Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

252. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Under Secretary of State (Herter)¹

Washington, May 29, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Your Appointment with Tunisian Ambassador Mongi Slim on May 29 at 4:15 p.m.²

Discussion:

The Tunisian Ambassador wishes to discuss with you the situation created by the suspension of French aid to Tunisia on May 20 and by the subsequent reaction of Prime Minister Bourguiba who has in effect called into question the entire range of economic relations between the two countries by announcing that the effect of the Franco-Tunisian Conventions of 1955 has been nullified by the French action.

We do not know how long French suspension of aid will continue, since Bourguiba has said that he will never change his attitude on the Algerian question, and probably will feel unable to discontinue assistance to the Algerians, which is the primary reason for the suspension. Nor do we know how far Bourguiba will go in breaking the economic and financial ties of Tunisia with France and the franc zone. It seems clear, however, that the structure of economic relations between the two countries has been seriously shaken, and the long-range prospects for their collaboration do not appear favorable at this juncture.

The Franco-Tunisian rift obviously poses a most difficult problem for the United States. Even if we deemed it politically desirable, our present budgetary limitations would not permit us to supply more than a fraction of the past French contribution, which has run to about $45 million a year. For Fiscal Year 1957 we are supplying $5 million in economic aid funds plus $3 million from Middle East funds. Proposed programs for 1958 would involve $5 million from the special economic assistance funds plus an undetermined amount, originally planned at $5 million, from the development loan fund.

This is obviously insufficient to enable us to be of much help if a real emergency develops. Thus far the Tunisians have requested only that we authorize temporary use of counterpart funds generated by the 1957 program to meet current obligations under their equipment budget and it appears likely that this can be done. It seems likely, however, that other requests will develop if the present rift continues.

Our reaction to such requests will probably have an important effect on the future course of our relations with Tunisia, as well as with France, and will be carefully watched also by the Moroccans, where the situation of the bases would make undue reticence on our part in the face of any Moroccan requests even more undesirable.

It is therefore evident that for the moment we have every interest in bringing about a Franco-Tunisian rapprochement, even though we may recognize that any modus vivendi may not prove permanent.

Recommendations:

It is therefore recommended that you make the following points to the Tunisian Ambassador:

1. The U.S. was, of course, unaware of any French plan to suspend aid to Tunisia and, in view of our own heavy commitments and our desire to see the responsibility for such aid shared by other friendly nations, we have based our plans on continuation of French aid.

2. These plans are reflected in budgetary provisions which cannot easily be revised, and quite apart from our desire for friendly relations between France and Tunisia, we feel that a sudden rupture of their long-standing economic relations would pose a most serious problem for Tunisia’s stability and the welfare of her people.

3. We therefore cannot but regret both the French decision and the Tunisian response in calling into question the whole range of economic matters embodied in the 1955 Conventions. While understanding the reasons for the Tunisian reaction, we hope that the Tunisian Government does not intend to close the door on future Franco-Tunisian collaboration and will, on its part, refrain from formal abrogation of the 1955 Conventions. (In this connection it may be helpful to remember that Ambassador Slim is proud of his role as architect and negotiator of these Conventions.)

4. We do not condone the French decision and hope that France will reconsider it and resume its aid under conditions consonant with Tunisian sovereignty and dignity. We have already made this view clear to the French. In this connection, we were gratified by reports of the conciliatory remarks made by Mr. Bourguiba to the Constituent Assembly in Tunis on May 27 and hope these will prove helpful. We believe it to be of the greatest importance that discretion and moderation be exercised by all concerned in the present difficulty. We are confident that the Tunisian Government will share this view.

5. We will of course give sympathetic consideration to Tunisia’s situation but hope that Tunisia will understand our present limitations, which reflect our own global situation rather than deference to French sentiment. France is of course our ally and friend, but this in no way diminishes our friendship for Tunisia nor our interest in her independence and stability.

6. We continue to be grateful for Tunisia’s support of U.S. policies and we were also interested by Mr. Bourguiba’s announcement that Tunisia, Libya and Morocco were trying to persuade Algerian leaders to accept free elections in Algeria. We hope he will continue conciliatory efforts of this kind but believe that in order to be most effective this is also a matter calling for great discretion.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.72/5–2957. Secret. Drafted by Bovey and concurred in by EUR/VVE. U/MSA also concurred except that Robert G. Barnes, Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs, disputed the use of the word “sympathetic” in recommendation 5.
2. The memorandum of conversation by Bovey is not printed. (Ibid., 851.10/5–2957)