jones argued that if Bourguiba could announce on September 12, when he was to resume his weekly speeches to the nation, that the United States was prepared to supply Tunisia with internal security equipment including arms, it “would be impressive vindication of wisdom his pro-Western, pro-US policy.” (Department of State, Central Files, 651.72/9–957)