Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

251. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Consulate at Rabat¹

Tunis, May 7, 1957—3 p.m.

145. Rabat for Richards. I spent hour and half this morning alone with Deputy Prime Minister Ladgham since Bourguiba still absent in south. Following emerged:

1. Position GOT re $3 million aid offer is as expressed by Knani² except GOT now agrees use goods generate counterpart for economic development portion ($1.5 million). Ladgham said repeatedly GOT accepted $3 million but decision seek half in internal security equipment and half in economic assistance firm one taken by ministers following Bourguiba dinner for Richards and subsequently re-affirmed several times by Bourguiba. Ladgham said important GOT to present gift internal security equipment to Tunisian people as joint US-Tunisian effort reinforce Tunisian security: Reason for joint US-Tunisian activity in economic field self-evident. Ladgham said GOT felt that at this juncture equal division for two purposes reasonable and that “the two are inseparable”. I told him he should not assume any part of $3 million available for Tunisia after Richards mission returns Washington. He accepted this fact but said, if Richards funds could not be equally divided in accordance cabinet decision, on political grounds GOT would prefer to forego entire grant thus preserving Tunisia immune from any shadow of doubt which might be cast in Tunisia or in Arab world upon integrity and sincerity of Tunisia’s wholehearted acceptance Eisenhower Doctrine. GOT would look forward to continued close collaboration with USOM on economic assistance, but having weighed political impact advantages and disadvantages of accepting less than equal division for two purposes, GOT resolved, most regretfully, to do without Richards assistance if necessary.

2. Ladgham mentioned urgent GOT need for patrol craft for immigration, fisheries and customs controls; he said “We will have to find money to buy these. They will be used only by Ministry of National Economy. It seems to me that such small craft clearly fall within field internal security”.

3. Reversal Knani’s position re insistence on check for economic aid portion followed my rehearsing familiar arguments about necessity prevent inflation.

4. Ladgham said that whether or not US rules and requirements will permit Ambassador Richards to make $3 million available to GOT on fifty-fifty basis, which is only basis acceptable politically, GOT has already derived from Richards mission two major benefits which dwarf $3 million. First is Ambassador Richards’ assurance re extension benefits Eisenhower Doctrine to Tunisia against menace of international communism and second Ambassador Richards’ promise to bring to attention President Eisenhower Tunisian views re situation in Algeria which is “creating major opportunity for spreading germs of communism”.

5. Re “political grounds” (paragraph 1 above) I believe there is domestic political element. Ladgham told me in confidence that if GOT had known aid only $3 million, “we would have handled things very differently. We would not have called in all ministers thus raising their hopes and, instead, have worked with only a few. As it is, however, entire cabinet involved and it would be politically disadvantageous for ‘us’ to attempt to reverse or alter materially cabinet decision re fifty-fifty”. Presumably those Tunisian ministers who do not share Bourguiba’s enthusiasm for US took strong position after Richards mission left Bourguiba’s residence.

6. Embassy comment: … Talk this morning cordial without hint diminished friendship. We know strict rules under which Richards mission operating and would not suggest for one moment Communist threat here so severe (Communist candidates snowed under in May 5 municipal elections) that exception rules should be sought meet GOT position. We suggest, however, that Ambassador Richards might, if he considers action indicated, have another look at internal security equipment sought by GOT to determine whether, in light of satisfactory GOT political attitude described above, a sufficient number of items of non-objectionable character could be added to police and gendarmérie equipment already approved by Ambassador Richards to bring total up to neighborhood $1.5 million. Most important aid Morocco re security equipment be consistent with such aid GOT. Inhibiting factor while Ambassador Richards here was presumed adverse French reaction US aid in security field. This probably element in Department ruling against patrol craft (Deptel 470).³ However, quick and frank check with French, whose citizens Tunisians protecting, might reveal less objection than anticipated to such items as small patrol craft, radio equipment, mine detectors, uniforms, et cetera.

Jones

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–757. Secret; Niact. Also sent to Paris and repeated to the Department. The source text is the copy sent to Washington.
2. Abdesselam Knani, Director of Planning.
3. Telegram 470, May 1, conveyed Department policy not to provide military items to Tunisia, especially patrol boats. (Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–157)